Constitution-making, constitutional conventions and conflict resolution: lesson drawing for Cyprus

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Notes

¹ The proposal for a constitutional convention for Cyprus is put forward in Andreas Auer, ‘On the way to a constitutional convention for Cyprus’, in Andreas Auer and Vasiliki Triga (eds), A Constitutional Convention for Cyprus, Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, Berlin, 2008, pp. 13–26.

² Jon Elster, ‘The optimal design of a constituent assembly’, conference paper presented at Colloquium on Collective Wisdom, Collège de France, 22–23 May 2008, available at < http://telechargeu.cines.fr/3517/load/documents//cerimes/UPL55488_Elster.pdf>.

³ William H. Riker, Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance, Little Brown, Boston, 1964.

⁴ It should be noted that for Riker dimensions 2 and 3 had a different meaning to that which is used in our understanding.

⁵ David McKay, ‘William Riker on federalism: sometimes wrong but more right than anyone else?’, Regional & Federal Studies, 14, 2004, pp. 167–186; Mikhail Filippov, ‘Riker and federalism’, Constitutional Political Economy, 16, 2005, pp. 93–111.

⁶ Riker's insight, accordingly modified, is certainly pertinent to the case of Cyprus. At the perceptual level the security threat, both military (for the Greek Cypriot community) and economic (for the Turkish Cypriot community), is certainly present although it affects each community inversely. If true, then one could speculate that the economic turbulence that has followed the financial crisis sparked in 2008 may put further pressure on the Turkish Cypriot community to seek a negotiated solution. On the other hand, the integration of the Republic of Cyprus (ROC) into the European Union, and the fact that it is a full member state of the latter, may have diminished the salience of the security threat.

⁷ Jon Elster, ‘Forces and mechanisms in the constitution-making process’, Duke Law Journal, 45, 1995, pp. 364–396.

⁸ In connection with this point we should underlie the fact that failure is very common. Indeed, in the case of federations most actually end in failure; see Alfred C. Stepan, ‘Federalism and democracy: beyond the U.S. model’, Journal of Democracy, 10, 1999, pp. 19–34 and Jonathan Lemco, Political Stability in Federal Governments, Praeger, New York, 1991.

⁹ Karl-Heinz Reif and Hermann Schmitt, ‘Nine second-order national elections—a conceptual framework for the analysis of European election results’, European Journal of Political Research, 8, 1980, pp. 3–44.

¹⁰ Sujit Choudhry, ‘Bridging comparative politics and comparative constitutional law: constitutional design in divided societies’, in Sujit Choudhry (ed.), Constitutional Design for Divided Societies: Integration or Accommodation?, Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York, 2008, pp. 3–40.

¹¹ Johan P. Olsen, ‘Coping with conflict at constitutional moments’, Industrial and Corporate Change, 12, 2003, pp. 815–842. Olsen also identifies a further type of constitutional transformation which is ‘evolutionary’ in nature. Though he does not mention it, an example of this more organic form of constitutional transformation is the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in the USA.

¹² Sujit Choudhry, op. cit.

¹³ A notable attempt is in Patrick Farfad and Daniel R. Reid, Constituent Assemblies: A Comparative Survey, Queen's University, Kingston, 1991.

¹⁴ Calvin C. Jillson, Constitution Making: Conflict and Consensus in the Federal Convention of 1787, Agathon Press, New York, 1988; Catherine Bowen, Miracle at Philadelphia: The Story of the Constitutional Convention, May to September 1787, Little Brown, Boston, 1966.

¹⁵ Jim Mitchell, The French Legislative Assembly, Brill, Leiden, 1988; Michael P. Fitzsimmons, The Remaking of France: The National Assembly and the Constitution of 1791, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994.

¹⁶ Jon Elster, ‘Arguing and bargaining in two constituent assemblies’, University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law, 2, 1999, p. 345.

¹⁷ Alfred Kölz, Le origini della costituzione svizzera, Armando Dado Editore, Locarno, 1999.

¹⁸ Research project with the title: ‘Constitutional Conventions, Direct Democracy and Institutional Change’ [100015–120040] funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation.

¹⁹ We plan to publish a more detailed qualitative and quantitative analysis of our ongoing research on comparative constitution-making in a separate monograph.

²⁰ Daniel Judah Elazar, The American Constitutional Tradition, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, 1988.

²¹ Commonly taken to possess four operational features: executive power-sharing; high degree of self-government; proportionality; and veto-rights.

²² It is important to note that a ‘Border Poll’ was held shortly after the Northern Ireland agreements of 1973. According to some analysts this ‘futile border poll’ is hardly comparable to the two referendums that were held after the 1998 agreements, see Jonathan Tonge, ‘From Sunningdale to the Good Friday Agreement: creating devolved government in Northern Ireland’, Contemporary British History, 14, 2000, pp. 39–60.

²³ Michael B. Stein, ‘Improving the process of constitutional reform in Canada: lessons from the Meech Lake and Charlottetown constitutional rounds’, Canadian Journal of Political Science, 30, 1997, pp. 307–338.

²⁴ Wayne Norman, Negotiating Nationalism: Nation-Building, Federalism, and Secession in the Multinational State, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006.

²⁵ Van Coufoudakis and Klearchos Kyriakides, The Case Against the Annan Plan, Lobby for Cyprus, London, 2004.

²⁶ Guillermo O'Donnell, ‘Delegative democracy’, Journal of Democracy, 7, 1994, pp. 112–126.

²⁷ Andreas Auer, op. cit.

²⁸ James H. Wolf, ‘Cyprus: federation under international safeguards’, Publius, 18, 1988, pp. 75–89.

²⁹ James H. Wolf, ‘Cyprus: federation under international safeguards’, Publius, 18, 1988, pp. 75–89