Optimising US regional footprints: Europe

Abstract

‘In this timely Adelphi book, Jonathan Stevenson reminds us of the size and complexity of the American global footprint, and how foreign-policy imperatives have tended to override pressures to cut back on the number of overseas bases. In today’s tense strategic environment, this will most likely remain the case.’

Sir Lawrence Freedman, Emeritus Professor of War Studies, King’s College London

‘Jonathan Stevenson offers an indispensable look at the United States’ overseas bases in 2022 and persuasively explains why they remain critical to American strategy today and for the foreseeable future.’

Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Senior Fellow and Director of the Defense Program at the Center for a New American Security

Overseas military bases have been the bedrock of the United States’ ability to project military power, exert political influence and deter potential adversaries since the Second World War. But fatigue with America’s ‘forever wars’, as well as more nuanced financial and strategic reasons, have inclined the public and policy community to favour reducing US global military activities and overseas presence.

In this Adelphi book, Jonathan Stevenson argues that this desire does not necessarily translate into sound strategy. Overseas bases are a key element of the reassurance required to resurrect and bolster America’s reputation among its allies and adversaries. Meanwhile, strategic imperatives and geopolitical realities impose restraints in every theatre. The fluidity prevailing in the Middle East and Indo-Pacific counsels maintaining forward-deployed forces there at roughly the current level. Russia’s confrontational posture towards NATO and invasion of Ukraine, as well as NATO’s short- and medium-term reliance on US capabilities, require the American presence in Europe to increase and expand eastward. The US should not commit itself to a foreign policy that is heavy on forward-deployed military power and light on diplomacy. But paradoxically, reducing forward military presence may not be consistent with a policy that is less focused on military power as a means of achieving stability and security.

Notes

1 See John R. Deni, Rotational Deployments vs. Forward Stationing: How Can the Army Achieve Assurance and Deterrence Efficiently and Effectively? (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2017).

2 US Department of Defense, Strengthening US Global Defense Posture, Report to Congress, September 2004, http://www.dmzhawaii.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/12/global_posture.pdf.

3 Deni, Rotational Deployments vs. Forward Stationing: How Can the Army Achieve Assurance and Deterrence Efficiently and Effectively?, pp. 6–8.

4 See Alexander R. Vershbow and Philip M. Breedlove, Permanent Deterrence: Enhancements to the US Military Presence in North Central Europe, Atlantic Council, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, February 2019, https://atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Permanent-Deterrence.pdf.

5 See Clint Reach et al., ‘Competing with Russia Militarily: Implications of Conventional and Nuclear Conflicts’, Perspectives, RAND Corporation, June 2021, https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE330.html.

6 See, for example, Scott Boston et al., ‘Assessing the Conventional Force Imbalance in Europe: Implications for Countering Russian Local Superiority’, Research Report, RAND Corporation, 2018, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR2400/RR2402/RAND_RR2402.pdf; Kris Osborn, ‘Russia vs. NATO: Who Would Win the Ultimate Showdown?’, National Interest, 16 October 2019, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/russia-vs-nato-who-would-win-ultimate-showdown-88221; and David A. Shlapak and Michael Johnson, ‘Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank: Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics’, Research Report, RAND Corporation, 2016, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1253.html. For a discerning assessment made since the Ukrainian– Russian war began, in light of Russia’s military performance, see Robert Dalsjö, Michael Jonsson and Johan Norberg, ‘A Brutal Examination: Russian Military Capability in Light of the Ukraine War’, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, vol. 64, no. 2, June–July 2022, pp. 7–30.

7 Shlapak and Johnson, ‘Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank: Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics’.

8 See Douglas Barrie et al., ‘Defending Europe: Scenario-based Capability Requirements for NATO’s European Members’, IISS Research Paper, 10 May 2019, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/research-paper/2019/05/defending-europe.

9 Ibid.

10 See Henry Boyd and Bastian Giegerich, ‘US Military Presence in Europe: Posturing for Global Success, Risking Regional Ties’, IISS Military Balance Blog, 13 August 2020, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/military-balance/2020/08/us-military-presence-in-europe. Some do not agree that a heavy permanent presence is necessary for deterrence. See Melanie W. Sisson, ‘It’s Time to Rethink NATO’s Deterrent Strategy’, War on the Rocks, 6 December 2019, https://warontherocks.com/2019/12/want-to-deter-russia-think-mobility-not-presence/.

11 See Bryan Frederick et al., Understanding the Deterrent Impact of US Overseas Forces (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2020), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR2500/RR2533/RAND_RR2533.pdf.

12 Igor Delanoe, ‘After the Crimean Crisis: Towards a Greater Russian Maritime Power in the Black Sea’, South East European and Black Sea Studies, vol. 14, no. 3, September 2013, p. 371.

13 Igor Delanoe, ‘Crimea, a Strategic Bastion on Russia’s Southern Flank’, Russian International Affairs Council, 18 December 2014, https://russiancouncil.ru/en/blogs/igor_delanoe-en/1588/.

14 See Dmitry Gorenburg, ‘Is a New Russian Black Sea Fleet Coming? Or Is It Already Here?’, War on the Rocks, 31 July 2018, https://warontherocks.com/2018/07/is-a-new-russian-black-sea-fleet-coming-or-is-it-here/.

15 See George Visan and Octavian Manea, ‘Crimea’s Transformation into an Access-denial Base’, Romania Energy Center, 14 July 2015, https://bsad.roec.biz/portfolio-item/crimeas-transformation-into-an-access-denial-base/.

16 ‘Russia to Deploy 10 Strategic Bombers to Crimea for Snap Drills’, Sputnik News, 18 March 2015, https://www.spacedaily.com/reports/Russia_to_Deploy_10_Strategic_Bombers_to_Crimea_for_Snap_Drills_999.html.

17 See ‘Here’s Where Russia Will Deploy Nuclear-capable Tu-22M3 Bombers in Crimea (IMINT)’, T-Intelligence, 27 March 2019, https://t-intell.com/2019/03/27/heres-where-russia-will-deploy-nuclear-capable-tu-22m3-bombers-in-crimea-imint/.

18 See Dave Johnson, ‘Russia’s Deceptive Nuclear Policy’, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, vol. 63, no. 3, June–July 2021, pp. 123–42. See also Adrian Croft, ‘Insight: Russia’s Nuclear Strategy Raises Concerns in NATO’, Reuters, 5 February 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/ukraine-crisis-russia-nuclear/insight-rpt-russias-nuclear-strategy-raises-concerns-in-nato-idUSL6N0VE2RV20150205.

19 See Henry Foy, Max Seddon and Demetri Sevastopulo, ‘West Takes Putin’s Nuclear Weapons Threat Seriously’, Financial Times, 27 February 2022, https://www.ft.com/content/e12976cf-59be-414e-b90f-56875df79753.

20 See Stephan Frühling and Guillaume Lasconjarias, ‘NATO, A2/AD and the Kaliningrad Challenge’, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, vol. 58, no. 2, April–May 2020, pp. 95–116.

21 For the conclusions summarised in this paragraph, see Boston et al., ‘Assessing the Conventional Force Imbalance in Europe: Implications for Countering Russian Local Superiority’.

22 Robert Dalsjo, Michael Jonsson and Christofer Berglund, ‘Don’t Believe the Russian Hype’, Foreign Policy, 7 March 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/07/dont-believe-the-russian-hype-a2-ad-missiles-sweden-kaliningrad-baltic-states-annexation-nato/; and Michael Kofman, ‘It’s Time to Talk About A2/AD: Rethinking the Russian Military Challenge’, War on the Rocks, 5 September 2019, https://warontherocks.com/2019/09/its-time-to-talk-about-a2-ad-rethinking-the-russian-military-challenge/.

23 See James Hackett, Nick Childs and Douglas Barrie, ‘If New Looks Could Kill: Russia’s Military Capability in 2022’, IISS Military Balance Blog, 15 February 2022, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/military-balance/2022/02/if-new-looks-could-kill-russias-military-capability-in-2022. The authors recognise that Russia’s modernisation efforts have been skewed away from ground forces in favour of strategic, aerospace and naval forces.

24 Boston et al., ‘Assessing the Conventional Force Imbalance in Europe: Implications for Countering Russian Local Superiority’; and Barrie et al., ‘Defending Europe: Scenario-based Capability Requirements for NATO’s European Members’.

25 See ‘Fact Sheet: Atlantic Resolve’, US Army Europe Public Affairs Office, 1 September 2019, https://web.archive.org/web/20200604022036/https://www.eur.army.mil/Portals/19/documents/FactSheets/AtlanticResolveFactSheet190804.pdf?ver=2019-09-05-071340-827.

26 See John Vandiver, ‘US Tanks and Troops Headed to Lithuania for Lengthy Deployment’, Stars and Stripes, 25 September 2019, https://www.stripes.com/news/europe/us-tanks-and-troops-headed-to-lithuania-for-lengthy-deployment-1.600424.

27 Boston et al., ‘Assessing the Conventional Force Imbalance in Europe: Implications for Countering Russian Local Superiority’.

28 See ‘NATO Response Force (NRF) Fact Sheet’, Allied Joint Force Command, Headquarters Brunssum, https://jfcbs.nato.int/page5725819/nato-response-force-nrf-fact-sheet.

29 See ‘US Military Presence in Poland’, Congressional Research Service, 4 August 2020, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/IF11280.pdf.

30 For an argument in favour of developing intermediate-range missiles, see Luke Griffith, ‘Biden Should Continue Building Intermediate-range Missiles’, Defense News, 23 December 2020, https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/12/23/biden-should-continue-building-intermediate-range-missiles/. On other options, see Sydney J. Freedberg Jr, ‘Target, Kaliningrad: Air Force Puts Putin on Notice’, Breaking Defense, 17 September 2019, https://breakingdefense.com/2019/09/target-kaliningrad-eucom-puts-putin-on-notice/; and Jerry Hendrix, ‘Filling the Seams in US Long-range Penetrating Strike’, Center for a New American Security, 10 September 2018, https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/filling-the-seams-in-u-s-long-range-penetrating-strike.

31 See Robert M. Klein et al., ‘Baltics Left of Bang: The Role of NATO with Partners in Denial-based Deterrence’, Strategic Forum No. 301, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, November 2019, https://inss.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratforum/SF-301.pdf.