Post catch-up system transition failure: the case of ICT technology development in Korea

Figures & data

Figure 1: Research framework.

Table 1: The main characteristics of each case.

	Catch-up phase project	Transition-phase project
	TDX	IMT-2000	WiBro
Development period	1981–1991 Three-stage development process	1997–2001 Two-stage development process	2001–2007 Two-stage development process
Development object	Assimilation and localisation of digital telecommunication switching system Import-substitution	World’s first mobile communication system and service technology development	World’s first wireless broadband internet technology
Input of resources	3320 manpower US$96 million	US$174 million	Public (ETRI) 192 manpower/Private (Samsung) 60 manpower US$32 million (Private fund)
Performance of technology development	1991 digital telecom switching system development	1998 Synchronous IMT-2000 technology development, 2000 Synchronous IMT-2000 standard approved (ITU)	2005 approved for global standard in IEEE
Service commercialization	1991 2.2 million line service launch	2001 Synchronous service provider designated (LGT) 2002 Asynchronous IMT-2000 service launch (SKT)	2006. 6. WiBro commercial service
Market performance	Export to developing countries (936 million $)	2006 LGT discarded synchronous IMT-2000 service	-Insufficient market size -Supplementary role to LTE service

Table 2: Comparison of CDMA-2000 and W-CDMA.

	Synchronous (CDMA 2000)	Asynchronous (W-CDMA)
Stakeholders	CDMA device manufacturers (Samsung Electronics, Hyundai Electronics) The Ministry of Information and Communication and other related organisations	Mainly mobile telecommunication operators (SK Telecom, KT, LG Telecom) LG Electronics, a latecomer in device manufacturing
Support logic	CDMA competitiveness improvement The possibility of entering Southeast Asian regions with CDMA The need for multiple standards Faster commercialisation than asynchronous devices	Possible global business collaboration A large number of mobile telecom subscribers Profit increase with global roaming Wider business opportunity than CDMA

Sources: Adapted from Cho (2003) and Song (2009).

Table 3: Catch-up regime and performance.

	Catch-up regime	Performance
Policy planning	Technology supply-driven planning by single Ministry as a control tower	Targeting and planning in existing technology Strong driving force via large-scale resource allocation
Resource allocation	Public Research Institute driven with manufacturing related large SME participation in national R&D program	Rapid learning and diffusion in imported generic technologies Creation of core player
Coordination	Coordination among innovation actors via hierarchical control mechanism Incentive via procurement function	Condensed learning and development via public procurement with guided competition

Table 4: Persistent catch-up regime and failure in system transition.

	Persisted catch-up regime	System transition failures
Policy planning	Technology supply-driven planning by single Ministry as a control tower	Inter-ministerial difficulties Success in technology development with international standard but failure in market creation
Resource allocation	PRI driven with manufacturing-related large SME participation in national R&D program	World first technology development Closed innovation activities resulted in Korean IT Galapagos syndrome
Coordination	Coordination among innovation actors via hierarchical control mechanism	Conflict and coordination failure between device manufacturer and service provider

Cho, H.S. (2003), ‘From monopoly to new governance: political economy of liberalization in the Korean mobile market’, Korean Political Science Association Journal, 37(5), 439–460.

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Song, K.J. (2009), ‘A research on the policy network in the policy making process of IT industry’, A Study on Korean Public Administration, 18(3), 159–181 [Texts in Korean].

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