Telegraphs and Territoriality in Ottoman Africa and Arabia during the Age of High Imperialism

Abstract

This paper investigates the transformation of the Ottoman Empire’s position on the international stage during the age of High Imperialism. It uses two major technological projects, namely, the two Hijaz telegraph lines of 1882 and 1901, as case studies in which to analyse the shift in the Ottoman Empire’s relationship with its European counterparts and draw important conclusions about the relationship between imperialism and technology. The paper makes the argument that only by understanding the Great Powers’ gradual stifling of the Ottoman participation in the ‘Scramble for Africa’, and the connection between the private telegraph industry and imperialism over the 1880s can we appreciate the significance of the shift from Istanbul’s dependence on European telegraph technology in 1882 to its insistence on an independently planned, constructed and run telegraph line 20 years later.

Acknowledgements

I would like to express my gratitude to T. Robert Travers, Amal Ghazal, Jens Hanssen, Elektra Kostopoulou, Ernesto Bassi and Durba Ghosh for reading and commenting on different versions of this paper. I would also like to thank the staff at the Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA) in Istanbul for their kindness, patience and help during the research process.

Notes

1. ‘Minute of a conference respecting the feasibility of a line of overland telegraph through Africa to connect the lines in South Africa with those of Egypt’, Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society of London, 21, 1877, p. 620.

2. Thomas Kuehn, Empire, Islam, and Politics of Difference: Ottoman Rule in Yemen, 1849–1919, Brill, Leiden, 2011; John M. Willis, Unmaking North and South: Cartographies of the Yemeni Past, 1857–1934, Columbia University Press, New York, 2012. The recent work of Sabri Ateş also deals with Hamidian-era unique policies along the Ottoman eastern borderlands in his The Ottoman–Iranian Borderlands: Making a Boundary, 1843–1914, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013.

3. Engin Deniz Akarlı, ‘The problems of external pressures, power struggles, and budgetary deficit in Ottoman politics under Abdülhamid II (1876–1909): origins and solutions’, PhD dissertation, Princeton University, 1976. Even though this dissertation was converted to a monograph, Engin Deniz Akarlı developed his argument further over the next few decades, most significantly in his seminal article ‘The tangled ends of an empire: Ottoman encounters with the West and problems of Westernization—an overview’, Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, 26(3), 2006, pp. 353–366. For more on Abdülhamid II’s use of Islamic symbolism and image making, see Selim Deringil, The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire, 1876–1909, I. B. Tauris, London, 1998; Selim Deringil, ‘The invention of tradition as public image, 1808–1908’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 35, 1993, pp. 3–29. For more on the pan-Islamic ideology promoted by Abdülhamid II, see Kemal Karpat, The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman State, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001. Francois Georgeon offers a detailed and nuanced account on Sultan Abdülhamid II’s life and career in his book Abdülhamid II: Le Sultan Calife, Fayard, Paris, 2003.

4. Ottoman education during the Hamidian period has been a constant focus of research. One of the most well-known sources for the study of the Hamidian education system is Benjamin C. Fortna, Imperial Classroom: Islam, the State, and Education in the Late Ottoman Empire, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002. For more on the lives of Syrian bureaucrats and their education and career paths, see Corinne Lee Blake, ‘Training Arab-Ottoman bureaucrats: Syrian graduates of the Mülkiye Mektebi, 1890–1920’, PhD dissertation, Princeton University, 1991. The Hamidian period is known for its large-scale infrastructure projects. No project is more studied than the Hijaz railway. For more on the Hijaz railway, see William Ochsenwald, ‘The financing of the Hijaz railroad’, Die Welt des Islams, 14, 1973, pp. 129–149; William Ochsenwald, ‘A modern Waqf: the Hijaz railroad, 1900–48’, Arabian Studies, 3, 1976, pp. 1–12; Jacob M. Landau, The Hejaz Railway and the Muslim Pilgrimage: A Case of Ottoman Political Propaganda, Wayne State University Press, Detroit, 1971. For more on the political economy of the Hijaz railway in the Syrian hinterland, see Linda Schatkowski-Schilcher, ‘Railways in the political economy of Southern Syria 1890–1925’, in T. Philipp and B. Schäebler (eds), The Syrian Land: Processes of Integration and Fragmentation, Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart, 1998, pp. 97–112. Ufuk Gülsöy, Hicaz Demiryolu, Eren, Istanbul, 1994; Murat Özyüksel, Hicaz Demiryolu, Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, Istanbul, 2000. For more on the Hijaz railway’s branch to Haifa, see Recep Kürekli, ‘Hicaz Demiryolu’nun Akdeniz’e Açılası ile Yaşayan Sosyo-Ekonomik Dönüşüm: Hayfa Kazası Örneği’, International Journal of History Studies, Middle East Special Issue, 2010, pp. 245–269. Ahmad Raʾfat al-Marwin, ‘al-Khat al-Hadidi al-Hijazi’, PhD dissertation, University of Damascus, 1959; ʿIzza ʿAli Aqbiq, ‘Dukhul al-Sikak al-Hadidiyya ila Bilad al-Sham Awakhir al-Hukm al-ʿUthmani wa Athaaruha al-Siyasiyya wa al-ʿAskariyya wa al-Ijtimaʿiyya wa al-Iqtisadiyya, 1891–1918’, Master’s thesis, University of Damascus, 2006; Johnny Mansour, Al-Khat al-Hadidi al-Hijazi: Tarikh wa Tatawor Qitar Darʿa-Haifa, Muʾasasat al-Dirasaat al-Maqdisiyya, Jerusalem, 2008.

5. Ebru Boyar, Ottomans, Turks and the Balkans: Empire Lost, Relations Altered, I. B. Tauris, London, 2007, p. 1. Also, see Yücel Yanıkdağ, Healing the Nation: Prisoners of War, Medicine, and Nationalism in Turkey 1914–1939, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2013, pp. 1–13 and Elektra Kostopoulu, ‘Armed negotiations: the institutionalization of the late Ottoman locality’, Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, 33, 2013, pp. 295–309.

6. I owe a debt of gratitude to the work of Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, and their call to take the participation of the so-called ‘old empires’ (Ottoman, Habsburg and Russian) in the so-called ‘new imperialism’ often attributed exclusively to western European agents (Britain, France, Italy, Germany). See Jane Burbank and Frederic Cooper, Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 2011.

7. For more on the Ottoman participation in the Scramble for Africa, see Mostafa Minawi, The Ottoman Scramble for Africa: Empire and Diplomacy in the Sahara and the Hijaz, Stanford University Press, Redwood City, CA, 2016.

8. I will refer to Sultan Abdülhamid II and his close advisors by the name of the palace where he resided and conducted most of the state affairs. The choice of this term is intentional, meant to highlight the separation between the Sublime Porte and the palace when it came to the decision-making process during the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II. The Palace’s rising power during the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II is a salient feature of his rule, and a sharp contrast to the power that the Sublime Porte monopolized at the height of the Tanzimat era.

9. I borrow this term from the historian of Japanese imperialism in China Daqing Yang who defines it as ‘The strategic practice of designing or using technology for the purpose of advancing empire-building goals …’ in Technology of Empire: Telecommunications and Japanese Expansion in Asia, 1883–1945, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2010, p. 8.

10. Alan Mikhail and Christine Philliou, ‘The Ottoman and the imperial turn’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 54, 2013, pp. 721–745.

11. Pascal Griset and Daniel Headrick, ‘Submarine telegraph cables: business and politics, 1838–1939’, The Business History Review, 75, 2001, p. 568.

12. P. M. Kennedy, ‘Imperial cable communication and strategy, 1870–1914’, The English Historical Review, 86, 1971, p. 730.

13. Historians such as Ezel Shaw have argued that this was just a symbolic gesture that was forgotten less than 20 years later when war erupted between Russia and the Ottoman Empire. Regardless, at the time it held enough symbolic meaning to spur on some Ottoman–European diplomatic cooperation. Ezel Kural Shaw, ‘Integrity and integration: assumptions and expectations behind nineteenth century decision making’, in Caesar Farah (ed.), Decision Making and Change in the Ottoman Empire, The Thomas Jefferson University Press, Kirksville, MI, 1993, p. 40.

14. For more on the early years of the telegraph in the Ottoman Empire, see Yakup Bektaş, ‘The Sultan’s messenger: cultural constructions of Ottoman telegraphy, 1847–1880’, Technology and Culture, 41, 2000, pp. 669–696.

15. In 1869, Pender founded the Falmouth, Gibraltar and Malta Cable Company and the British Indian Submarine Telegraph Company, which connected the Anglo-Mediterranean cable (linking Malta to Alexandria using a cable manufactured by one of Pender’s companies) to Britain and India, respectively. In 1872, the three companies were merged with the Marseilles, Algiers and Malta Telegraph Company to form the Eastern Telegraph Company, with Pender at its helm, <www.atlantic-cable.com> (accessed 25 July 2013).

16. Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (henceforth cited as BOA), Şura-yı Devlet Maruzatı (henceforth cited as ŞD)-2254/15, 22 July 1880.

17. Not to be confused with the Ministry of Post and Telegraph (Telegraf ve Posta Nezareti). The council was a special board of experts and bureaucrats assembled for the Hijaz telegraph line project.

18. BOA, ŞD-2254/15, 22 July 1880.

19. Christina Harris, ‘The Persian Gulf submarine telegraph of 1864’, The Geographical Journal, 135(2), 1969, p. 184.

20. Kennedy, op. cit., p. 731.

21. BOA, ŞD-2254/15, 22 July 1880.

22. The Ottoman Empire’s treasury declared bankruptcy in October 1875.

23. The British government was determined to be the dominant force in international telecommunication as a way of maintaining a military advantage over its European counterparts. The British imperial government understood that controlling communication was as vital as having a strong naval fleet at its disposal. For more on this, see Griset and Headrick, op. cit., pp. 543–578.

24. BOA, ŞD-2254/15, 22 July 1880.

25. The complexity of the codes used becomes evident when looking at one of the yearly Ottoman Telegraph Guides issued to the telegraph offices, some of which have survived. Some of the telegraph guides used in the Damascus office are preserved at the Institut Français du Proche-Orient (IFPO): Telegraph Rehebleri, Posta ve Telegraf ve Telefon Nezareti, Istanbul, 1912.

26. Soli Shahvar, ‘Tribes and telegraphs in lower Iraq: the Muntafiq and the Baghdad–Basrah telegraph line of 1863–65’, Middle Eastern Studies, 39, 2003, p. 92. For more on the Istanbul–Fao line and previous British attempts to cooperate with the Ottoman government to extend the telegraph line through its territories, see Harris, op. cit., pp. 169–190; Soli Shahvar, ‘Concession hunting in the age of reform: British companies and the search for government guarantees; telegraph concessions through Ottoman territories, 1855–58’, Middle Eastern Studies, 38, 2002, pp. 169–193.

27. BOA, İrade, Dahiliye (henceforth cited as I.DH)-853/68401, 1 May 1882.

28. Suakin was the former Ottoman provincial capital of the Province of Abyssinia (Habeş Eyaleti) in the 16th century, and was reincorporated into the Ottoman domain in the 19th century.

29. Juan Cole, Colonialism and Revolution in the Middle East: Social and Cultural Origins of Egypt’s Urabi Movement, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1992, p. 112.

30. For more on the development of the Sudanese infrastructure during the rule of Khedive Ismail, see Ghada H. Talhami, Suakin and Massawa under Egyptian Rule, 1865–1885, University Press of America, Washington, DC, 1979, pp. 97–124.

31. BOA, Yıldız Sadaret Resmi Maruzat Evrakı (henceforth cited as Y.A.RES)-17/59, 30 October 1882.

32. Tom Standage, The Victorian Internet: The Remarkable Story of the Telegraph and the Nineteenth Century’s On-line Pioneers, Walker, New York, 1998, pp. 92–93.

33. BOA, Yıldız Sadaret Hususı Maruzat (henceforth cited as Y.A.HUS)-171/112, 31 October 1882; the lack of reliability extended to the overland route between Cairo and Istanbul as well, prompting many in Cairo to use the post service as a backup for important messages. For more on the telegraph service in Cairo and its relation to Egyptian perception of time, see On Barak, On Time: Technology and Temporality in Modern Egypt, University of California Press, Los Angeles, 2013.

34. BOA, Y.A.HUS-171/118, 13 November 1882.

35. BOA, Y.A.RES-21/46, 8 October 1883; he did not follow orders for his immediate relocation, feeling that further compensation should be provided, especially considering the importance of the mission and the length of time he would have to spend away from his home in Syria. However, after financial rewards for his good service and compensation for being away from his home were given, he and two assistants moved to Cairo to assume their new responsibilities. This was not to be a temporary assignment, and three years later, Émile Bey and his Syrian assistants had to be financially enticed yet again to remain in Cairo with further increases in their salaries, indicating the necessity of their presence in Egypt. BOA, Y.A.RES-21/46, 8 October 1883; three years later, Émile Bey and his Syrian assistants had to be enticed yet again to remain in Cairo with further increases in their salaries, indicating the necessity of their presence in Egypt. BOA, I.ŞD-80/4747, 4 April 1886.

36. For a comprehensive study of the Mahdist State, see P. M. Holt, The Mahdist State in the Sudan, 1881–1898: A Study in its Origins, Development and Overthrow, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1970.

37. Talhami, op. cit., pp. 195–216.

38. Kennedy, op. cit., p. 741.

39. BOA, Dahiliye Nezareti Mektubi Kalemi-1632/11, 27 June 1889; diversion of the Jeddah–Suakin traffic to the Syrian network, coupled with the exponential increase in demand for telegraphic communication in general caused an expansion of the telegraphic network within the province of Syria and increasing the staffing of telegraph offices in Beirut and Damascus. For example, the Beirut office, which formerly fell under the directorship of the Damascus office, was made an independent branch with its own director. BOA, DH.MKT-1588/96, 29 January 1889.

40. BOA, ŞD-2667/41, 13 May 1896; İrade, Posta ve Telegraf (henceforth cited as İ.PT)II-8/1313-Z-3, 16 May 1896; İ.PT-5/1313-ca-3, 7 November 1895; the ripple effect could be felt as far as Kayseri, a nodal point for the telegraph messages coming from the Arab provinces. In 1893, the Ottoman government approved the construction of an additional telegraph line in Kayseri to handle the increase in the volume of messages. BOA, İ.PT-2/1310-Z-2, 21 June 1893.

41. In 1893, a decade after the line went into operation, urgent repairs were finally approved by the Ministry of Telegraph and Post, the office of the grand vizier and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. BOA, DH.MKT-6/60, 31 January 1893; İ.PT-2/1310-l-5, 15 May 1893; DH.MKT-48/25, 27 May 1893.

42. Elektra was a steamship built in 1884 and registered to the Lloyd Austria Co. and was registered in the city of Trieste, a port city in the Austro-Hungarian Empire at the time. See Lloyd’s Register of Ships, 1900–1, Ross & Co., London, 1901.

43. BOA, ŞD-2665/58, 13 August 1897; the location of the submarine cable continued to be a source of problems until 1907, when an order endorsed by the Council of Ministers and the Sublime Porte was sent out to move the cable line away from the Jeddah harbour. The breakage became an increased risk particularly due to the increased traffic from the delivery of equipment and material for the construction of the last phase of the Hijaz railway. BOA, I.PT-23/1325-S-3, 4 April 1907.

44. BOA, DH.MKT-6/60, 31 January 1893.

45. BOA, Y.A.HUS-217/13, 9 September 1888.

46. For more on the Ottoman second period of rule of Yemen starting in 1872, and the special status of the Yemen as the southern frontier of the empire during a time of colonial competition in the Red Sea, see Caesar Farah, The Sultan’s Yemen: Nineteenth Century Challenges to Ottoman Rule, I. B. Tauris, London, 2002; Isa Blumi, Foundations of Modernity, Human Agency and the Imperial State, Routledge, London, 2012; and Kuehn, op. cit.

47. BOA, Y.A.HUS-217/28, 16 September 1888; I.DH-1099/86125, 15 September 1888.

48. The General Act of Berlin came as the outcome of the Conference of Berlin (1884–85). The Conference of Berlin (also referred to as the West African Conference of Berlin) was convened on the behest of Germany’s Bismarck and took place in his private residence between 15 November 1884 and 26 February 1885. With 15 European powers (including the Ottoman Empire) attending, this was the first conference aimed at setting the rules for the division of the continent of Africa between the major powers. George Shepperson, ‘The centennial of the West African Conference of Berlin, 1884–1885’, Phylon, 46, 1985, pp. 37–48.

49. For an overview of the concept of ‘effective occupation’ and its role in designating an international legal code for colonial occupation after the Conference of Berlin, 1884–85, see S. Forster and W. J. Mommsen, Bismarck, Europe and Africa: The Berlin Africa Conference 1884–85 and the Onset of Partition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1988.

50. Claudio Canaparo, ‘Marconi and other artifices: long-range technology and the conquest of the desert’, in Jens Andermann and William Rowe (eds), Images of Power, Iconography, Culture and the State in Latin America, Berghahn Books, New York, 2005, pp. 243–244.

51. BOA, Y.A.HUS-217/13, 9 September 1888.

52. BOA, DH.MKT-2242/16, 3 September 1899; ŞD-1135/6, 15 July 1901; DH.MKT-555/27, 8 August 1902.

53. Khedive Ismail had conquered this area south of Khartoum in the name of Sultan Abdülaziz, but no substantial Ottoman presence was subsequently established. The area discussed in the British–Belgian agreement was considered part of Egyptian Sudan, and an extended region of the Egyptian hinterland. For more on how the Province of Equatoria was created during an expansionist bid by Khedive Ismail, see İdris Bostan, ‘The Ottoman Empire and the Congo: the crisis of 1893–95’, in Selim Deringil and Sinan Kuneralp (eds), Studies on Ottoman Diplomatic History, Part V, Isis, Istanbul, 1990, pp. 103–106. For more on Khedive Ismail’s military expansion into east Africa south of Egypt, see John P. Dunn, Khedive Ismail’s Army, Routledge, London, 2005.

54. BOA, Yıldız Perakende Arzuhal ve Jurnaller (henceforth cited as Y.PRK.AZJ)-29/64, 15 August 1894.

55. BOA, Hariciye Nezareti Evrakı Siyasi (henceforth cited as HR.SYS)-1603/11, 25 September 1894.

56. BOA, Yıldız Perakende Posta ve Telegraf Nezareti Maruzatı (henceforth cited as Y.PRK.PT)-10/67, 12 June 1896.

57. BOA, DH.MKT-2162/95, 24 January 1899; DH.MKT-2169/54, 23 February 1899.

58. The list included the Minister of External Affairs, the head of the Council of State, the Minister of Education, the Director of Religious Endowments, the head of the Treasury, a representative from the Imperial Armory, the Minister of Internal Affairs, a Grand Vizier’s advisor, the Şeyhülislam, the Minister of Justice, a representative from the army and the navy, and the Minister of Commerce. BOA, Y.A.RES-84/79, 28 January 1897.

59. For more on the intersection of steam power and imperialism, see Ben Marsden and Crosbie Smith, Engineering Empires: A Cultural History of Technology in Nineteenth-Century Britain, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2005. Other historians have also explored the intersection between imperialism, science and technology, most representatively, Eric Tagliacozzo, ‘The lit archipelago: coast lighting and the imperial optic in insular Southeast Asia, 1860–1910’, Technology and Culture, 46, 2005, pp. 306–328; Michael Ada, Machines as the Measure of Men: Science, Technology and Ideologies of Western Dominance, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 1989.

60. Yang, op. cit., p. 8.

61. In 1836, Joseph Henry of Princeton University used earth as a conductor to invent what some believe could have been the first telegraph line. A painter by the name of Joseph Morse, who claims to have been the first to think of a national telegraph network, sought the assistance of Professor Henry to create the first working telegraph instrument. Either way, Morse was the one to further develop the instrument and take the idea to several states. Chester G. Hearn, Circuits in the Sea: The Men, the Ships, and the Atlantic Cable, Praeger, Westport, CT, 2004, p. 5.

62. For more on Morse’s life’s struggles to promote the use of the telegraph to governments around the world, see Kenneth Silverman, Lightning Man: The Accursed Life of Samuel F. B. Morse, First Da Capo Press, Cambridge, MA, 2003.

63. Hearn, op. cit., p. 7.

64. Ibid., p. 8. Gutta-percha was used as the equivalent of plastic today, but was an expensive material that had to be imported from South East Asia at great cost to the producers limiting its mass use for everyday products. Standage, op. cit., p. 70.

65. Robert W. D. Boyce, ‘Imperial dreams and national realities: Britain, Canada and the struggle for a Pacific telegraph cable’, The English Historical Review, 115, 2000, p. 39.

66. John Tully, ‘A Victorian ecological disaster: imperialism, the telegraph, and gutta-percha’, Journal of World History, 20, 2009, p. 567.

67. Yakup Bektaş, ‘Displaying the American genius: the electromagnetic telegraph in the wider world’, The British Journal of the History of Science, 34, 2001, p. 217.

68. Daniel Headrick, ‘A double-edged sword: communications and imperial control in British India’, Historical Social Research, 35(1), 2010, p. 55.

69. Deep Kanta Lahiri Choudhury, Telegraphic Imperialism: Crisis and Panic in the Indian Empire, c. 1830, Palgrave Macmillan Transnational History Series, New York, 2010, p. 107. For more on the Anglo-Persian negotiations over the Indo-European telegraph line, see Soli Shahvar, ‘Communications, Qajar irredentism, and the strategies of British India: the Makran Coast telegraph and British policy of containing Persia in the East (Baluchistan)—Part 1’, Iranian Studies, 39, 2006, pp. 329–351.

70. Bektaş, ‘The Sultan’s messenger’, op. cit., p. 669. Soon after, a second line that went through the Russian territories and Tehran and then connected with the submarine line was opened. Even though the overall transmission time was much faster, it did not solve the fundamental concern of having complete control over British imperial communication. Daniel Headrick, The Invisible Weapon: Telecommunications and International Politics, 1851–1945, Oxford University Press, New York, 1991, pp. 21–22.

71. Daniel Headrick, The Tools of Empire: Technology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century, Oxford University Press, New York, 1981, p. 160.

72. Headrick, The Invisible Weapon, op. cit., pp. 120–122.

73. Headrick, ‘A double-edged sword’, op. cit., p. 56.

74. Standage, op. cit., p. 103.

75. Headrick, The Invisible Weapon, op. cit., p. 30.

76. Choudhury, op. cit., p. 117.

77. Griset and Headrick, op. cit., pp. 549–562.

78. Pike and Winseck, op. cit., p. 108.

79. Ariane Knuesel, ‘British diplomacy and the telegraph in nineteenth-century China’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, 18, 2007, p. 523.

80. Griset and Headrick, op. cit., p. 563.

81. For much more on the telegraph monopoly of the Eastern Company and its affiliates and the role it played in the southern Atlantic, see Javier Marquez Quevedo, ‘Telecommunication and colonial rivalry: European telegraph cables to the Canary Islands and Northwest Africa, 1883–1914’, Historical Research Review, 35, 2010, pp. 108–124.

82. Pike and Winseck, op. cit., p. 100.

83. Ibid., p. 93. Ariane Knuesel makes a very similar argument in which the author explains that European imperialism in China, before 1900, took on the tools of ‘informal imperialism’ that would help support a strong government and to maintain the commercial interests within China. Knuesel, op. cit., p. 526.

84. Pike and Winseck, op. cit., pp. 95–96.

85. Sultan Abdülhamid II Han, Muthakarati al-Siyasiyya (1891–1908), Translator’s name not given, Muʾasasat-ul-Risala, Beirut, 1979, p. 106.

86. BOA, DH.MKT-2242/16, 3 September 1899.

87. Mikhail and Philliou, op. cit., p. 743.