Japan’s geo-economic evolution

Abstract

‘In foreign affairs, Japan is often thought of as a big country acting like a small one. Yet that is to miss the significance, range and effectiveness of Japan’s economic statecraft, in which the country not only acts its true size but also does so with much more autonomy and agency than it does in classic diplomacy. Yuka Koshino and Robert Ward shine a truly illuminating light on how Japan thinks and behaves as a geo-economic actor, whether through trade, investment, aid, rule-setting or, crucially, technology. This Adelphi book deserves to be widely read, for it adds greatly to our understanding of a much neglected and under-appreciated aspect of Japanese strategy.’

Bill Emmott, Chairman of the IISS Trustees; Chairman of the Japan Society of the UK; and author of Japan’s Far More Female Future (Oxford University Press, 2020)

‘Groundbreaking work and a penetrating analysis of the geo-economic challenges facing Japan, a frontline country in the age of US–China rivalry and economic statecraft.’

Dr Funabashi Yoichi, Chairman of Asia Pacific Initiative

Geo-economic strategy – deploying economic instruments to secure foreign-policy aims and to project power – has long been a key element of statecraft. In recent years it has acquired even greater salience, given China’s growing antagonism with the United States and the willingness of both Beijing and Washington to wield economic power in their confrontation. This trend has particular significance for Japan, due to its often tense political relationship with China, which remains its largest trading partner. While Japan’s post-war geo-economic performance often failed to match its status as one of the world’s largest economies, more recently Tokyo has demonstrated increased geo-economic agency and effectiveness.

In this Adelphi book, Yuka Koshino and Robert Ward draw on multiple disciplines – including economics, political economy, foreign policy and security policy – and interviews with key policymakers to examine Japan’s geo-economic power in the context of great-power competition between the US and China. They examine Japan’s previous underperformance, how Tokyo’s understanding of geo-economics has evolved and, given constraints on its national power projection, what actions Japan might feasibly take to become a more effective geo-economic actor. Their conclusions will be of direct interest not only for all those concerned with Japanese grand strategy and the Asia-Pacific, but also for those middle powers seeking to navigate great-power competition in the coming decades.

Notes

1 Christopher W. Hughes, Japan’s Remilitarisation, Adelphi 403 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2009), p. 22; and John Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Aftermath of World War II (London: Penguin Books, 1999), p. 77.

2 Victor D. Cha, Powerplay: The Origins of the American Alliance System in Asia (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016), pp. 142–8.

3 Kosaka Masataka, Saishō Yoshida Shigeru [Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru] (Tokyo: Chūokōron-Shinsha, 2006), p. 71.

4 Osamu Nariai, History of the Modern Japanese Economy (Tokyo: Foreign Press Center Japan, 1994), p. 32.

5 See the following for the reference to the Economic Planning Agency’s white paper: Jun Saito, ‘Japan’s Economy and Policy in a Global Context: Postwar Experience and Prospects for the 21st Century’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 2017, https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/160401_Japan_Economy_Policy_Global_Context.pdf.

6 Ibid., p. 5.

7 Shinji Takagi, ‘From Recipient to Donor: Japan’s Official Aid Flows, 1945 to 1990 and Beyond’, Essays in International Finance, no. 196, March 1995, Princeton University, p. 10, https://ies.princeton.edu/pdf/E196.pdf.

8 Ibid., pp. 14–15.

9 Hiroyuki Hoshiro, ‘The Ministerial Conference for the Economic Development of Southeast Asia and Japanese Diplomacy: Japan’s Initiative and Its Limitations in the 1960s’, International Relations, no. 144, February 2006, p. 11, https://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/kokusaiseiji1957/2006/144/2006_144_1/_article.

10 Royama, The Asian Balance of Power: A Japanese View, p. 5.

11 See, for example, Inoue Masaya, ‘Kokuren Chūgoku Daihyō Mondai to Ikeda Gaikō – Kokufu “Bundan Koteika” Kosō o Megutte, 1957–1964’ [The Chinese Representation Issue in the United Nations and the Ikeda Administration’s Diplomacy, 1957– 1964], Kobe Law Journal, vol. 57, no. 1, June 2007, p. 213, http://www.lib.kobe-u.ac.jp/infolib/meta_pub/G0000003kernel_81005064.

12 So-called LT bōeki (LT Trade) required Japanese firms to accept China’s three principles: ‘The Japanese were not to (1) obstruct the establishment of diplomatic relations between Japan and the People’s Republic of China; (2) participate in the formation of two Chinas; or (3) regard the People’s Republic of China as an enemy’; quoted from Masaya Tsuchiya, ‘Recent Developments in Sino-Japanese Trade’, Law and Contemporary Problems, vol. 38, no. 2, Summer 1973, pp. 240–8, especially pp. 241–2, https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/lcp/vol38/iss2/6.

13 Glenn D. Hook et al., Japan’s International Relations: Politics, Economics and Security, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2005), p. 191; and Saito, ‘Japan’s Economy and Policy in a Global Context: Postwar Experience and Prospects for the 21st Century’, p. 6.

14 See Jeffrey E. Garten, Three Days at Camp David: How a Secret Meeting in 1971 Transformed the Global Economy (New York: HarperCollins, 2021), pp. 26–44 for a detailed discussion on the United States' economic problems at the time.

15 Ibid., p. 11.

16 Tanaka Akihiko, Anzenhoshō: Sengo 50 Nen no Mosaku [Security: Japan’s 50 Years of Exploration in the Post-war Period] (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shimbunsha, 1997), pp. 269–71.

17 Saito, ‘Japan’s Economy and Policy in a Global Context: Postwar Experience and Prospects for the 21st Century’, p. 7.

18 Funabashi, Keizai Anzenhoshō Ron – Chikyū Keizai Jidai no Pawā Ekonomikkusu [Economic Security – the Era of Power Economics in the Global Economy], pp. 292–5.

19 See National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, ‘The World and Japan’ database, http://worldjpn.grips.ac.jp/documents/texts/docs/19770818.S1E.html for an English translation of Fukuda’s ‘Fukuda Doctrine’ policy speech.

20 ‘Tai no ODA Donāka to Nihon no Shien ni Kansuru Kōsatsu’ [An Analysis on Japanese Cooperation Towards Thailand as an Emerging Donor], Fukuoka Daigaku Shōgaku Rongyō, vol. 60, no. 3, March 2016, pp. 528–9, https://ci.nii.ac.jp/naid/120005739432.

21 Sueo Sudo, ‘Japan–ASEAN Relations: New Dimensions in Japanese Foreign Policy’, Asian Survey, vol. 28, no. 5, May 1988, pp. 509–25. See also ‘The World and Japan’ database for the report from Ohira’s study group, https://worldjpn.grips.ac.jp/documents/texts/APEC/19800519.O1E.html.

22 Fukuda first stated this in his policy speech to the Diet in 1977; in his book Atarashi Hoshu no Ronri [Logic of the New Conservatives] (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1978), which was published before the LDP election in 1978, Nakasone writes: ‘National security is based first of all on the consent and willingness of the people, and then on a comprehensive combination of diplomacy, economic cooperation, global public opinion influence operation, resource policy and other factors’ (authors’ translation). See Tanaka, Anzenhoshō: Sengo 50 Nen no Mosaku [Security: Japan’s 50 Years of Exploration in the Post-war Period], p. 273.

23 Ibid., pp. 276–7. Authors’ translation.

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid., p. 277.

26 Quoted in Tanaka, ‘Rhetorics and Limitations of Japan’s New Internationalism’, p. 3.

27 Pyle, ‘In Pursuit of a Grand Design: Nakasone Betwixt the Past and the Future’, p. 244.

28 Bank of Japan, ‘BOJ’s Main Time-series Statistics’, https://www.stat-search.boj.or.jp/ssi/mtshtml/fm08_m_1_en.html.

29 IMF, Annual Report 1986, p. 18, https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/ar/archive/pdf/ar1986.pdf.

30 Interview with Dr Funabashi Yoichi, Chairman, Asia Pacific Initiative, July 2021.

31 Emmott, The Sun Also Sets: The Limits to Japan’s Economic Power, p. 131.

32 ‘Japan Buys the Center of New York’, New York Times, 3 November 1989, https://www.nytimes.com/1989/11/03/opinion/japan-buys-the-center-of-new-york.html.

33 Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, ‘A Look at China’s New Exchange Rate Regime’, 9 September 2005, https://www.frbsf.org/eco-nomic-research/publications/eco-nomic-letter/2005/september/a-look-at-china-new-exchange-rate-regime/.

34 Murayama Yuzo, Keizai Anzenhoshō o kangaeru: Kaiyōkokka Nihon no Sentaku [Thinking about Economic Security: Japan’s Choices as a Maritime Nation], (Tokyo: NHK, 2003), p. 59.

35 David E. Sanger, Clyde Haberman and Steve Lohr, ‘A Bizarre Deal Diverts Vital Tools to the Russians’, New York Times, 12 June 1987, https://www.nytimes.com/1987/06/12/world/a-bizarre-deal-diverts-vital-tools-to-russians.html.

36 ‘The Toshiba–Kongsberg Case’, King’s College London, 22 September 2014, https://www.kcl.ac.uk/news/the-toshiba-kongsberg-case; Murayama, Thinking about Economic Security: Japan’s Choices as a Maritime Nation, p. 83; and Stuart Auerbach, ‘Senate Approves 2-Year Ban on Toshiba’s Sales in U.S.’, Washington Post, 1 July 1987, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1987/07/01/sen-ate-approves-2-year-ban-on-toshibas-sales-in-us/00e93986-4c8a-4365-99dd-4cdc5244fe4c/.

37 Douglas A. Irwin, ‘The US–Japan Semiconductor Trade Conflict’, National Bureau of Economic Research, January 1996, p. 5, https://www.nber.org/system/files/chapters/c8717/c8717.pdf. The Trump administration’s imposition of targets for US–China trade under its Phase One trade deal with China in early 2020 had strong echoes of the United States’ efforts to manage trade with Japan in 1986.

38 Murayama Yuzo, Amerika no Keizai Anzenhoshō Senryaku – Gunji Henchō kara no Tenkan to Nichibei Masatsu [US Economic Security Strategy: A Shift from a Military Focus and US–Japan Friction] (Tokyo: PHP Research Institute, 1996), p. 141.

39 Ibid., p. 141.

40 The prime minister at the time, Kaifu Toshiki, took office following a series of scandals that had triggered the resignations of his two immediate predecessors, but was politically weak. The ruling LDP had also lost its majority in the upper house of the Diet, the House of Councillors, in 1989.

41 Yoichi Funabashi, ‘Japan and the New World Order’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 70, no. 5, Winter 1991/92, https://www.foreignaf-fairs.com/articles/asia/1991-12-01/japan-and-new-world-order.

42 Thomas L. Friedman, ‘Baker Asks Japan to Broaden Role’, New York Times, 12 November 1991, https://www.nytimes.com/1991/11/12/world/baker-asks-japan-to-broaden-role.html.

43 UN Security Council, ‘Resolution 678 (1990) / Adopted by the Security Council at Its 2963rd Meeting, on 29 November 1990’, https://digitalli-brary.un.org/record/102245?ln=en.

44 See Samuel P. Huntington, ‘Why International Primacy Matters’, International Security, vol. 17, no. 4, Spring 1993, pp. 68–83, for a US critique of Japan’s ‘economic power maximization’. It is striking how similar Huntington’s argument is to those now made about China’s economic power.

45 APEC, the AMF and the CMI are all described in more detail in the next chapter.

46 See, for example, US president Bill Clinton’s speech to the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University on 9 March 2000 for an example of the optimism that economic integration into the world economy would also ‘create positive change in China’ in the United States’ ‘national interest’: https://www.iatp.org/sites/default/files/Full_Text_of_Clintons_Speech_on_China_Trade_Bi.htm.

47 For views that considered the threat posed by the rise of China as being long term, see, for example, Shiraishi Takashi, Umi no Teikoku: Ajia wo Dō Kangaeru ka [Empire of the Seas: Thinking about Asia] (Tokyo: Chuko Shinsho, 2000), p. 195.

48 Japan’s prominent post-war strategist Kosaka Masataka, for example, remained cautious about the rise of China in his 1969 essay Kaiyōkokka Nihon no Kōsō [Japan’s Vision as a Maritime Country] and reiterated his concerns in the early 1990s. In his 1996 essay Ajia Taiheiyō no Anzenhoshō [Security in the Asia-Pacific], Kosaka stated that ‘challenges from China will be the largest problem for Japan in the first half of the twenty-first century’ [‘Chūgoku mondai wa nijūisseiki zenhan no saidai no mondai’]. See Iokibe Makoto and Nakanishi Hiroshi’s edited volume, Kōsaka Masataka to Sengō Nihon [Kosaka Masataka and Post-war Japan] (Tokyo: ChūokōronShinsha, 2016), pp. 101–2 for reference to Ajia Taiheiyō no Anzenhoshō.

49 Seth Faison, ‘China Sets Off Second Underground Nuclear Test in 3 Months’, New York Times, 17 August 1995, https://www.nytimes.com/1995/08/17/world/china-sets-off-second-underground-nuclear-test-in-3-months.html; Barton Gellman, ‘US and China Nearly Came to Blows in ‘96’, Washington Post, 21 June 1998, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1998/06/21/us-and-china-nearly-came-to-blows-in-96/926d105f-1fd8-404c-9995-90984f86a613/; Tsukasa Hadano, ‘China Purges School Libraries of “Western Veneration”’, Nikkei Asia, 18 April 2021, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/China-purges-school-libraries-of-Western-veneration2; and Kevin Sullivan, ‘Japan’s War Apology Disappoints Chinese’, Washington Post, 27 November 1998, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/poli-tics/1998/11/27/japans-war-apology-disappoints-chinese/f3b3eedc-de23-42b5-9100-b63d6eefcd67/.

50 Ward, ‘Japan’s Security Policy and China’, p. 9.

51 Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Japan–China Joint Press Statement’, 8 October 2006, https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/joint0610.html.

52 This phrase was used in the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Diplomatic Blue Book until 2019; see, for example: p. 41, https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/2019/pdf/pdfs/2_1.pdf.

53 Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘“Confluence of the Two Seas”, Speech by H. E. Mr Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan at the Parliament of the Republic of India’, 22 August 2007, https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0708/speech-2.html.

54 ‘The Japan–India Strategic Relationship with Dr Sanjaya Baru’, Japan Memo podcast, IISS, 1 September 2021, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/podcast/2021/09/the-japan-india-strategic-relationship-with-dr-sanjaya-baru.

55 ‘India Top Recipient of Japanese Financial Aid Since 2003, Surpassing China’, Economic Times, 26 March 2021, https://economictimes.india-times.com/news/india/india-top-recipient-of-japanese-financial-aid-since-2003-surpassing-china/article-show/81710675.cms?from=mdr.

56 Yukio Hatoyama, ‘A New Path for Japan’, New York Times, 26 August 2009, https://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/27/opinion/27iht-edha-toyama.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1.

57 Yoko Nishikawa, ‘Q+A – What Is Japan’s East Asia Community?’ Reuters, 24 October 2009, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-asia-summit-japan-idUSTRE59N0IS20091024.

58 Justin McCurry, ‘Japan PM Backtracks on Okinawa Military Base Pledge’, Guardian, 4 May 2010, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/may/04/japan-okinawa-feud-us-base.

59 Keith Bradsher, ‘Amid Tension, China Blocks Vital Exports to Japan’, New York Times, 22 September 2010, https://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/23/busi-ness/global/23rare.html.

60 ‘Japan’s Economic Statecraft’, IISS Strategic Comments, vol. 26, no. 14, 10 July 2020, https://www.iiss.org/pub-lications/strategic-comments/2020/japan-economic-statecraft.

61 Roel Landingin, ‘Philippines vs China: Going Bananas’, Financial Times, 11 May 2012, https://www.ft.com/content/7f801f57-b7fc-3a54-9634-56a15c41fd3e.

62 Shannon Tiezzi, ‘It’s Official: China, Not Japan, Is Building Indonesia’s First High-speed Railway’, Diplomat, 1 October 2015, https://thediplomat.com/2015/10/its-official-china-not-japan-is-building-indonesias-first-high-speed-railway/.

63 Kiran Stacey, ‘China Signs 99-year Lease on Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port’, Financial Times, 11 December 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/e150ef0c-de37-11e7-a8a4-0a1e63a52f9c; ‘Japan’s Economic Statecraft’; for a Japanese perspective on the BRI’s strategic implications, see, for example, Shino Watanabe, ‘China’s Infrastructure Development in the Indo-Pacific Region: Challenges and Opportunities’, Center for Strategic & International Studies, March 2019, p. 7, https://csis-web-site-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/FINAL_Working%20Paper_Shino%20Watanabe.pdf.

64 Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Extraordinary Press Conference by Foreign Minister Taro Kono’, 14 April 2019, https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/kaiken/kaiken4e_000629.html.

65 Martin Fackler, ‘Japan, Sticking with U.S., Says It Won’t Join China-led Bank’, New York Times, 31 March 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/01/world/asia/japan-says-no-to-asian-infrastructure-investment-bank.html.

66 Hillary Clinton, ‘America’s Pacific Century’, Foreign Policy, 11 October 2011, https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/11/americas-pacific-century/. ‘The pivot to Asia’ strategy was rebranded as ‘the rebalance to Asia and the Pacific’ in 2015: Office of the Press Secretary, ‘Fact Sheet: Advancing the Rebalance to Asia and the Pacific’, 16 November 2015, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/11/16/fact-sheet-advancing-rebalance-asia-and-pacific.

67 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, ‘Remarks by President Obama and President Xi Jinping of the People’s Republic of China After Bilateral Meeting’, 8 June 2013, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/08/remarks-president-obama-and-president-xi-jinping-peoples-republic-china-. For concerns raised by Tokyo, see, for example, Brian Harding, ‘The U.S.–Japan Alliance in an Age of Elevated U.S.–China Relations’, Center for American Progress, 17 March 2017, https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/secu-rity/reports/2017/03/17/426709/u-s-japan-alliance-age-elevated-u-s-china-relations/.

68 John Ruwitch, ‘China Bolsters East China Sea Claim, Warns of “Defensive Measures”’, Reuters, 23 November 2013, https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-china-japan-idUKBRE-9AM02B20131123.

69 ‘Remarks As Prepared for Delivery by National Security Advisor Susan E. Rice: “America’s Future in Asia”’, The White House, President Barack Obama, 21 November 2013, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/11/21/remarks-pre-pared-delivery-national-security-advisor-susan-e-rice; and Hughes, Japan’s Foreign and Security Policy under the ‘Abe Doctrine’, p. 82.

70 See Introduction for details of Abe’s security reforms.

71 Japan, Cabinet Secretariat, Kisō Shiryō [Basic Documents], October 2020, p. 12, https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/keizaisaisei/miraitoshikaigi/dai32/siryou1.pdf.

72 Rogier Creemers, Paul Triolo and Graham Webster, ‘Translation: Cybersecurity Law of the People’s Republic of China (Effective June 1, 2017)’, New America, 29 June 2018, https://www.newamerica.org/cybersecurity-initia-tive/digichina/blog/translation-cyber-security-law-peoples-republic-china/.

73 ‘National Intelligence Law of the P.R.C. (2017)’, China Law Translate, 27 June 2017, https://www.chinal-awtranslate.com/en/national-intelli-gence-law-of-the-p-r-c-2017/.

74 ‘Rūru Keisei Senryaku Giin Renmei to wa’, Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 13 October 2020, https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGKKZO64917120S0A011C2PP8000/. See also Japanese Diet member Nakamura Hiroyuki’s blog post for Amari’s comments at the launch of the group: https://www.hiro-nakamura.jp/?tag=%E3%83%AB%E3%83%BC%E3%83%AB%E5%BD%A2%E6%88%90%E3%81%AE%E6%84%8F%E7%BE%A9. For Amari’s views on China’s digital development model and its export to Asia and beyond, see, for example, ‘Dokusen Ichiman Ji: Keizaigaikō no Puro ga Kataru, Chūgoku Dejitaru Haken no Kyōi’ [Exclusive: Economic Diplomacy Professional’s View on Threat Posed by China’s Digital Supremacy], NewsPicks, 13 August 2018, https://newspicks.com/news/3236775/body/.

75 US–China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC), ‘2018 Report to Congress’, November 2018, p. 266, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/annual_reports/2018%20Annual%20Report%20to%20Con-gress.pdf.

76 Arjun Kharpal, ‘Power Is “Up for Grabs”: Behind China’s Plan to Shape the Future of Next-generation Tech’, CNBC, 26 April 2020, https://www.cnbc.com/2020/04/27/china-stand-ards-2035-explained.html.

77 USCC, ‘PRC Representation in International Organizations’, 20 April 2020, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2020-04/PRC_Represen-tation_in_International_Organiza-tions_April2020.pdf.

78 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, ‘Global Initiative on Data Security’, 8 September 2020, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1812951.shtml.

79 Funabashi Yoichi, ‘China’s Embrace of Digital Leninism’, Japan Times, 9 January 2018, https://www.japan-times.co.jp/opinion/2018/01/09/commentary/world-commentary/chinas-embrace-digital-leninism/.

80 Danielle Cave, Fergus Ryan and Vicky Xiuzhong Xu, ‘Mapping More of China’s Tech Giants: AI and Surveillance’, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 28 November 2019, https://www.aspi.org.au/report/mapping-more-chinas-tech-giants; and Steven Feldstein, ‘Testimony before the US– China Economic and Security Review Commission Hearing on China’s Strategic Aims in Africa’, USCC, 8 May 2020, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Feldstein_Testimony.pdf.

81 Charlie Osborne, ‘Japan Investigates Potential Leak of Prototype Missile Data in Mitsubishi Hack’, ZDNet, 21 May 2020, https://www.zdnet.com/article/japan-investigates-potential-leak-of-prototype-missile-design-in-mitsubishi-hack/.

82 Yoshino Jiro, ‘NEC, Mitsubishi mo Higai, Chūgoku Hakkā Shūdan no Zenyō’ [The Full Story Behind China’s Hacker Group Attacks on NEC and Mitsubishi], Nikkei Business, 7 February 2020, https://business.nikkei.com/atcl/gen/19/00002/020701079/.

83 Isabel Reynolds and Alyza Sebenius, ‘Chinese Military Seen Behind Japan Cyberattacks’, Bloomberg, 20 April 2021, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/arti-cles/2021-04-20/chinese-military-seen-behind-japan-cyberattacks-nhk-says.

84 ‘Report on Research Funding Aims to Improve Transparency’, Japan News by the Yomiuri Shimbun, 20 March 2021, https://the-japan-news.com/news/article/0007241292.

85 The idea that FOIP is a geo-economic concept will be discussed in detail in Chapter Three.

86 See, for example, The White House, ‘National Security Strategy of the United States of America’, December 2017, https://trump-whitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf; and US Department of Defense, ‘Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of The United States of America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge’, 2018, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strat-egy-Summary.pdf.

87 Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Japan Is Back’.

88 See ‘Japan’s Free and Open IndoPacific Vision at the Crossroads: Will It Endure After Abe?’, Strategic Survey 2020: The Annual Assessment of Geopolitics (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2020), pp. 130–8; and ‘Launch of Strategic Survey 2020: The Annual Assessment of Geopolitics’, IISS, 20 November 2020, https://www.iiss.org/events/2020/11/strategic-survey-2020-launch.

89 This formulation is now frequently used by the Japanese government to articulate its concerns about China’s activities.

90 Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Address by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the Opening Session of the Sixth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD VI)’, 27 August 2016, https://www.mofa.go.jp/afr/af2/page4e_000496.html.

91 ‘The Japan–India Strategic Relationship with Dr Sanjaya Baru’, Japan Memo podcast, IISS.

92 Takita Yoichi, ‘Chūgoku no “Inryoku Ba” ga Nomikomu, Beikoku no Inūma ni Jinchi Kakudai’ [China’s Gravitational Pull Grows, China Expanding in the United States’ Absence], Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 30 November 2020, https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXMZO66744250X-21C20A1TCR000/.

93 Hugo Erken and Michael Every, ‘Why India Is Wise Not to Join RCEP’, RaboResearch – Economic Research, 29 December 2020, https://economics.rabobank.com/publications/2020/december/why-india-is-wise-not-to-join-rcep/.

94 Michael J. Green, ‘Japan Is Back: Unbundling Abe’s Grand Strategy’, Lowy Institute for International Policy, December 2013, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/sites/default/files/green_japan_is_back_web_0_0.pdf.

95 Percentage calculated from the World Bank’s database at https://data.world-bank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD. Data is for 2019. See also James McBride, Andrew Chatzky and Anshu Siripurapu, ‘What’s Next for the TransPacific Partnership (TPP)?’, Council on Foreign Relations, 20 September 2021, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-trans-pacific-partnership-tpp.

96 Sebastian Strangio, ‘At Annual Summit, US Stumbles on Engagement with Southeast Asia – Again’, Diplomat, 16 November 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/11/at-annual-summit-us-stumbles-on-engagement-with-southeast-asia-again/.

97 President of the United States, ‘National Security Strategy of the United States of America’, December 2017, p. 46, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf; US, Department of Defense, ‘Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America’, p. 9; see also US, Department of Defense, ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked Region’, 1 June 2019, https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jul/01/2002152311/-1/-1/1/DEPART-MENT-OF-DEFENSE-INDO-PACIFIC-STRATEGY-REPORT-2019.PDF.

98 Lindsey W. Ford, ‘The Trump Administration and the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific”’, Brookings Institute, May 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-trump-adminis-tration-and-the-free-and-open-indo-pacific/.

99 US Mission to ASEAN, ‘Sec. Pompeo Remarks on “America’s Indo-Pacific Economic Vision”’, 30 July 2018, https://asean.usmission.gov/sec-pompeo-remarks-on-americas-indo-pacific-economic-vision/.

100 In January 2021, 66% of Chinese exports were subject to US tariffs and 58% of US exports were subject to Chinese tariffs. See Chad P. Brown, ‘US–China Trade War Tariffs: An Upto-Date Chart’, 16 March 2021, https://www.piie.com/research/piie-charts/us-china-trade-war-tariffs-date-chart.

101 Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Treaty of Mutual Cooperation Between Japan and the United States of America’, 19 January 1960, https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/q&a/ref/1.html.

102 US, Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, ‘Addition of Software Specially Designed to Automate the Analysis of Geospatial Imagery to the Export Control Classification Number 0Y521 Series’, Federal Register, 6 January 2020, https://www.federalregister.gov/doc-uments/2020/01/06/2019-27649/addi-tion-of-software-specially-designed-to-automate-the-analysis-of-geospa-tial-imagery-to-the-export.

103 Ibid.

104 Fifty-two Memorandums of Cooperation (MOCs) were signed between Japan and China for cooperation in third countries. See Japan, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, ’52 MOCs Signed in Line with Convening of First Japan–China Forum on Third Country Business Cooperation’, 26 October 2018, https://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2018/1026_003.html.

105 See, for example, Kawai Masahiro ‘“Ittai Ichirō Kōsō” to “Indo Taiheiyō Kōsō”’ [One Belt One Road Vision and IndoPacific Vision], World Economy Report, vol. 2, Japan Institute of International Affairs, 8 May 2019, https://www.jiia.or.jp/column/column-348.html.

106 Steve Mollman, ‘Japan’s Buzzword of the Year Means “an Explosive Shopping Spree by the Chinese”’, Quartz, 2 December 2015, https://qz.com/563304/japans-buzzword-of-the-year-means-an-explosive-shop-ping-spree-by-the-chinese/. Before the onset of the coronavirus pandemic in early 2020, inbound tourism had also been an important tool for revitalising Japan’s economically struggling provinces. See, for example, ‘Hōnichi Kyaku “Chihō e Chokkō” Kyūzō, 25% ga Shuyō 6 Kūkō Igai e’ [Rapid Increase in Inbound Tourism Directly to the Regions, 25% Flying Directly to Airports Other than the Six Largest], Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 22 December 2019, http://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXMZO53565850Z11C19A-2SHA000/.

107 See, for example, Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Diplomatic Blue Book, 2019, p. 51, https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000527147.pdf.

108 Funabashi Yoichi was one of the first to theorise ‘economic security’ in 1976. See Funabashi Yoichi, Keizai Anzenhoshō Ron [Theory of Economic Security] (Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 1978), pp. 292–301. Ohira’s study group on comprehensive security also used the term economic security. See, for example, Tanaka, Anzenhoshō: Sengo 50 Nen no Mosaku [Security: Japan’s 50 Years of Exploration in the Post War Period], pp. 276–7.

109 For a description of ‘the Great Moderation’, see ‘Remarks by Governor Ben S. Bernanke’, Federal Reserve Board, 20 February 2004, https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2004/20040220/.

110 Interview with Terazawa Tatsuya, July 2021.

111 ‘Kitamura Shigeru (Zen Kokka Anzenhoshō Kyokuchō) “Keizai Anzenhoshō” to wa Nani ka?’ [Kitamura Shigeru, Former National Security Advisor, on ‘Economic Security’], Bungei Shunju Digital, 9 August 2021, https://bungeishunju.com/n/n8282e3583553.

112 See, for example, Kirk Lancaster, Michael Rubin and Mira Rapp-Hopper, ‘Mapping China’s Health Silk Road’, Councilon Foreign Relations, 10 April 2020, https://www.cfr.org/blog/mapping-chinas-health-silk-road.

113 See, for example, the mid-term report put together by METI: ‘Sangyō Kozō Shingikai: Tsushō Boeki Bunkakai, Anzenhoshō Boeki Kanri Shōiinnkai Chūkan Hōkoku’ [Industrial Structure Council, Commerce and Trade Subcommittee, Trade Security Management Sub-committee Mid-term Report], 10 June 2021, p. 3, https://www.meti.go.jp/shingikai/sankoshin/tsusho_boeki/anzen_hosho/pdf/20210610_1.pdf.

114 Murayama Yuzo et al., Bei Chū no Keizai Anzenhoshō Senryaku [US and China’s Economic Security Strategy] (Tokyo: Fuyoshobo, 2021), pp. 207–29.

115 Authors’ interview with Terazawa Tatsuya. See also Kitamura Shigeru’s interview with Bungei Shunju Digital, 9 August 2021, https://bungeishunju.com/n/n8282e3583553; for white papers, see METI’s ‘White Paper on International Economy and Trade’ for the years 2018, 2019, 2020 and 2021, which are available at https://www.meti.go.jp/english/report/index_white-paper.html. For mentions of military– civil integration, see Japan, Ministry of Defense, ‘National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2019 and Beyond’, p. 5, https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/pdf/2019boueikeikaku_e.pdf.

116 Cabinet Office, ‘Integrated Innovation Strategy’, 2018, p. 92, https://www8.cao.go.jp/cstp/english/doc/integrated_main.pdf.

117 Japan, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, Kizon Chitsujo no Henyō to Keizai Sangyō Seisaku no Hōkōsei [Changes in the Existing Order and Direction of Economic and Industrial Policy], p. 10, https://www.meti.go.jp/shingikai/sankoshin/sokai/pdf/024_02_00.pdf; and Japan, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, ‘White Paper on International Economy and Trade 2019’, November 2019, https://www.meti.go.jp/english/report/data/wp2019/wp2019.html.

118 Japan, Cabinet Secretariat, ‘National Security Strategy’, 17 December 2013, p. 20, https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/131217anzenhoshou/nss-e.pdf.

119 Japan, Ministry of Defense, ‘Defense Technology Strategy: Towards Delivering Superior Defense Equipment and to Secure Technological Superiority’, August 2016, https://www.mod.go.jp/atla/en/policy/pdf/defense_technology_strategy.pdf.

120 MOD’s ‘Defense of Japan, 2018’ white paper flagged for the first time that ‘rapid advancements in technological innovation are now spreading into military fields’, and mentioned that China, Russia and the US are focusing on R&D in unmanned technologies, AI and stealth technologies ‘that rely heavily on the development of civilian technologies’: see Japan, MOD, ‘Defense of Japan, 2018’, p. 51, https://warp.da.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/11591426/www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2018/DOJ2018_Full_1130.pdf. The paper also mentioned for the first time Chinese military–civil fusion, stating that the goal ‘is said to have been upgraded to the national strategy’: see MOD, ‘Defense of Japan, 2018’, p. 115. The National Defense Program Guidelines released at end-2018 stated for the first time that ‘China is promoting civil–military integration policy in areas of national defense, science & technology and industry, and actively developing and acquiring cuttingedge technologies of potential military utility’: see Japan, Cabinet Secretariat, ‘National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2019 and Beyond’, p. 5. For MOD’s efforts to enhance interactions between the civilian and military sectors, see, for example, Yuka Koshino, ‘Is Japan Ready for Civil–Military “Integration”?’, IISS Analysis, 3 August 2021, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2021/08/japan-civil-military-integration.