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Abstract
The January 2013 appointment of thirty Saudi women leaders to the Majlis al-Shura (Consultative Council) underlined the commitment of the late King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz to greater engagement by Saudi women in the national decision-making process. Institutions including the Council of Saudi Chambers of Commerce and Industry and the King Abdulaziz Center for National Dialogue now offer platforms for women to enter official deliberations, both nationally and regionally. This paper shows how Saudi women leaders confront and deal with the new challenges and opportunities available to them, and discusses some of the challenges they face, the methods they use to deal with such challenges, and ways and means through which they activate their leadership roles. Additionally, the study attempts to advance our understanding of the challenges and opportunities facing women at the forefront of societal reform, that is, the leaders of societal groupings arguing that Saudi female leaders, the “trailblazers”, can play a positive role in Saudi national development.
Notes
1 Al Rasheed (ed.), Kingdom Without Borders (2008), p. 24.
2 Hamzawy, “The Saudi Labyrinth” (2008), p. 189.
3 Ibid., p. 197.
4 Hertog, “Building the Body Politic” (2004), p. 18.
5 Hertog, “Segmented Clientelism” (2005), pp. 118–19.
6 Niblock (ed.), State, Society and Economy (1982), p. 110.
7 However, while a majority of Saudi business leaders may have no political profile per se, they often take sides on issues of political importance or engage in “political games”. For this reason, it is claimed that among all modern sectors of Saudi society, only business appears to be emerging as a serious negotiating partner for the government [see Hertog, “Building the Body Politic”].
8 Hertog, “Two-level Negotiations in a Fragmented System” (2008), p. 657.
9 Steinberg, “A Colossus with Feet of Clay”, p. 1.
10 Steinberg, “Political Islam Hindering Reform” 2006, p. 1. Following the 9/11 events in the US in 2001, Wahhabism was blamed for promoting extremism in the Kingdom. However, (former) Prince Salman bin Abdulaziz asserts there is no connection between the term Wahhabi, which he claims is derogatory, and the original teachings of Al Wahhab [see MEMRI, “Saudi Prince Salman” (2010), p. 1].
11 Interview with anonymous (Shiʿi writer and political activist), Qatif, Apr. 2010.
12 Okruhlik, “State Power, Religious Privilege” (2009), p. 104.
13 Habib, “Wahhabi Origins of the Contemporary Saudi State” (2009), p. 64.
14 Al Nabulsi, “Fresh Voice of Saudi Enlightenment” (2006), p. 280.
15 Interview with Ibrahim Belaihi (writer and intellectual), Riyadh, June 2010. He specifically referred to Wahhabism and not Salafism during the interview. Okruhlik defines “Wahhabi” as referring to the official religious orthodoxy in Saudi Arabia, “Salafi” as referring to believers in society who follow the way, but are not tied to the state ulama, and “neo-Salafi” being those who promote political change through social change [Okruhlik, “State Power, Religious Privilege”, pp. 92–3].
16 Ibid.
17 Interview with anonymous (Shiʿi writer and political activist), Qatif, Apr. 2010.
18 Dorsey, “A Battle of the Fatwas” p. 1; Whitaker, “Saudi King Seeks to Restrict Fatwas” (2010), p. 1; Boucek, “Saudi Fatwa Restrictions and the State-Clerical Relationship” (2010), p. 1.
19 Interview with Ibrahim Belaihi (writer and intellectual), Riyadh, June 2010.
20 Okruhlik, “Saudi Arabia” (2010), p. 390.
21 Saudi culture is also frequently interpreted as monolithic, that is, “one size fits all”.
22 “The common means of engagement with the Saudi state for women's organizations are dialogue, support and partnership” [Meijer and Aarts, Saudi Arabia between Conservatism (2012), p. 83].
23 Metcalf, “Women, Empowerment and Development in the Arab Gulf States” (2011), p. 135.
24 Van Geel, “Whither the Saudi Woman?” (2012), p. 71.
25 Correspondence with Dr Basmah Maziad Al Tuwaijri (Vice Dean, Girls’ Centre in Olaysha, King Saud University), Riyadh, Apr. 2013.
26 Correspondence with H.E. Norah Al Faiz (former Deputy Minister for Girls’ Education), Riyadh, Apr. 2013.
27 Ibid. She argues that “A Saudi women is more like a juggler who needs to control many balls at the same time”.
28 Mishkhas, “In Sickness and in Health”.
29 Almunajjed, Saudi Women Speak (2006), pp. 4–6. After years of campaigning, and following the Labour Ministry's mandatory directive to appoint Saudi saleswomen in shops selling women-only products, women were finally allowed to start work in lingerie shops starting from 4 Jan. 2012. More than 28,000 women have applied for jobs. This brought to an end the most bizarre example of gender mixing in the Kingdom. [Lippman, “Saudi Women Shatter the Lingerie Ceiling”].
30 Correspondence with Samar Fatany (author, journalist and social commentator), Jeddah, Apr. 2013.
31 Almunajjed, Saudi Women Speak, pp. 4–6. Princess Noura bin Abdulrahman University for Women in Riyadh (originally planned as King Abdullah University for Women until he decided that his late aunt's name was more appropriate) is one of the largest centres for female higher education in the world with fifteen colleges, 12,000 employees and the capacity to enrol more than 40,000 students. [Almunajjed, “Eighth National Dialogue on Reform, Development”].
32 Correspondence with Professor Huda bint Dlijan bin Abdullah Al Dlijan (Qurʾanic Studies Professor at King Faisal University, al-Ahsa; Senior Adviser to the Ministry of Higher Education; and President of the Women's Committee of the Saudi Scientific Society of the Holy Qurʾan and its Sciences), al-Ahsa, Apr. 2013.
33 Almunajjed, Saudi Women Speak, pp. 30–3.
34 Ibid., pp. 4–6.
35 Al Ahmadi, “Challenges Facing Women Leaders in Saudi Arabia” (2011), p. 149. Dr Al Ahmadi (Majlis al-Shura delegate) reviewed the questionnaire prepared for this paper, Riyadh, Mar. 2013.
36 Fatany argues that “obstructionists in our own country fail to understand that it is not just an issue about women's rights but an important keystone for Saudi Arabia to progress and compete with its neighbours — who are already making use of this competitive edge” [Fatany, Saudi Women (2007), p. 60].
37 Sheddi, Organizational Conflict-Management of Women Leaders (2013).
38 Correspondence with Dr Feryal Almajhad (Lecturer at Imam Mohammed Bin Saud University), Riyadh, Sept. 2013.
39 For example in the Majlis al-Shura, the SCCI and municipal councils.
40 Al Rasheed, A Most Masculine State (2013), p. 171.
41 Okruhlik, “The Irony of Islah (Reform)” (2005), p. 154.
42 Coleman acknowledges that critics dismiss the National Dialogue as little more than window dressing, but relates a conversation with journalist Sabria Jawhar who believes that KACND has “made a big change as the institution gave women permission to talk”. Jawhar says that “Saudi women work in the shadows, but do not want to live in the shadows anymore. Saudi women need equality, as long as it falls within the Shariah” [Coleman, Paradise Beneath Her Feet (2010), p. 221. Also see Al Ahmadi, “Challenges Facing Women Leaders in Saudi Arabia”, p. 150].
43 Dankowitz, “A Saudi National Dialogue” (2004), p. 3.
44 Correspondence with Almajhad, Riyadh, Sept. 2013.
45 Almunajjed, Saudi Women Speak, p. 33. In interviews with the author, many Saudi women complained that they were often misquoted or misinterpreted by Western media sources.
46 Ibid.
47 Correspondence with Al Faiz, Riyadh, Apr. 2013.
48 Correspondence with Al Tuwaijri, Riyadh, Apr. 2013.
49 Correspondence with Ms Ghada Al Tobaishi (Executive Vice President & General Manager, Dunia InterMedia, the largest organizer of events and conferences in Saudi Arabia), Eastern Province, Apr. 2013.
50 Davalos, “A Golden Age for Saudi Women”, 27 July 2013.
51 Correspondence with Al Tobaishi, Eastern Province, Apr. 2013: “Personally, I do not believe that it is a very big challenge.”
52 Correspondence with Dr Hend Al Al-Sheikh (Director General, Women's Branch, Institute of Public Administration), Riyadh, Apr. 2013.
53 Central Intelligence Agency, “The World Factbook”, 5 Dec. 2013.
54 Correspondence with Dr Amal Fatani (General Supervisor of Female Sections, Ministry of Higher Education; Associate Professor, Dept of Pharmacology and Toxicology, College of Pharmacy, King Saud University), Riyadh, Apr. 2013. She believes that both have value and a place in Saudi life.
55 Correspondence with Almajhad, Riyadh, Sept. 2013.
56 Montagu, “Civil Society and the Voluntary Sector in Saudi Arabia” (2010), p. 80.
57 Correspondence with Fatani, Riyadh, Apr. 2013.
58 Ibid.; correspondence with Al Dlijan, al-Ahsa, Apr. 2013.
59 Correspondence with Al Faiz, Riyadh, Apr. 2013. Prince Faisal is married to Princess Adila, the influential daughter of King Abdullah.
60 Correspondence with Ms Lama O. Aggad (CEO, Al Multaka Ladies Centre), Jeddah, Apr. 2013.
61 Correspondence with Al Tobaishi, Eastern Province, Apr. 2013: “I work with men in a profession capacity and have been always given their support.”
62 Correspondence with Al Tuwaijri, Riyadh, Apr. 2013: “It is necessary to qualify who we are talking about in terms of high profile men.”
63 Ibid. “I think that the road is long, unpaved and the end is not near at all, but it is a step in the right direction.”
64 Interview with anonymous (male human rights activist), Riyadh, July 2010. This view was shared by several young Saudi male undergraduates who, when interviewed for this paper, argued that women were often divided on important issues and tended to focus on specific issues rather than the overall picture [King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals, Sept. 2013].
65 Correspondence with Al Al-Sheikh, Riyadh, Apr. 2013.
66 Almunajjed says Islam gives women equal, but not identical rights to men, be those personal, civil, social, political, educational or professional. Almunajjed, Saudi Women Speak, p. 33. Although women's standing is influenced by strong social customs and local traditions, some traditions such as the wearing of the veil and strict segregation in Saudi society, whilst having negative connotations in Western eyes, are accepted, to varying degrees by Saudi women. Van Geel's research in Saudi Arabia reveals that “most women prefer to maintain the status quo vis-à-vis segreagation” and in fact, that this “status quo is desirable” [Van Geel, Saudi Arabia Between Conservatism (2012), p. 69].
67 Correspondence with Al Tobaishi, Eastern Province, Apr. 2013; correspondence with Al Tuwaijri, Riyadh, Apr. 2013.
68 Correspondence with Al Faiz, Riyadh, Apr. 2013.
69 Correspondence with Fatany, Jeddah, Apr. 2013.
70 Correspondence with Al Dlijan, al-Ahsa, Apr. 2013; correspondence with Aggad, Jeddah, Apr. 2013.
72 The Khadija bint Khuwailid Business Centre was established in 1998 by Dr Nadia Baeshen to train, qualify and empower Saudi women. Dr Baeshen, a former Vice Dean of the Business and Economics College at King Abdulaziz University (KAAU), believes that limiting the rights of women hinders economic growth [Mokhtar, “Khadija bint Khuwailid Center”, 25 Mar. 2007].
73 Correspondence with Fatany, Jeddah, Apr. 2013.
74 Correspondence with Al Al-Sheikh, Riyadh, Apr. 2013.
75 Ibid.
76 Correspondence with Al Tobaishi, Eastern Province, Apr. 2013.
77 Pharaon, “Saudi Women and the Muslim State” (2004), p. 358. “But this does not prevent them from having an interest in and/or following new technologies and scientific trends. Indeed, several notable Saudi women working in different disciplines have received national and international awards attesting to their diligence and dedication which has gone hand-in-hand with their family obligations” [Al Tuwaijri, Apr. 2013].
78 Al Omran points out that these “conservative women”, for example, Rokaya Al Mohreb and Juhayyer Al Mesaad, are not as well-known internationally as their more “liberal” counterparts, for example, Manal Al Sharif. Al Omran, “Saudi Conservative Women Feel Marginalized”, 23 Jan. 2013.
79 Al Rasheed, A Most Masculine State, p. 254.
80 Correspondence with Fatany, Jeddah, Apr. 2013.
81 Correspondence with Al Tobaishi, Eastern Province, Apr. 2013.
82 Correspondence with Al Al-Sheikh, Riyadh, Apr. 2013: “Many women leaders wonder why their professional judgments are mistrusted, or rejected by men, even though they are trusted to bring up children and take care of the household budget.”
83 Correspondence with Almajhad, Riyadh, Sept. 2013.
84 Ibid.
85 Correspondence with Al Tobaishi, Eastern Province, Apr. 2013.
86 Correspondence with Fatani, Riyadh, Apr. 2013; correspondence with Fatany, Jeddah, Apr. 2013.
87 Al Ahmadi, “Challenges Facing Women Leaders in Saudi Arabia”, p. 150.
88 Correspondence with Al Al-Sheikh, Riyadh, Apr. 2013.
89 Correspondence with Fatani, Riyadh, Apr. 2013; correspondence with Aggad, Jeddah, Apr. 2013; Al Ahmadi, “Challenges Facing Women Leaders in Saudi Arabia”, p. 163.
90 According Al Seghayer, “One of the greatest challenges Saudi Arabia and the Saudi people are facing is the need to overcome the tendency to be reactive and not being proactive. We tend to take action after problems have already arisen, not the other way around. We do not put forth polices and plans for an uncertain future. In other words, we often attend to the crisis of the moment and perhaps wait for an irreversible situation to develop and then scramble to find a solution and actions to take in response” [Al Seghayer, “Saudi Arabia and Its People”, 16 Apr. 2013].
91 Correspondence with Fatany, Jeddah, Apr. 2013.
92 Correspondence with Al Tobaishi, Eastern Province, Apr. 2013.
93 Ibid.
94 Correspondence with Al Tuwaijri, Riyadh, Apr. 2013.
95 Correspondence with Al Al-Sheikh, Riyadh, Apr. 2013.
96 Al Ahmadi, “Challenges Facing Women Leaders in Saudi Arabia”, p. 152.
97 Interview with anonymous (consultant for Ministry of Education), Riyadh, July 2010.
98 Al Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia (2010), p. 247.
99 The report states erroneously that this was the Seventh National Dialogue Meeting. In addition to King Abdullah, the late Crown Prince Sultan also appeared in the Okaz photograph, but this photograph was taken when the women visited Riyadh a month after the forum. The release of the photograph after the National Dialogue meeting appeared to send a message that some senior members of the Al Saʿud were in agreement on the issue of relaxing gender segregation. According to one source, this was timed to coincide with the decision by the Commission for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice to reinstate the head of the religious police in Mecca, Shaikh Ahmed Al Ghamdi, who had questioned whether Islam in fact required gender separation [Kapoor, “A Reformist King” (2010), p. 1].
100 Human Rights Watch, Looser Rein, Uncertain Gain (2010), p. 18.
101 Interview with Ms Dalal Dia (former General Director of Jeddah Radio), Jeddah, July 2010. She followed in the footsteps of her mother who had worked in Saudi radio in the 1960s.
102 Sakr, “Women and Media in Saudi Arabia” (2008), p. 390.
103 Al Rasheed, A Most Masculine State, p. 289. Al Rasheed notes that despite King Abdullah's “reforms”, the state is “increasingly fragmented by a plethora of princes and institutions that do not share a common vision and policy”.
104 Al Rasheed, Kingdom Without Borders, p. 17.
105 Correspondence with Al Al-Sheikh, Riyadh, Apr. 2013: “I am very optimistic about the role of women leaders in societal transformation. These leaders are setting an example for their daughters and the next generation by inspiring them. If they can make it with all the obstacles, then for sure the next generation can do the same with all the new laws and opportunities available now and in the future.”
106 Correspondence with Al Tuwaijri, Riyadh, Apr. 2013: “Unfortunately, this [lack of a central reference point] appears to be the defining feature of many women's movements in the contemporary Arab world.”
107 Sir Tom Phillips, the then British Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, who was present at the session, said the speech was “received very warmly” in the chamber [Saudi-British Society seminar, London, 12 Oct. 2011].
108 Kechichian, Legal and Political Reforms (2013), p. 214. However, it should be noted that women have worked as consultants to the Majlis al-Shura for the last decade mainly handling women's and family-related issues; therefore these appointments constitute additional female council participation.
109 Anon., “Details of Women’s Membership to be Revealed Soon — Shura Council Chief”, Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 27 Sept. 2011. In fact, the appointments reflected the fact that employment opportunities were opening up for Saudi women along with increased public visibility in the retail and service sectors.
110 Ghafour, “Kingdom Believes in Evolution”, 3 Apr. 2011.
111 Interview with anonymous (male Majlis al-Shura delegate), Jeddah, July 2011.
112 Al Omran, “Saudi Conservative Women Feel Marginalized by Shura Council Snub”.
113 For a list of the thirty female members of the Majlis al-Shura, see, Bashraheel and Muhammad, “Optimism and Worries”, 12 Jan. 2013.
114 In 2013 there was a great deal of debate in the Kingdom's diwaniyyat regarding the long-term political effectiveness of the Majlis al-Shura and whether the council would be able to play a more important socio-political role. Whilst the idea of a partially elected chamber has been discussed for some time, there is a suggestion that a second elected body to sit alongside the appointed chamber might constitute a better option; however, in the meantime this remains an abstract idea.
115 Correspondence with Al Tobaishi, Eastern Province, Apr. 2013.
116 In Mar. 2013, members of a British parliamentary delegation visiting Saudi Arabia on a fact-finding mission had a meeting with delegates from the Majlis al-Shura, both men and women. According to an embassy official who accompanied the delegation, the new female members of the Majlis al-Shura “[were] impressive, much more so than many of the men”, and that this surprised their British counterparts [interview with anonymous (British Embassy official), Riyadh, Apr. 2013].
117 Correspondence with Fatany, Jeddah, Apr. 2013.
118 Correspondence with Al Faiz, Riyadh, Apr. 2013; correspondence with Aggad, Jeddah, Apr. 2013.
119 Fatany, “The Challenges Facing Women”, 10 Feb. 2013.
120 Taylor, “As the Smoke Clears ”, 13 Mar. 2013.
121 Correspondence with Al Al-Sheikh, Riyadh, Apr. 2013.
122 Correspondence with Almajhad, Riyadh, Sept. 2013.
123 Interview with anonymous (Saudi journalist), Riyadh, Oct., 2013.
124 Shura members call to lift driving ban for women in Saudi [Riyadh Connect, 8 Oct. 2013].
125 In late Nov. 2013, two women leaders of the driving campaign were told by Interior Minister Mohammed bin Nayef that “the driving issue is on the table” [interview with anonymous (human rights activist), Riyadh, Nov. 2013].
126 Ibid.
127 Interview with anonymous (human rights activist), Qatif, Oct. 2013.
128 For example, the large numbers of Saudis who regularly visit Dubai will see women driving and can go to the cinema.
129 Interviews (multiple sources), Saudi Arabia, 2010–13.
130 Correspondence with Al Al-Sheikh, Riyadh, Apr. 2013.
131 Correspondence with Fatani, Riyadh, Apr. 2013.
132 Norah Al Faiz was the first female member of the Saudi Arabia Council of Ministers. She gained a Master's Degree in education Utah State University in 1982. After returning to the Kingdom she became Principal of Prince Alwaleed bin Talal's Kingdom Schools and Director of the Women's Section at the Institute of Public Administration in Riyadh.
133 Male human rights activist, July 2010.
134 Prior to the National Dialogue, in 2002, the then Crown Prince Abdullah had a private meeting with a senior female executive at Saudi Aramco and a group of women, selected from different fields, to discuss women's issues, with each participant presenting her own point of view depending on her area of specialization. The Crown Prince, according to the Aramco executive, listened attentively: “he is sincere and he cares” [interview with anonymous (female executive, Aramco) al-Khobar, June 2010]. By sheer coincidence, this meeting occurred on the same day as the notorious fire at a girl's school in Mecca which provoked public outrage throughout the Kingdom.
135 Okruhlik, “Saudi Arabia”, p. 408.
136 Correspondence with Fatani, Riyadh, Apr. 2013.
137 Correspondence with Al Tobaishi, Eastern Province, Apr. 2013.
138 Correspondence with Al Al-Sheikh, Riyadh, Apr. 2013.
139 Correspondence with Al Tobaishi, Eastern Province, Apr. 2013.
140 Correspondence with Al Al-Sheikh, Riyadh, Apr. 2013.
141 In the 2013 budget, funding of $54 billion/SR 204 billion was allocated to the education sector. See: Mohammed, “Kingdom Tops World in Education Spending”, 2 Jan. 2013. The $54.4 billion budget was 21% higher than that of 2012, and the highest increase since 2007. According to the government the money would be used to finance the construction of 539 new schools along with 1,900 existing school projects, and to refurbish 2,000 schools. In addition, fifteen new colleges, facilities and campuses at newly opened universities would be built, and the Saudi Electronic University would receive $3.6 billion (SR13.4 billion). An estimated $1.1 billion (SR4.25 billion) was allocated to build three new college hospitals while $5.8 billion (SR21.6 billion) was earmarked for over 120,000 Saudi students studying abroad and their families, an increase from the figure of $5.3 billion (SR20 billion) in 2012 [see www.us-sabc.org/custom/news/details.cfm?id=1380#.Ui7L3Rj6jIU].
142 Correspondence with Al Tuwaijri, Riyadh, Apr. 2013, “However, a comparison with women leaders, (numbers and status) in several other countries shows many similarities rather than differences between women leaders in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere.”
143 Correspondence with Al Al-Sheikh, Riyadh, Apr. 2013.
144 Gause, Saudi Arabia in the New Middle East (2011), p. 10. Gause argues that the Saudi argument over women driving and whether it is compatible with Islam prevents Saudis from coalescing “around common political reform demands”.
145 “Amongst the most pressing issues is the removal of the guardianship rule that treats women as minors; the driving issue which can be categorised as a human rights issue; and accelerated reform of the judiciary as it is inefficient and weak due to the malign influence of hardliners and extremists. Moreover, the codification of Shariah law is necessary in order to ensure justice for all” [correspondence with Fatany, Jeddah, Apr. 2013]. In addition, “the need for women to enter the workplace is now simply a fact of life due to the rising cost of living in Saudi Arabia” [correspondence with Aggad, Jeddah, Apr. 2013].
146 Correspondence with Fatany, Jeddah, Apr. 2013.
147 Correspondence with Al Tuwaijri, Riyadh, Apr. 2013.
148 Interviews (multiple sources), Saudi Arabia, 2010–13.
149 Correspondence with Al Tuwaijri, Riyadh, Apr. 2013.
150 Correspondence with Fatany, Jeddah, Apr. 2013.
151 Correspondence with Al Faiz, Riyadh, Apr. 2013.
152 Ibid.; correspondence with Fatany, Jeddah, Apr. 2013.
153 Correspondence with Al Faiz, Riyadh, Apr. 2013.
154 Correspondence with Fatany, Jeddah, Apr. 2013; correspondence with Almajhad, Riyadh, Sept. 2013.
155 Correspondence with Fatany, Jeddah, Apr. 2013; correspondence with Al Faiz, Riyadh, Apr. 2013.
156 Ibid.
157 Hill, “Vote Now on a Socially Inclusive Saudi Arabia” (2011), p. 3.