The Nour Party: Weathering the Political Storm in Post-Revolutionary Egypt

Abstract

This article addresses the role of the Salafi Nour party in the current Egyptian political arena, examining its ability to survive in a tumultuous environment by investigating three junctures in the revolutionary and post-revolutionary period: the January 2011 demonstrations, the ouster of President Muhammad Morsi, and the 2015 parliamentary elections. The investigation relied on two theoretical approaches. The first, framing theory, enabled us to investigate the party’s frames and how these were modified in response to unfolding events. Second, because frame ideas frequently are produced and modified through discourse, we employed discourse analysis to explore these issues. The combination of these approaches allowed us to examine the statements issued by party leaders on their Facebook pages and in their interviews with local newspapers. Based on our analyses, we make three claims: First, that the Nour party’s central frame contained two major components, nationalist and Islamist concerns, which were developed in order to expand party supporters. Second, the development of the party’s major ideas constituted a contested and shared process, with different leaders articulating diverse views. The ensuing disagreements contributed to the contraction of the party’s support base, as reflected in the 2015 parliamentary elections. Third, the party’s ideational trajectory reflects its pragmatism.

Key Words:

• Discourse
• Frame
• Islamist
• Muslim Brotherhood
• Nationalist
• Nour party
• Salafi

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank the organizers of the 2016 annual BRIMES conference for the opportunity to present an earlier version of this article at that conference.

Notes

¹ R. D. Benford & D.A. Snow (2000) Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment, Annual Review of Sociology, 26, pp. 611–639. Quoted phrase: p. 615.

² Ibid, p. 619.

³ Ibid, p. 622.

⁴ J. Zuo & R. D. Benford (1995) Mobilization Processes and the 1989 Chinese Democracy Movement, Sociological Quarterly, 36(1), pp. 131–156.

⁵ D. A. Snow & E. B. Rochford Jr, S. K. Worden & R. D. Benford (1986) Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization and Movement Participation, American Sociological Review, 51(4), pp. 464–481.

⁶ Q. Wiktorowicz, Introduction: Islamic Activism and Social movement Theory, in Q. Wiktorowicz (ed.) (2004) Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press), p. 15.

⁷ D. A. Snow & R. D. Benford (n.d.) Clarifying the Relationship between Framing and Ideology in the Study of Social Movements. Available at: https://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~oliver/PROTESTS/ArticleCopies/SnowBenfordResponse.pdf, accessed February 3, 2017.

⁸ T. Van Dijk (2006) Ideology and Discourse Analysis, Journal of Political Ideologies, 11(2), p. 115.

⁹ All three opposition newspapers are published in Cairo. We consulted both the online versions and the printed copies.

¹⁰ For the observation that social movements commonly engage in this process, see Benford and Snow, Framing, pp. 614, 625–627.

¹¹ We are indebted to Nicholas Gjorvad and the anonymous peer reviewer for Middle East Critique for calling our attention to the importance of highlighting Salafi pragmatism.

¹² B. O. Utvik (2014) The Ikhwanization of the Salafis: Piety in the Politics of Egypt and Kuwait, Middle East Critique, 23(1), p. 13; J. Brown (2011) Salafis and Sufis in Egypt, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Available at https://carnegieendowment.org, accessed January 30, 2016.

¹³ N. Ibrahim (n.d.) Al-Salafyun al-masryun qabil wa-ba‘id thawrat 25 yanayir [Egyptian Salafis Before and after the January 25 Revolution], Unpublished paper, pp. 2–3.

¹⁴ A. El-Sherif (2015) Egypt’s Salafists at a Crossroads, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Available at https://carnegieendowment.org, accessed October 28, 2015.

¹⁵ Utvik, Ikhwanization, p. 10.

¹⁶ Ibid, pp. 10–11; quote, p. 11.

¹⁷ El-Sherif, Egypt’s Salafists. Salafiyya al-‘ilmiyya translates into Scholastic Salafism. Madkhaliyya Salafism is named after its Saudi teacher, Shaykh Rabi‘ al-Madkhali. While the Madkhaliyya and Traditional Salafism schools are part of the Scholastic Salafist School, we have kept this distinction between the three schools because the Salafi shaykhs do so themselves.

¹⁸ Ibid. Haraki Salafi translates into Active Salafism.

¹⁹ Islam Maghribi (2012) Mawaqif wa-tahawalat shuykh al-salafiyin athna’ wa-ba‘id al-thawra [Position of the Salafi Shaykhs Before and After the Revolution], December 1, 2012. Available at https://www.islammaghribi.com, accessed September 30, 2015.

²⁰ A. B. Galal (2014) Al-Muttahawalun: al-da‘wa al-salafiyyia tatanazil ‘an ‘aqa’idha [The Inconsistent: The Salafi Call gives up its Beliefs], December 17, 2014. Available at https://elbadil.com, accessed November 3, 2015.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Islam Maghribi, Position of the Salafi.

²³ Galal, The Inconsistent.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Brown, Salafis.

²⁶ See Nour party 2011 electoral party platform, available at: https://egyptianpartiesprograms.wordpress.com, accessed March 1, 2016. (The rest of this paragraph and the next are based on this document.).

²⁷ Brown, Salafis.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ S. Lacroix (2012) Sheikhs and Politicians: Inside the New Egyptian Salafism, Brookings Doha Center. Available at https://www.brookings.edu/, accessed September 25, 2013.

³⁰ Authors’ interview with Fatima, a lady’s hairdresser, May 27, 2016, Cairo.

³¹ Available at https://www.facebook.com/Salafiacall/posts/399733820148246:0; accessed June 30, 2017.

³² Available at https://www.anasalafy.com/play.php?catsmktba=53814; accessed June 30, 2017.

³³ Al-Yaum al-Sabi‘, Al-Nour Reveals the Mistakes.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Available at https://www.facebook.com/Salafiacall/posts/392274200894208:0, accessed November 5, 2015.

³⁶ Available at https://www.facebook.com/AlnourPartyOfficialPage/posts/393080594130208:0, accessed November 5, 2015.

³⁷ Available at https://www.facebook.com/Salafiacall/391800574274904:0, accessed November 5, 2015.

³⁸ Available at https://www.facebook.com/Salafiacall/posts/392277540893874:0; accessed November 5, 2015.

³⁹ Available at https://www.facebook.com/Salafiacall/posts/392284307559864:0, accessed November 5, 2015.

⁴⁰ Available at https://www.facebook.com/AlnourPArtyOfficialPage/posts/399400673498200:0, accessed November 5, 2015.

⁴¹ Available at https://www.facebook.com/Salafiacall/posts/394959770625651:0, accessed November 5, 2015.

⁴² Al-Yaum al-Sabi‘ (2013), Al-Nur Yakshif khataya al-Ikhwan khilal fatrat hukm mursi, [Al-Nour Reveals the Mistakes of the Ikhwan during Morsi’s Rule], July 20, 2013. Available at https://www.youm7.com/, accessed October 21, 2015.

⁴³ Available at https://www.facebook.com/Salafiacall/posts/396670640454564:0; accessed November 5, 2015.

⁴⁴ Al-Yaum al-Sabi‘, Nour Reveals the Mistakes.

⁴⁵ This figure was specified by the government-appointed committee headed by Judge Fuad ‘Abdel-Mun‘im Riyad. See: Ahram Online (2014) Dispersal of pro-Morsi sit-ins left 703 dead: Fact-finding committee, November 26, 2014. Available at https://english.ahram.org.eg/, accessed June 30, 2017.

⁴⁶ Human Rights Watch (2014) All According to Plan: The Rab’a Massacre and Mass Killings of Protestors in Egypt, August 12, 2014. Available at https://www.hrw.org/, accessed June 30, 2017.

⁴⁷ On October 9, 2011, peaceful Coptic Christians protesting against the demolition of a church in Aswan province were attacked by military forces in front of the Maspero television building in downtown Cairo resulting in roughly 24 deaths. See: Human Rights Watch (2011) Egypt: Don’t Cover Up Military Killing of Copt Protestors, October 25, 2011. Available at https://www.hrw.org/, accessed June 30, 2017.

⁴⁸ Available at https://www.anasalafy.com/play.php?catsmktba=42410, accessed November 5, 2015.

⁴⁹ Available at https://www.anasalafy.com/play.php?catsmktba=42436, accessed December 2, 2015.

⁵⁰ Nafithat Masr (2014) Burhami: lawla Musharakatna fi 3 yulyu li-kuna fi al-sujun alan [Borhami: If not for our Participation in 3 July (events), we would be in Prison now] April 26, 2014. Available at https://egyptwindow.net/ar, accessed 25 October 2015.

⁵¹ K. Kamal & A. Arafa (2015) Ma‘raka salafiyya:-salafiyya ‘ala al-musharaka fi al-intakhabat [Salafiyya - Salafiyya Battle about Participating in the Elections] Al-Yaum al-Sabi‘ [Cairo], September 25, 2015.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ M. Isma‘il & A. Arafa (2015) Al-nur yunshir barnamjuh al-intikhabi khaliya min al-shari‘a [Al-Nour Publishes an Electoral Program that is Devoid of Shari‘a] Al-Yaum al-Sabi‘ [Cairo] October 1, 2015.

⁵⁴ Egypt Independent (2015) Nour Party Reveals Electoral Platform, October 3, 2015. Available at https://www.egyptindependent.com/, accessed October 28, 2015.

⁵⁵ Rasad (2015) Mufaja’a…na’ib ra’is hizb al-nur: barnamij al-hiz khali min al-shari‘a [Surprise…Deputy Chair of the Nour Party: the Party’s Platform is Devoid of the Shari‘a] April 27, 2015. Available at https://rassd.com/, accessed August 31, 2016.

⁵⁶ Kamal & Arafa, Salafiyya – Salafiyya.

⁵⁷ M. Tabakh (2015) Qiyadi bi-al-da‘wa al-salafiyyia: tarshih al-mar’ah ‘ala qawa’imna yuhid min al-mutabarajat bi-al-barlaman [A Leader in the Salafi Call: The Nomination of Women on our Lists will Limit the Number of Loose Women in Parliament] Al-Bawaba News, January 31, 2015. Available at https://www.albawabhnews.com/, accessed November 3, 2015.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ O. Al-Mahdi (2015) al-nur yuqarar al-istimrar fi al-intikhabat [The Nour Decides to Continue in the Elections] Al-Masry al-Yaum, October 24, 2015.

⁶⁰ M. Antar (2015) Makhyun: al-barlaman al-muqbil lan yumathil al-sha‘ab al-masri wa-lan yuhaqiq tumuhatuh [Makhyun: The Prospective Parliament will not Represent the Egyptian Nation and will not Realize its Ambitions] Al-Shuruq, October 30, 2015, p. 4.

⁶¹ T. Salah & S. Ali (2015) Burhami yatahim al-amin wa-al-ikhwan bi-al-tasabib fi khusarat al-nur [Borhami Accuses the Security Services and the Muslim Brotherhood for the Nour’s Losses] Al-Masry al-Yaum, October 25, 2015.

⁶² A. Kamal (2015) Al-nur yafatah al-nar ‘ala al-jami‘: al-dawla wa-al-amin wa-al-qudah wara’ khusaratna [Nour opens Fire on Everyone: State, and Security Services and Judiciary caused our Defeat] Al-Shuruq, October 24, 2015.

⁶³ N. Ibrahim (2015) Al-asbab al-sab‘a li-hazimat hizb al-nur [Seven Reasons for the Defeat of the Nour Party] Al-Shuruq, October 24, 2015.

⁶⁴ S. Ali (2015) Al-nur: khudna al-intikhabat li-himayat al-balad min al-harb al-ahliyya [Al-Nour: We Competed in the Elections to Protect the Country from Civil War] Al-Masry al-Yaum, October 26, 2015.

⁶⁵ M. Abd Al-Azim (2015) Hizb al-nur fi mahab al-fatawi al-mutadarba wa-tanaqid al-mawawif al-shar‘iyya… [The Nour Party in the midst of Contradictory Fatawas and Opposing Positions based on Islamic Law…] Parlamany, October 11, 2015. Available at https://www.parlmany.com/, accessed October 3, 2015.

⁶⁶ H. Ashur (2015) Murashah al-nur fi qina yastaqil wa-ya‘tarif: a‘da’ al-hizb lam yukhruju lil-taswit [The Nour Candidate in Qina Resigns and Admits: the Members of the Party did not Come Out to Vote] Al-Shuruq, October 23, 2015.

⁶⁷ Snow & Benford, Framing, p. 615.

⁶⁸ R. Mason (2016) Egypt’s Future: Status Quo, Incremental Growth or Regional Leadership? Middle East Policy, 23(2), p. 83.