Turkey's Place in the ‘Missile Shield’

Abstract

The critical decision to share the advanced missile defence capabilities of the USA, also known as the ‘Missile Shield’, was taken at the Lisbon Summit meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in November 2010. Turkey had concerns about the Missile Shield project, which constituted an important item on the summit agenda. Turkey's concerns were addressed properly by the allies, and a key component of the project, namely, the radar site in eastern Turkey was activated in May 2012 at the time of the Chicago Summit of the Alliance. This paper aims to shed light on the background of the development and expansion of the missile defence project of the USA both at national and global scales. In the same vein, technological characteristics and operational principles of air defence systems as well as the reactions coming from other countries, such as Russia, China, Iran and the European allies will be presented. The paper will highlight the deliberations between Turkey and the USA since the 1990s with respect to the deployment of air defence systems on Turkish territory. Finally, Turkey's place in the debate concerning the deployment of the Missile Shield in NATO countries will be discussed with specific references to the role that Turkey could play in enhancing the defensive as well as deterrent capability of the Alliance and itself.

Notes

 [1] For a comprehensive study of the ‘Nunn–Lugar’ programme, see the doctoral dissertation conducted under the supervision of the author by Aylin Gurzel, ‘The Nunn–Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program: an effective regime to stem proliferation of weapons of mass destruction’, unpublished PhD Dissertation, Bilkent University, Ankara, 2012.

 [2] John M. Shields and William C. Potter, ‘Assessing the disarmament process’, in John M. Shields and William C. Potter (eds), Dismantling the Cold War: US and NIS Perspectives on the Nunn–Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1994, pp. 1–19.

 [3] The BMDO was first established in 1974 with the responsibility to coordinate ballistic missile defence efforts of the United States. In 1984, BMDO became part of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization under the Reagan administration. During the first term of the Clinton administration, BMDO was assigned a new role in developing a theatre missile defence with mobile capabilities.

 [4] Within the context of this debate, Western Europe, the USA, Canada and Japan—in the northern hemisphere—are identified as the developed ‘North’. The less developed states of Latin America, the Middle East, Africa and South Asia are identified as the ‘South’.

 [5] For detailed information on this issue, see the website of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies in Monterey, California, < cns.miis.edu>. For a documentary on the subject matter, see the website of the public broadcast services, < www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/nukes>.

 [6] It may be more appropriate to use the terminology of the age (i.e. the 1960s) where stability in superpower rivalry was believed to owe much to the existence of a ‘delicate balance of terror’, so labelled after the work of Albert Wohlstetter, who was a leading strategist with the RAND Corporation. See Albert Wohlstetter, ‘The delicate balance of terror’, in Philip Bobbitt, Lawrence Freedman and Gregory F. Treverton (eds), US Nuclear Strategy: A Reader, Macmillan Press, London, 1989, pp. 143–167. The text of the original document, which was published in 1958 by the RAND Corporation, a think tank based in Santa Monica, California, is available online at < http://www.albertwohlstetter.com/writings/19581200-AW-DelicateBalanceOfTerror-Unabridged.pdf>.

 [7] In August 1998, North Korea tested a Taepo-Dong missile with a range of 1360 km, which flew over Japan. Soon after, in September 1998, Iran tested its first Shahab-3 missile having a range of 1340 km. Iran carried out a second test in July 2000.

 [8] See the website of the US Department of Defense Missile Defense Agency at < www.mda.mil/mdalink/html/mdalink.html>.

 [9] During a press conference following the Defence Ministers meeting held in Brussels on 5 October 2011, NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said that ‘… as things stand today, and as we can envisage the development as of today, we would expect [the Missile Shield] to be fully operational in 2018’. See NATO's website at < www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_78812.htm?selectedLocale = en>.

[10] In accordance with the ABM Treaty, the USA and the Soviet Union agreed not to develop or deploy air defence systems on their territories except for two locations (their capital cities and one intercontinental missile silo of their choice). It was envisaged that hundreds of cities and millions of people over the vast territories of both countries would be exposed to a nuclear attack. This situation, which can only be explained with the paradoxical logic of military strategy, aimed to prevent the parties from carrying out a surprise attack against the other by purposefully leaving their most valuable assets vulnerable to an attack. As such, it was believed that the party intending to take advantage of a surprise attack by making the first strike would in the end refrain from doing so, knowing that the other party could retaliate by launching the ‘second strike’ against the defenceless cities and population of the party that attacked first, with its well-protected nuclear weapons deployed on nuclear submarines, long-range bomber aircraft and ground-based ICBM, also known as constituting the strategic triad, that could survive the ‘first strike’ of the enemy.

[11] The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty START I (1991) and START II (1993) required the number of nuclear warheads that could be delivered by intercontinental range ballistic missiles to be gradually decreased to 6000–6500 and then 3000–3500.

[12] The Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty of 1987 required the elimination of an entire category of nuclear missiles having ranges between 1500 and 5500 km.

[13] Having successfully tested a nuclear warhead for the first time in 1964, the People's Republic of China produced 400 of them, only some 25 of which are strategic warheads deployed on ICBM whose ranges can reach US territories. However, China's weapons are not held in high-security zones, thus it is argued that in case of an attack by the USA protected by a national defence system, China could lose its nuclear power very quickly. It is a matter of concern that in such a situation, China would be vulnerable to India, its historic rival, which possesses nuclear weapons as well.

[14] See, for instance, harsh criticism about the NATO summit decision about the deployment of the Missile Shield by Iran's Defence Minister Vahidi on 22 November 2010, < http://turkish.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn = 8909010378>.

[15] ‘Iran warns over NATO's radar system in Turkey: minister’, Tehran Times, 30 November 2011, < http://www.tehrantimes.com/politics/2267-iran-warns-over-natos-radar-system-in-turkey-minister->.

[16] An agreement between the USA and the Czech Republic was signed on 8 July 2008. A similar treaty was signed with Poland on 14 August 2008 in Warsaw.

[17] ‘Russia's top general says preemptive strike against Missile Shield possible’, Voice of America (VoA), 2 May 2012, < http://www.voanews.com/content/russia-talks-on-us-missile-defense-system-deadlocked–150017775/369880.html>.

[18] ‘China and allies back Russia against US missile shield’, Reuters, 15 June 2011, < http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/15/us-security-usa-missiles-idUSTRE75E2JZ20110615>.

[19] Mustafa Kibaroglu, ‘The “Missile Shield” and Turkey's position in the debate’, Today's Zaman, 1 November 2010, p. 20.

[20] Conversations with American and Israeli military and diplomatic staff as well as academics on the sidelines of conferences in Turkey as well as in the USA who would not want to be named.

[21] Mustafa Kibaroglu, ‘Acceptance and anxiety: Turkey (mostly) embraces Obama's nuclear posture’, Nonproliferation Review, 18(1), March 2011, pp. 201–217.

[22] Nur Bilge Criss, ‘Strategic nuclear missiles in Turkey: the Jupiter Affair (1959–1963)’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 20, 1997, pp. 97–122.

[23] Mustafa Kibaroglu, ‘No short-term fix to relations’, Bitterlemons-International, June 2010.

[24] A similar exploitation could be observed in Iran's using of the threat posed by Israel and the USA for advancing its own nuclear capabilities and legitimizing its actions in the eyes of the public domains in the greater Islamic world and also elsewhere.

[25] Iran's Army Chief of Staff Gen. Hassan Firouzabadi warned NATO on 15 December 2012 that stationing Patriot anti-missile batteries on Turkey's border with Syria was setting the stage for world war. See ‘Iran says deployment of NATO Patriot missiles near Syria may start world war’, Atlantic Council, 16 December 2012, < http://www.acus.org/natosource/iran-says-deployment-nato-patriot-missiles-near-syria-may-start-world-war>.

[26] Yet Turkey has warned Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Ramin Mehmanparast, while he was in Turkey for an official visit in late December, of Turkish officials' displeasure over Iran's remarks on the Patriot deployment in Turkey. See ‘Ankara warns Mehmanparast over Iran's remarks on Patriots’, En.Haberler.Com, 26 December 2012, < http://en.haberler.com/ankara-warns-mehmanparast-over-iran-s-remarks-on-249031/>.

[27] See the interview with the author on the possible implications of the decision to deploy the Patriots on Turkish territory: ‘Patriots might stay in Turkey longer than expected: expert’, Hurriyet Daily News, 26 November 2012, < http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/patriots-might-stay-longer-in-turkey-than-expected.aspx?pageID = 238&nid = 35439>.

[28] For an extensive discussion on the subject, see Mustafa Kibaroglu, ‘Nuclearization of the Middle East and Turkey's possible responses: does Turkey need to be reassured that it does not need to develop nuclear weapons?’, EDAM Discussion Paper Series 2012/5, November 2012.