UK pension sustainability and fund manager governance: agent duties to the principal

Abstract

Sustainable investing includes the application of non-financial (Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG)) criteria to asset selection in institutional investor portfolios [Capelle-Blancard, G., and S. Monjon. 2011. “Trends in the Literature on Socially Responsible Investment: Looking for the Keys Under the Lamppost.” Business Ethics: A European Review 21(3): 239–250]. The article explores the implications for applying ESG screening to the institutional investors making the asset selections. Institutional investors are a heterogeneous group of investors, with fund managers specifically being some of the largest listed organisations globally [Ingley, C. B., and N. T. van der Walt. 2004. “Corporate Governance, Institutional Investors and Conflicts of Interest.” Corporate Governance 12(4): 534–553]. Whether their own corporate management duties to fiduciary governance (the G in ESG) benefiting their shareholders has any material impact on the financial returns outcomes of the pension asset management contract, and specifically whether there is a fiduciary conflict favouring of the exclusive best interest of fund management shareholders is the question addressed by the paper.

Keywords:

• UK pensions
• fund managers
• sustainable investing
• ESG
• corporate governance
• fiduciary duties
• principal-agent theory

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

ORCID

Richard McManus http://orcid.org/0000-0001-8430-9328