Europe, the EU and foreign affairs

Abstract

‘Sarah Raine’s deeply informed, crisply written and authoritatively argued book will, I predict, swiftly become the indispensable analysis of Europe’s prospects as a strategic actor. The fact that she is clear-eyed (and dryly humorous) about the flaws and failures of European foreign and security policy makes her take on its strengths and possibilities all the more compelling.’

Dr. Constanze Stelzenmüller, Robert Bosch Senior Fellow, Center on the United States and Europe

‘Love it or loath it, there will be no European Army any time soon: this is one of the conclusions of this well thought-out assessment. It factors in the transformational impact of Europe’s internal travails against a rapidly deteriorating and unforgiving strategic backdrop. The book is required reading for anyone who wants to form an educated opinion on Europe’s ability or inability to face these challenges in terms of policies, capabilities, money and organisation.’

François Heisbourg, IISS Senior Adviser for Europe; former commission member of France’s White Paper on Defence and National Security

‘The book brilliantly takes the reader through the strategic challenges facing Europe and makes the unfashionable argument that Europe has scored some notable successes as well as the well-known disappointments. Europe must act quicker, be more joined up and solve the tension between national policies and collective outreach. Sarah Raine makes a cautiously optimistic case that it may indeed do so.’

Peter Round, former capabilities director, European Defence Agency

Europe has suffered a decade of crises, with sovereign-debt troubles leading to austerity policies that exacerbated divisions inside member states and between them. Thereafter the Union was confronted with the challenges posed by a revanchist Russia in Ukraine and by a surge in migration from the Middle East and other conflict zones. The June 2016 United Kingdom vote to leave the Union threatened further damage to an institution that acknowledges it has failed to punch its weight in the spheres of foreign, defence and security policy. While that is a chronic shortcoming, its impact is becoming more acute as economic power moves east and Europe can no longer count on the steadfast support and leadership of the United States. The costs of Europe’s failure to achieve strategic coherence and effect are steadily rising.

This Adelphi book addresses the consequences of Europe’s multiple crises for its standing as a strategic actor, acknowledging its unique character and capabilities. It argues that strategic thought and action are belatedly being informed by the deteriorating security environment, and that nascent initiatives have the potential to effect a step-change. There are grounds for cautious optimism, visible in the success of stabilisation and counter-piracy operations as well as coordinated diplomatic activity. Also, the continent’s leading powers are becoming more pragmatic about how cooperation is organised within and beyond the Union. These developments offer the possibility that Europe might meet its aspirations to be a strategic actor of consequence, despite a long-track record of disappointment and the still-considerable obstacles that lie in its path.

Notes

1 The definition and objectives of the CFSP can be found in Articles 24 and 21.2 of the TEU respectively.

2 See, for example, an interview with Angela Merkel, ‘Schwerwiegend und absolut nicht hinnehmbar’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 10 September 2017, https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/angela-merkel-scharfe-krtik-an-erdogan-im-f-a-s-interview-15191472.html.

3 Discussions with officials, various dates.

4 Italy also contributed to multilateral deployments, sending troops to the UN in Western Sahara, to the EU in CAR and to NATO in Tunisia. For more on this, see Amanda Lapo, ‘Italy: Renewed Focus on Overseas Deployments’, IISS Military Balance blog, 9 April 2018, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/military-balance/2018/04/italy-renewed-focus-overseas-deployments.

5 Florence Parly, Munich Security Conference, 16 February 2018, quoted in Judy Dempsey, ‘Waiting in Munich for European Defence’, Carnegie Strategic Europe blog, 16 February 2018, https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/75568.

6 Mogherini, announcing the EU– UN second Brussels Conference on ‘Supporting the Future of Syria and the Region’, 24–25 April 2018, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/39966/syria-eu-un-co-chair-second-brussels-conference-24-25-april_en.

7 David M. Herszenhorn, ‘Venezuela’s Chaos Exposes EU Disarray on Foreign Policy’, Politico, 4 February 2019, https://www.politico.eu/article/venezuela-president-inf-treaty-chaos-exposes-eu-disarray-on-foreign-policy-federica-mogherini/.

8 Emmanuel Macron, addressing a meeting of French ambassadors, 27 August 2018, quoted in ‘France Calls On EU To Not Rely On U.S. Defense, Reach Out To Russia’, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, https://www.rferl.org/a/france-says-eu-should-not-rely-us-military-defense-reach-out-russia/29456958.html.

9 EUGS, p. 46.

10 Unanimous support is currently required for action on ‘sensitive’ issues including the CFSP. Article 31.2 of the TEU lists four areas where QMV is permitted. Article 31.3 contains a bridging clause, as yet unused, that allows the European Council unanimously to decide to act on the basis of QMV in other areas, with the support of an absolute majority of MEPs. National parliaments would also have to be notified. An option for ‘constructive abstention’ under Article 31.1 has only been used once, by Cyprus in 2008 to permit the establishment of EULEX Kosovo. Modest provisions for QMV are provided for with regard to the financing of a start-up fund for military operations (Article 41.3), to decisions of the EDA (Article 45.2) or to PESCO (Article 46).

11 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: The Free Press, 1992), p. xi.

12 John Chipman, speaking at an IISS workshop in Berlin, 27 June 2018.

13 Crispian Balmer, ‘Italy Upset Over French Diplomatic Intervention in Libya’, Reuters, 24 July 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-italy-france-libya/italy-upset-over-french-diplomatic-intervention-in-libya-idUSKBN1A926W. For more on the dynamics with Italy and Haftar, see Mattia Toaldo, ‘Italy’s Dilemmas in Libya’, Aspenia Online, 19 September 2016, https://www.aspeniaonline.it/italys-dilemmas-in-libya/.

14 See, for example, ‘As Clashes Rage in Libya’s Tripoli, Italy Takes a Swipe at France’, France24, 4 September 2018, https://www.france24.com/en/20180904-libya-elections-italy-france-salvini-macron-sarkozy-diplomacy.

15 Gideon Rachman, ‘Middle-sized Powers must Unite to Preserve the World Order’, Financial Times, 28 May 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/546ca388-625d-11e8-90c2-9563a0613e56.

16 See, for example, the list of countries aligning themselves with EU sanctions on Belarus at https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/cfsp/133277.pdf.

17 See the map on the website of the Estonian European Council Presidency at https://sanctionsmap.eu/#/main.

18 Clara Portela, ‘The EU’s Sanctions Against Syria: Conflict Management by other Means’, Egmont Security Policy Brief, no. 38, September 2012, http://www.egmontinstitute.be/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/SPB38.pdf.

19 See, for example, Liu Jianxi, ‘Time to Lift EU’s Outdated Arms Embargo on China’, Global Times, 31 May 2017, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1049431.shtml.

20 Clara Portela, ‘Member States Resist-ance to EU Foreign Policy Sanctions’, European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 20, no. 2/1, p. 47, August 2015.

21 Robin Emmott, ‘Siemens’ Crimean Predicament Tests Limits of EU Sanctions’, Reuters, 12 July 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-siemens-eu-idUSKBN19X1QE.

22 Ross Denton, ‘Significant Changes to UK Sanctions Enforcement Come into Force’, Global Compliance News, 9 April 2017, https://globalcompliancenews.com/uk-sanctions-enforcement-20170409/.

23 Adam Smith et al., ‘2017 Year End Sanctions Update’, Gibson Dunn & Crutcher, 5 February 2018, https://www.gibsondunn.com/2017-year-end-sanctions-update/.

24 Nate Raymond, ‘BNP Paribas Sentenced in $8.9 Billion Accord over Sanctions Violations’, Reuters, 1 May 2015, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bnp-paribas-settlement-sentencing/bnp-paribas-sentenced-in-8-9-billion-accord-over-sanctions-violations-idUSKBN0NM41K20150501.

25 Smith et al., ‘2017 Year End Sanctions Update’.

26 Population Reference Bureau, ‘2017 World Population Data Sheet’, https://www.prb.org/2017-world-population-data-sheet/.

27 Peter Korzun, ‘Marshall Plan with Africa: New EU Foreign Policy Priority’, Strategic Culture Foundation Online Journal, 1 December 2017, https://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2017/12/01/marshall-plan-with-africa-new-eu-foreign-policy-priority.html.

28 Alex Duval Smith, ‘France’s Macron Outlines New Approach to African Policy’, BBC News, 28 November 2017, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-42151353.

29 Figures as of 9 June 2018. For more details on the EU Trust Fund for Africa, see https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/content/homepage_en.

30 Jacques Poos, quoted in Alan Riding, ‘Conflict in Yugoslavia: Europeans Send High-level Team’, New York Times, 29 June 1991, https://www.nytimes.com/1991/06/29/world/conflict-in-yugoslavia-europeans-send-high-level-team.html.

31 Ben Scott, Stefan Heumann and Phillipe Lorenz, Artificial Intelligence and Foreign Policy (Berlin: Stiftung Fur Neue Verantwortung, January 2018).

32 ‘Foreign Investment Screening and the China Factor’, Rasmussen Global memo, 16 November 2017, p. 1, available at https://rasmussenglobal.com/media/foreign-investment-screening-china-factor-memo.

33 ‘China Talks of Building a “Digital Silk Road”’, The Economist, 31 May 2018, https://www.economist.com/china/2018/05/31/china-talks-of-building-a-digital-silk-road.

34 For further discussion, and on the strategy in general, see ‘Made in China 2025’, MERICS Papers on China, no. 2, December 2016.

35 Ibid., p. 6.

36 Adam Segal, ‘Why Does Everyone Hate Made in China 2025?’, CFR blog, 28 March 2018, https://www.cfr.org/blog/why-does-everyone-hate-made-china-2025.

37 China’s ambitions are outlined in China’s 2017 New Generation AI Development Plan and Three Year Action Plan on this issue. See, for example, Elsa Kania, ‘China’s AI Agenda Advances’, Diplomat, 14 February 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/02/chinas-ai-agenda-advances/. For more on the European Commission AI strategy and its failure to match up to China, see Caroline Meinhardt et al., ‘Europe’s AI Strategy is No Match for China’s Global Dominance’, MERICS blog, 29 June 2018, https://www.merics.org/en/blog/europes-ai-strategy-no-match-chinas-drive-global-dominance.

38 Guy Chazan, ‘Germany Withdraws Approval for Chinese Takeover of Tech Group’, Financial Times, 24 October 2016, https://www.ft.com/content/f1b3e52e-99b0-11e6-8f9b-70e3cabccfae.

39 Shawn Donnan, ‘Obama Blocks Chinese Takeover of Tech Group’, Financial Times, 3 December 2016, https://www.ft.com/content/0c940900-b8e2-11e6-ba85-95d1533d9a62.

40 ‘Foreign Investment Screening and the China Factor’.

41 Gisela Grieger, ‘’EU Framework for FDI Screening’, European Parliament Research Service, January 2018, p.2, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/EPRS/EPRS-Briefing-614667-EU-framework-FDI-screening-FINAL.pdf.

42 See, for example, Theodore H. Moran, ‘CFIUS and National Security: Challenges for the US and Opportunities for the EU’, draft paper, Peterson Institute for International Economics, 21 February 2017, https://piie.com/commentary/speeches-papers/cfius-and-national-security-challenges-united-states-opportunities.

43 ‘Demistifying Chinese Investment in Australia’, KPMG/University of Sydney report, May 2017, https://home.kpmg.com/au/en/home/insights/2017/05/demystifying-chinese-investment-in-australia-may-2017.html.

44 See, for example, ‘France, Germany, Italy Urge Rethink of Foreign Investment in EU’, Reuters, 14 February 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-eu-trade-france/france-germany-italy-urge-rethink-of-foreign-investment-in-eu-idUKKBN15T1ND.

45 For further discussion, see Mathew P. Goodman and Ely Ratner, ‘A Better Way to Challenge China on Trade’, Foreign Affairs Snapshot, 22 March 2018, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-03-22/better-way-challenge-china-trade.