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Abstract
No state in the Gulf region currently enjoys stable relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran except for the Sultanate of Oman, and Oman is the only Gulf state to have maintained friendly relations with Iran since the 1970s. This raises the question about how Oman manages to maintain its relationship with Iran, which is considered a regional rival. This article analyzes Oman’s foreign policy approach to Iran, arguing that its strategy of hedging has been the main pattern and the ultimate reason for the sustenance of the relationship. Oman’s hedging strategy towards Iran is mostly driven by pragmatic incentives to preserve security and achieve political stability.
Notes
1 See Kechichian, Oman and the World: The Emergence of an Independent Foreign Policy (1995); Baabood, “Oman’s Independent Foreign Policy”, The Small Gulf States: Foreign and Security Policies Before and After the Arab Spring, ed. Almezaini and Rickli (2017), pp. 107–22.
2 Al-Khalili, Oman’s Foreign Policy: Foundation and Practice (2009).
3 Jones and Ridout, Oman, Culture and Diplomacy (2012). See also an Omani practitioner’s take in Al Bu Said, “Small States’ Diplomacy in the Age of Globalization: An Omani Perspective”, The Review of International Affairs 3.2 (2003), p. 354; also available as Al Bu Said, “Small States’ Diplomacy in the Age of Globalization: An Omani Perspective”, Analyzing Middle East Foreign Policies, ed. Nonneman (2005), pp. 257–62.
4 See Lefebvre, “Oman’s Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century”, Middle East Policy 17.1 (2010), pp. 99–112.
5 Omnibalancing is a theory in international relations put forward by Steven David to explain developing states alignment behaviour. It argues that the most important determinant of developing states alignment behaviour is the rational calculation of their leaders as to what outside power is most likely to do what is necessary to protect them from internal and external threats, David, “Explaining Third World Alignment”, World Politics 43.2 (1991), pp. 233–56.
6 O’Reilly, “Omanibalancing: Oman Confronts an Uncertain Future”, The Middle East Journal 52.1 (1998), pp. 70–85. He argues that Oman is trying to balance a variety of internal and external threats to achieve security.
7 Guzansky, “The Foreign-Policy Tools of Small Powers: Strategic Hedging in the Persian Gulf”, Middle East Policy 22.1 (2015), pp. 112–22.
8 Schroeder, “Historical Reality vs. Neo-realist Theory”, International Security 19.1 (1994), p. 117.
9 Kuik, “The Essence of Hedging: Malaysia and Singapore’s Response to a Rising China”, Contemporary Southeast Asia 30.2 (2008), p. 63.
10 Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions”, International Security 19.3 (1994/95), p. 10.
11 See Waltz, Theory of International Politics (1979); Walt, The Origins of Alliance (1987).
12 For a discussion on this, see Labs, “Do Weak States Bandwagon?”, Security Studies 1.3 (1992), pp. 383–416; Kaufman, “To Balance or to Bandwagon? Alignment Decisions in 1930s Europe”, Security Studies 1.3 (1992), pp. 417–47; Walt, “Alliance, Threats, and U.S. Strategy: A Reply to Kaufman and Labs”, Security Studies 1.3 (1992), pp. 448–82.
13 Snyder, “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics”, World Politics 36.4 (1984), pp. 461–95.
14 Goh, “Southeast Asian Perspectives on the China Challenge”, Journal of Strategic Studies 30.4–5 (2007), p. 825.
15 Kuik, “How Do Weaker States Hedge? Unpacking ASEAN States’ Alignment Behavior towards China”, Journal of Contemporary China 25.100 (2016), p. 504.
16 Goh, Meeting the China Challenge: The U.S. in Southeast Asian Regional Security Strategies (2005), p. 2.
17 Goh, “Understanding ‘Hedging’ in Asia-Pacific Security”, PacNet 43 (31 August 2006).
18 Jin, “Korea between the United States and China: How Does Hedging Work?”, Facing Reality in East Asia: Tough Decisions on Competition and Cooperation 26 (2015), ed. Rozman, pp. 59–74.
19 Peterson, Defending Arabia (1986), p. 21.
20 Jones and Ridout, A History of Modern Oman (2015), p. 113.
21 See Peterson, Oman Insurgencies: The Sultanate’s Struggle for Supremacy (2007).
22 Takriti, Monsoon Revolution: Republicans, Sultans, and Empires in Oman, 1965–1976 (2013).
23 DeVore, “The United Kingdom’s Last Hot War of the Cold War: Oman, 1963–75”, Cold War History 11.3 (2011), p. 3.
24 Rabinovich and Shaked, Middle East Contemporary Survey, 1984–1985 (1987), p. 414.
25 Khan, “The Motives Behind the Newly Announced UK Naval Base in Oman”, The Arab Weekly, 29 May 2016.
26 Halliday, Revolutions and Foreign Policy: The Case of South Yemen 1967–1987 (1990), p. 145.
27 Neubauer, “Oman: The Gulf’s Go-Between”, The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington 1 (2016), p. 3.
28 Gresh, Gulf Security and the U.S. Military: Regime Survival and the Politics of Basing (2015), p. 119.
29 Jones and Ridout, A History of Modern Oman (2015), p. 193.
30 Al-Khalili, Oman’s Foreign Policy: Foundation and Practice (2009), p. 101.
31 Kechichian, Oman and the World: The Emergence of an Independent Foreign Policy (1995), pp. 111–12.
32 Ibid., p. 176.
33 Graz, The Turbulent Gulf: People, Politics and Power (1990), p. 215.
34 Rabinovich and Shaked, Middle East Contemporary Survey, 1984–1985 (1987), p. 413.
35 Al-Kalili, Oman’s Foreign Policy (2009), p. 105.
36 Bahgat, “Security in the Gulf: The View from Oman”, Security Dialogue 30.4 (1999), pp. 445–58.
37 Al-Khalili, Oman’s Foreign Policy: Foundation and Practice (2009), p. 258.
38 Almajdoub, “Discrete Diplomacy: Oman and the Iran Nuclear Deal”, E-International Relations Students (2016).
39 Jones and Ridout, Oman, Culture and Diplomacy (2012), p. 42.
40 According to Valeri, “High Visibility, Low Profile: The Shi’a in Oman under Sultan Qaboos”, International Journal of Middle East Studies 42.2 (2010), p. 253.
41 Bandera, The Second Cold War: Geopolitical and Strategic Dimensions of the USA (2017), p. 210.
42 Valeri, “Iran-Oman Relations since the 1970s: A Mutually Beneficial Modus Vivendi”, Security and Bilateral Issues between Iran and Its Arab Neighbors, ed. Bahgat, Ehteshami, and Quilliam (2017), p. 151.
43 Valeri, “High Visibilty, Low Profile: The Shi’a in Oman under Sultan Qaboos”, p. 259.
44 U.S. Energy Information Administration website, “The Strait of Hormuz is the World’s Most Important Oil Transit Chokepoint”, 4 January 2012.
45 Jafari-Valdani, “The Geopolitics of the Strait of Hormuz and the Iran-Oman Relations”, Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs 2 (2012), pp. 7–40.
46 Barrett, “Oman’s Balancing Act in the Yemen Conflict”, The Middle East Institute website, 17 June 2015.
47 Al-Falahi, “Just How Neutral Is Oman in Yemen War?”, Al-Monitor website, 12 October 2016.
48 International Business Publications, Oman: Economic and Developmental Strategy Handbook 1: Strategic Information and Program 2010 (2013), p. 279.
49 Cafiero, “Oman and Iran: Friends with Many Benefits”, Al-Monitor, 2 May 2016.
50 Gresh, “Iran and Oman: Burgeoning Allies”, World Affairs Journal, 15 July 2016.
51 John, “Boost for UAE-Iran Trade”, Khaleej Times, 15 July 2015.
52 Press TV, “Iran Says It Has Found Substitutes for Trade with UAE”, 8 January 2016.
53 Wagner and Cafiero, “Can Oman and Iran’s ‘Special Relationship’ Last?”, Institute for Near East and Gulf Military Analysis, 29 July 2003.
54 Statista website, “Oman: Youth Unemployment Rate from 2007 to 2017” (2018).