Evidence-based judicial review of legislation in divided states: the Belgian case

ABSTRACT

This paper presents a case study on the Belgian Constitutional Court to examine why courts in some countries are more inclined to review legislation on an evidentiary basis than courts in others. It analyses how the Court, when assessing Parliamentary Acts, deals with scientific evidence used in the legislative process or the lack thereof. Subsequently, four hypotheses are examined that might explain the limited use of scientific evidence in the jurisprudence of the Belgian Court. Of these hypotheses, the judges’ expertise, the infancy of better regulation programmes, and the political context seem to offer the most plausible explanations.

KEYWORDS:

• Constitutional Court
• Belgium
• evidence-based review
• empirical investigation

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

1 Konstantin Markin v Russia (App no 30078/06) ECHR 7 October 2010.

2 A. Alemanno, ‘The Emergence of the Evidence-based Judicial Reflex: A Response to Bar-Siman-Tov’s Semiprocedural Review’ (2013) 1 TPLeg 329; and A. Alemanno, ‘Impact Assessment and Courts’, forthcoming in C. Radaelli and C. Dunlop, Handbook on Regulatory Impact Assessment (Edward Elgar).

3 Konstantin Markin v Russia, Grand Chamber Decision of 22 March 2012 [App. No. 30078/06]. Background information provided by Judge A. Nussbaum at the seminar on ‘procedural review and the European Court of Human Rights’ at the University of Ghent, 21–22 May 2015.

4 S. Rose-Ackerman, S. Egidy and J. Fowkes, Due Process of Lawmaking (Cambridge University Press 2015) 185.

5 See R. Masterman, ‘Process and Substance in Judicial Review in the United Kingdom and at Strasbourg: Proportionality, Subsidiarity, Complementarity?’ in E. Brems and J. Gerards, Procedural Review and the European Court of Human Rights (Cambridge University Press 2016).

6 Hirst (no 2) v the United Kingdom (App no 74025/01) ECHR 30 March 2005 and [GC] ECHR 2005-IX.

7 P. Popelier, ‘The Role of Courts in Legislative Policy Diffusion and Divergence’ (2015) 3 TPLeg 2015, 316–318.

8 These include all judgments in which the Court gave a final decision on the substance. Other cases, e.g. in which the Court decided on a request for suspension, declared the request inadmissible or sent a preliminary reference to the Court of Justice, were not coded.

9 In 1988, it received the power to review Acts of Parliament against constitutional clauses protecting rights and freedoms concerning education, as well as the equality principle; since 2003 it can review Acts of Parliament directly against fundamental rights inserted under Title II of the Constitution.

10 In addition, since 2014, it can review decisions of an audit commission regarding the audit of the Chamber of Representatives’ election expenses, as well as decisions to organise regional consultative referenda.

11 Data drawn from the database that we built at the University of Antwerp for a project financed by the Fund for Scientific Research (FWO), under the supervision of Patricia Popelier and Jan Beyers and executed by Josephine De Jaegere.

12 A. Alemanno, ‘The Emergence of the Evidence-based Judicial Reflex: A Response to Bar-Siman-Tov’s Semiprocedural Review’ (2013) 1 TPLeg 333.

13 Const. Court No 1/1993, 7 January 1993.

14 Const. Court No 182/2008, 72/2009, 73/2009, 110/2009, 118/2009, 176/2009. In No 73/2009, the Court confines itself to quoting its judgment No 182/2008.

15 Const. Court Nos 127/2000, 81/2003, 198/2006, 61/2010.

16 Const. Court Nos 50/2003, 51/2003, 189/2005.

17 Const. Court Nos 27/2014 and 180/2015.

18 Const. Court Nos 50/2011, 145/2013.

19 Const. Court No 30/1999; No 94/2003; No 72/2008; No 31/2009; No 72/2009; No 118/2009; No 176/2009.

20 Const. Court No 2/2009, 15 January 2009.

21 Const. Court Nos 50 and 51/2003, 30 April 2003; Const. Court No 193/2006, 5 December 2006.

22 In another case, they added the reproach that preparatory studies were lacking to the claim that the allocation of powers rules were violated because the sub-states had not been consulted: Const. Court No. 193/2006, 5 December 2006. The law defines the neglect of federal consultation requirements as a violation of allocation of power rules.

23 Const. Court No 29/1996, 15 May 1996; Const. Court No 2/2009, 15 January 2009.

24 Const. Court No 89/2012.

25 Const. Court No 42/1997.

26 Const. Court No 127/2000.

27 Const. Court No 7/1995, 2 February 1995.

28 Const. Court No 29/1996, 15 May 1996; Const. Court No 89/2011, 31 May 2011.

29 Const. Court No 7/1995, 2 February 1995.

30 Const. Court No 182/2008, 18 December 2008.

31 Const. Court No 41/1995, 6 June 1995; Const. Court No 180/2015, 17 December 2015.

32 Const. Court No 89/2012, 12 July 2012.

33 Const. Court No 27/2014, 13 February 2014; Const. Court No 50/2015, 30 April 2015.

34 Const. Court No 27/2014, 13 February 2014, § B.13.3.

35 Const. Court No 195/2004, 1 December 2004, § B.24.6.

36 Const. Court No 1/93, 7 January 1993; Const. Court No 37/2011, 15 March 2011.

37 For example, Const. Court No 10/1998, 11 February 1998; Const. Court No 50/2011, 6 April 2011.

38 Const. Court No 70/2001, 30 May 2001.

39 Const. Court No 2/2009, 15 January 2009.

40 Const. Court No 8/2014, 23 January 2014.

41 Const. Court No 196/2011, 22 December 2011.

42 In Const. Court No 196/2011, 22 December 2011, the government departed from expert advice submitted by the High Council of Justice.

43 Const. Court No 51/2003, 30 April 2003.

44 Smith and Grady v the United Kingdom (App nos 33985/96; 33986/96) Reports 1999-VI.

45 With regard to expert testimonials, see the standards established by the US Supreme Court in Daubert v Merell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

46 For example, Const. Court No 89/2011, 31 May 2011.

47 For example, Const. Court No 94/2003, 2 July 2003; Const. Court No 72/2009, 5 May 2009; Const. Court No 110/2009, 9 July 2009; Const. Court No 176/2009, 12 November 2009.

48 For example, Const. Court No 40/2007, 15 March 2007; Const. Court No 31/2009, 24 February 2009; Const. Court No 72/2009, 5 May 2009; Const. Court No 69/2010, 10 June 2010.

49 For example, Const. Court No 22/2000, 23 February 2000; Const. Court No 151/2006, 18 October 2006.

50 For example, Const. Court No 160/2003, 10 December 2003.

51 Animal Defenders International v the United Kingdom, Grand Chamber decision of 22 April 2013 [App. No 48876/08] § 114.

52 For example, Const. Court No 41/1995, 6 June 1995. This is certainly the case if the petitioners (unjustly) argue that the lawmaker did not have correct figures at his/her disposal to justify the measure: Const. Court No 4/2011, 13 January 2011.

53 Const. Court No 37/2011, 15 March 2011.

54 Const. Court No 9/2007, 11 January 2007.

55 For example, Const. Court No 1/1993, 7 January 1993, Const. Court No 24/1996, 27 March 1996, Const. Court No 29/1996, 15 May 1996, Const. Court No 42/199714 July 1997, Const. Court No 134/1998, 16 December 1998, Const. Court No 127/2000, 6 December 2000, Const. Court No 51/2003, 30 April 2003, Const. Court No 81/2003, 11 June 2003, Const. Court No 147/2004, 15 September 2004, Const. Court No 186/2005, 14 December 2005, Const. Court No 189/2005, 14 December 2005, Const. Court No 142/2006, 20 September 2006, Const. Court No 198/2006, 13 December 2006, Const. Court No 96/2008, 26 June 2008, Const. Court No 37/2009, 4 March 2009, Const. Court No 61/2010, 27 May 2010, Const. Court No 74/2010, 23 June 2010, Const. Court No 147/2010, 16 December 2010, Const. Court No 89/2011, 31 May 2011, Const. Court No 128/2011, 14 July 2011, Const. Court No 196/2011, 22 December 2011, Const. Court No 78/2013, 6 June 2013, Const. Court No 8/2014, 23 January 2014, Const. Court No 27/2014, 13 February 2014, Const. Court No 176/2014, 4 December 2014.

56 Const. Court No 47/2004, 24 March 2004, Const. Court No 53/2009, 19 March 2009, Const. Court No 150/2012, 13 December 2012, Const. Court No 170/2014, 27 November 2014, Const. Court No 50/2015, 30 April 2015. Also Const. Court No 143/2007, 22 November 2007, Const. Court No 8/2014, 23 January 2014.

57 Const. Court No 7/2012, 18 January 2012, Const. Court No 106/2014, 17 July 2014, Const. Court No 114/2015, 17 September 2015, Const. Court No 180/2015, 17 December 2015. See also Const. Court No 142/2015, 15 October 2015.

58 Const. Court No 72/2008, 24 April 2008, Const. Court No 153/2015, 29 October 2015.

59 Const. Court No 138/2009, 17 September 2009.

60 Const. Court No 145/2013, 7 November 2013.

61 Const. Court No 29/1996, 15 May 1996, Const. Court No 42/199714 July 1997, Const. Court No 127/2000, 6 December 2000.

62 Const. Court No 50/2011, 6 April 2011 and Const. Court No 145/2013, 7 November 2013.

63 Const. Court No 3/2013, 17 January 2013.

64 See T.S. Clark et al., ‘Measuring the Political Salience of Supreme Court Cases’ (2015) 3 Journal of Law and Courts 44.

65 K. Sill et al., ‘Media coverage of the U.S. Supreme Court: How Do Journalists Assess the Importance of Court Decisions?’ (2013) 30 Political Communication 2013, 11–18.

66 J. De Jaegere, ‘Inclusiviteit als deliberatieve bouwsteen van legitimiteit: een empirische analyse van het Belgische Grondwettelijk Hof’ (2015) Tijdschrift voor Bestuurswetenschappen en Publiekrecht 209.

67 L. Epstein and J.A. Segal, ‘Measuring Issue Salience’, (2000) 44 American Journal of Political Science 66–83; T.A. Collins and C.A. Cooper, ‘Case Salience and Media Coverage of Supreme Court Decisions: Toward a New Measure’ (2012) 65 Political Research Quarterly 396–407; K. Sill, supra n. 64.

68 Epstein and Segal, supra n. 66, at p. 66.

69 In fact, on average 16.7 newspaper articles before and 3.2 after such judgments. In regular cases, this is much lower: 0.39 and 1 newspaper article on average. An independent samples t-test showed that these differences were significant (equal variances not assumed: p = 0.013 (before) and p = 0.001 (after)).

70 Expertise cases attract on average 1.80 different types of parties, whereas in regular cases the average is 1.39. An independent samples t-test shows that this difference is significant (equal variances not assumed, p = 0.001).

71 The correlation between the dichotomous variable ‘reference to expertise’ on the one hand and the dichotomous variables ‘small or large (< 5) groups’ of petitioning or intervening parties is significant but weak: Phi 0.088 (p = 0.000) for petitioning parties and Phi 0,050 (p = 0.005) for intervening parties.

72 Phi 0.086 (p = 0.000).

73 Const. Court Nos 50 and 51/2003, 30 April 2003 and Const. Court No 37/2011, 15 March 2011.

74 E. Mangez, ‘Global Knowledge-based Policy in Fragmented Societies: The Case of Curriculum Reform in French-speaking Belgium’ (2010) 45 European Journal of Education 60.

75 Const. Court No 89/2011, 31 May 2011.

76 Const. Court No 4/2011, 13 January 2011.

77 P. Popelier, ‘The Court as Regulatory Watchdog. The Procedural Approach in the Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights’ in P. Popelier, A. Mazmanyan and W. Vandenbruwaene (eds), The Role of Constitutional Courts in Multilevel Government (Intersentia 2013) 249–267.

78 A. Alemanno, ‘A Meeting of Minds on Impact Assessment: When ex ante Evaluation Meets ex post Judicial Control’ (2011) 17 European Public Law 485–505; D. Keyaerts, ‘Courts as Regulatory Watchdogs. Does the European Court of Justice Bark or Bite?’, in Popelier, Mazmanyan and Vandenbruwaene, supra n. 76 at p. 281–284; K. Lenaerts, ‘The European Court of Justice and Process-oriented Review’, working paper in Research Papers in Law, No 1/2012, Bruges, Europa College, 12.

79 Phi 0.148 (p = 0.000). On average, the Court is asked to review against EU law in 5.9% of the cases. In expertise judgments, this rises to 29%.

80 Phi 0.122 (p = 0.000). On average, the Court refers to case law of the European Court of Justice in 4.6% of the cases. In expertise judgments, this rises to 21.7%.

81 ECJ (Grand Chamber) Bressol and Chaverot, C-37/08, 13 April 2010, para 71–75.

82 Const. Court No 89/2011, 31 May 2011.

83 Const. Court No. 50/2015, 30 March 2015.

84 Phi 0.085 (p = 0.000).

85 Phi 0.056 (p = 0.000).

86 Hatton v the United Kingdom, Grand Chamber decision of 8 July 2003, [2003] ECHR VIII, §§ 99 and 128.

87 Const. Court No 50/2003, 30 April 2003, A.4.2.

88 B.8.4.

89 Const. Court No 51/2003, 30 April 2003.

90 E. Mak, ‘Judicial Review of Regulatory Instruments: The Least Imperfect Alternative?’(2012) 6 Legisprudence 301–319.

91 On average 25.2%. In 2015, this rose to 40%.

92 To the Supreme Court (Court of Cassation): on average 10% and 9% in 2015; to the Council of State: on average 2.8%, this rose to 6% in 2015.

93 Court of Justice: on average 4.6%, and 11% in 2015; European Court of Human Rights: on average 10.4%, and 34% in 2015.

94 On average 7.9%; 18% in 2015.

95 On average 85.5%; 96% in 2015.

96 On average 2.7%; 5% in 2015.

97 A. Alemanno, ‘The Emergence of the Evidence-Based Judicial Reflex: A Response to Bar-Siman-Tov’s Semiprocedural Review’ (2013) 1 TPLeg 333.

98 For possible explanations see P. Popelier, ‘The Role of Courts in Legislative Policy Diffusion and Divergence’ (2015) 3 TPLeg 316–318.

99 Alemanno, supra n. 96.

100 P. T’Kindt and J. Van Nieuwenhove, ‘De federale voorafgaande regelgevingsimpactanalyse (RIA) – een wassen neus of een stap vooruit?’ (2014) Tijdschrift voor Wetgeving 174–175.

101 Critical for this reason: P. Popelier and W. Marneffe, ‘De reguleringsimpactanalyse en de bescherming van grondrechten: een verantwoordelijkheid van wetgever en rechter. Een toepassing op het huisonderwijs’ (2014) Tijdschrift voor Wetgeving 212–223.

102 K. Meßerschmidt, ‘The Race to Rationality Review and the Score of the German Federal Constitutional Court’ (2012) 5 Legisprudence, 372.

103 A. Mazmanyan, ‘Majoritarianism, deliberation and accountability as institutional instincts of constitutional courts’ in P. Popelier, A. Mazmanyan and W. Vandenbruwaene (eds.), The Role of Constitutional Courts in Multilevel Governance (Intersentia, 2013) 167–168.

104 Ibid., 168–169.

105 G. Vanberg, The Politics of Constitutional Review in Germany (Cambridge University Press 2005) 12–14.

106 For example, Const. Court No 90/94, 22 December 1994.

107 For example, Const. Court Nos 66/89, 45/92, 18/2004, 123/2006, 2/2009, 70/2013.

108 Art. 30bis of the Special Majority Law on the Constitutional Court.

109 For example, Const. Court Nos 132/2004, 128/2005, 136/2006.

110 Const. Court No 35/2003, 25 March 2003.

111 Ibid.

112 Const. Court Nos 144/2012, 22 November 2012 and 29/2014, 13 February 2014.

113 Rose-Ackerman, Egidy and Fowkes, supra n. 4.

114 Rose-Ackerman, Egidy and Fowkes, supra n. 4, 13–16; 263–267.

115 See C.M. Radaelli and F. De Francesco, Regulatory Quality in Europe (Manchester University Press 2007) 40.

116 R. Hoppe, ‘Ex Ante Evaluation of Legislation: between Puzzling and Powering’ in J. Verschuuren (ed.), The Impact of Legislation (Martinus Nijhoff 2009) 84.

117 C.F. van den Berg, C. Braun and T. Steen, ‘Consensus Politics as Administrative Practice’ in H. Vollaard, J. Beyers and P. Dumont (eds), European Integration and Consensus Politics in the Low Countries (Routledge 2015) 117; M. Brans, C. Pelgrims and D. Hoet, ‘Comparative observations on tensions between professional policy advice and political control in the Low Countries’ (2006) 72 International Review of Administrative Sciences 61–62.

118 OECD, Better Regulation in Europe. Belgium (OECD 2010) 51.

119 P. Popelier, P. Van Humbeeck, A. Meuwese and K. Van Aeken, ‘Transparant consulteren in Vlaanderen: de spanning tussen rationeel wetgevingsmodel en besluitvormingspraktijk’ (2012) Tijdschrift voor Wetgeving 9–10.

120 B.G. Peters, ‘Consociationalism, Corruption and Chocolate: Belgian Exceptionalism’ (2006) West European Politics 1079–1092.

121 F. Varone, S. Jacob and L. De Winter, ‘Polity, Politics and Policy Evaluation in Belgium’ (2005) 11 Evaluation Review 261–264.

122 E. Mangez, ‘Global Knowledge-based Policy in Fragmented Societies: The Case of Curriculum Reform in French-speaking Belgium’ (2010) 45 European Journal of Education 61.

123 Varone, Jacob and De Winter, supra n. 120, at 262.

124 R. Andeweg, ‘Consociational democracy’ (2000) 3 Annual Review of Political Science 510.

125 Const. Court No 142/2014, 9 October 2014, B.12.

126 J. Beyers, H. Vollaard and P. Dumont, ‘Introduction. European Integration and Consensus Politics’ in H. Vollaard, J. Beyers and P. Dumont (eds), European Integration and Consensus Politics in the Low Countries (Routledge 2015) 13.

127 C.F. van den Berg, C. Braun and T. Steen, ‘Consensus Politics as Administrative Practice’ in H. Vollaard, J. Beyers and P. Dumont (eds), European Integration and Consensus Politics in the Low Countries (Routledge 2015) 118.

128 C.F. van den Berg, C. Braun and T. Steen, ‘Consensus Politics as Administrative Practice’ in H. Vollaard, J. Beyers and P. Dumont (eds), European Integration and Consensus Politics in the Low Countries (Routledge 2015) 126–127.

129 R. Andeweg, ‘The Consequences of Nested Consensus Politics’ in H. Vollaard, J. Beyers and P. Dumont (eds), European Integration and Consensus Politics in the Low Countries (Routledge 2015) 235.

130 E. Mangez, ‘Global Knowledge-based Policy in Fragmented Societies: The Case of Curriculum Reform in French-speaking Belgium’ (2010) 45 European Journal of Education 60.

131 Ibid., 63.

132 F. De Francesco, Comparative Political Studies 1286, 1289–1290, 1295.

133 See E. Mangez, ‘Global Knowledge-based Policy in Fragmented Societies: The Case of Curriculum Reform in French-speaking Belgium’ (2010) 45 European Journal of Education 63, in the field of education.