A Framework for Understanding the Intra-Islamist Conflict Between the AK Party and the Gülen Movement

ABSTRACT

This article examines the circumstances shaping the evolution of the Gülen movement. Once considered a relatively liberal and pluralistic Islamic movement based in Turkey, the movement later succumbed to authoritarianism and illiberalism following its political alliance with the AK Party and their subsequent falling out. The paper opens with a brief overview of the historical context of the relationship between state and society in the Ottoman Empire and then examines the politicization of Islam as a movement of resistance against the modernizing reforms of the Kemalist state. The complex interplay of these factors culminated in the construction of a secular communalism in Turkey. The remainder of the paper focuses on the triangulated relationship among state, society, and religion, targeting the alliance and political struggles between the AK Party and the Gülen movement. The paper concludes that once legal and political checks and balances are removed, Islamic movements bend towards authoritarian tendencies seeking to monopolize or, at least, influence nearly every sphere of social and political life. After a decade-long experiment with Islamic movements in power, Turkey—increasingly authoritarian in character and socially fragmented—is experiencing the most serious institutional crisis in its history as a modern republic.

Acknowledgements

I wish to thank Iştar Gözaydın, Mustafa Erdoğan, Levent Köker, Mehmet Arisan, Ahmet Erdi Öztürk, and Simon Watmough for their valuable comments.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on contributor

M. Hakan Yavuz is a professor of political science at the University of Utah. His current projects focus on transnational Islamic networks in Central Asia and Turkey; the role of Islam in state-building and nationalism; ethnic cleansing and genocide; and ethno-religious conflict management. He is an author of 9 books and around 60 articles on Islam, nationalism, Kurdish question, and modern Turkish politics. He published in Comparative Politics, Middle East Critique, Middle East Journal, Oxford Journal of Islamic Studies, SAIS Review, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, Current History, Central Asian Survey, Journal of Islamic Studies, and Journal of Palestine Studies. Some of his articles are translated into Arabic and Bosnian from English. He is an editorial member of Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs and Critique.

Notes

1 M. Hakan Yavuz and Bayram Balci (eds), Turkey’s July 14th Coup: What Happened and Why (Salt Lake City: University of Utah, 2018).

2 M. Hakan Yavuz and John Esposito (eds), Turkish Islam and the Secular State: The Gülen Movement (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2003); M. Hakan Yavuz, Toward an Islamic Enlightenment: The Gülen Movement (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013).

3 Yavuz, interviews with the followers of the Gülen movement in Washington DC, New York and Boston.

4 Berk Esen and Sebnem Gumuscu, ‘Rising Competitive Authoritarianism in Turkey’, Third World Quarterly, 37:9 (2016), pp. 1581–1606.

5 Siyaves Azeri, ‘The July 15 Coup Attempt in Turkey: The Erdoğan–Gülen Confrontation and the Fall of “Moderate” Political Islam’, Critique, 44:4 (2016), pp. 465–478.

6 Bassam Tibi, ‘Europeanizing Islam, or the Islamization of Europe’ in Timothy Byrnes and Peter Katzenstein (eds) Religion in an Expanding Europe (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 204–224.

7 In 2004, the AK Party and the Liberal Thinkers Associations organized a wide-ranging international conference to discuss the AK Party’s identity and ideology and the proceedings of this conference is published: Uluslarası Muhafazakarlık ve Demokrasi Sempozyumu, 10–12 Oçak 2004 (Ankara: AK Parti, 2004). Erdoğan delivered the opening speech, discussing the AK Party’s identity. He differentiated the party from others by arguing that ‘previous political parties before the AK Party exemplified two group characteristics. The first group of parties perceive politics on the basis of ideology, functioning as a “political community” (siyasi cemaat) rather than as a party’. As a result, Erdoğan contends these parties would further radicalize national politics and polarize the society. He identifies the second group of parties as a ‘political company’ (siyasi sirket) in terms of distributing favours and contracts while making key supporters wealthy. Erdoğan concludes that ‘The AK Party is against these two forms of parties as a “political community” or a “political company”’. In 2018, the AK Party has achieved a hybrid in becoming the most rigid ‘communitarian political party’ on the basis of Islamist political ideology of Kısakürek and the ‘company’ that leverages assets of wealth from the Anatolian tigers of commerce and distributes public bids for infrastructure projects to party supporters.

8 Bahar Baser and Ahmet Erdi Ozturk (eds), Authoritarian Politics in Turkey: Elections, Resistance and the AKP (London: I.B. Tauris, 2017); Soner Cagaptay, The New Sultan: Erdoğan and the Crisis of Modern Turkey (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2017); Mustafa Akyol, ‘Turkey’s Authoritarian Drift’, New York Times, 10 November 2015; Nora Fisher Onar, ‘The populism/realism gap: Managing uncertainty in Turkey’s politics and foreign policy’, Brookings Institution, 4 February 2016; Burak Kadercan, ‘Erdoğan’s Last Off-Ramp: Authoritarianism, Democracy, and the Future of Turkey’, War on the Rocks, 28 July 2016.

9 Şerif Mardin, ‘Civil Society and Islam’ in John Hall (ed.) Civil Society: Theory, History and Comparison (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 1995), p. 287.

10 Ibid., pp. 278–299.

11 Ahmet Yaşar Oçak, ‘Islam in the Ottoman Empire: a sociological framework for a new interpretation’, International Journal of Turkish Studies, 9:1 (2003), pp. 183–197.

12 Tönnies distinguished between the two types of social groups, Gemeinschaft [community] and Gesellschaft [society]. See Ferdinand Tönnies, Community and Society (New York: Dover Publications, 2011).

13 Halil Inalcık, The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300–1600 (New York: Praeger, 1973); Halil Inalcık, An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300–1914 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Halil Inalcık, ‘The Nature of Traditional Society: Turkey’ in Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow (eds) Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), pp. 42–63.

14 Roderic H. Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856–1876 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).

15 Halil Inalcık and Mehmet Seyitdanlioğlu, Tanzimat, Değişim Sürecinde Osmanlı İmparatorluğu (Istanbul: İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2011); Ilber Ortaylı, İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı (İstanbul: İletişim Yayinlari, 2003),.

16 Berkes, The Development, pp. 467–468. Binnaz Toprak, Islam and Political Development (Leiden: E.J.Brill, 1982); Binnaz Sayarı, ‘Türkiye’de Dinin Denetim Islevi’, A.U. Siyasal Bilgiler Fakultesi Dergisi, 33 (March–June 1978).

17 Under the AK Party government, there is an increasing interest in the writings of Kısakürek. See İlyas Ersoy, Necip Fazıl Kısakürek Düşüncesinde Felsefenin Rolü (Ankara University, Unpublished MA Thesis, 2007); Mustafa Çelik, Necip Fazil’a Gore Edebiyat ve Devlet Baglami (Gazi University, Unpublished MA Thesis, 2013), pp. 203–293.

18 Tunc Aybak, ‘The Sultan is dead, long live Başyüce Erdoğan!’, https://www.opendemocracy.net/tun-aybak/sultan-is-dead-long-live-ba-y-ce-Erdoğan-sultan (accessed 14 January 2018).

19 Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, İdeolocya Örgüsü (Ankara: Hilal, 1959), pp. 102–103.

20 Mehmet Arisan, ‘“Eternal Sunshine of an Obscure Mind”: World War I, The Imperial Collapse and Trauma Management in the New Turkish Republic’ in Yavuz and Ahmad (eds) War and Collapse, pp. 1217–1239.

21 M. Hakan Yavuz, ‘Social and Intellectual Origins of Neo-Ottomanism: Searching for a Post-National Vision’, Die Welt Des Islams, 56:3–4 (2016), pp. 438–465.

22 Toni Alaranta, National and State Identity in Turkey: The Transformation of the Republic’s Status in the International System (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015). His previous publications include Contemporary Kemalism: From Universal Secular-Humanism to Extreme Turkish Nationalism (Routledge, 2014).

23 Serif Mardin’s argument that Turkey’s secularists failed to build a shared moral and political language that would be conducive to democracy and civil society should be reconsidered in light of the AK Party’s record of governance since 2002. Even taking account of military coups in the country’s history, Turkey had never previously experienced the extent of decay in ethics and moral conscience of public life, along with the dismantling of political institutions, that is occurring presently.

24 M. Hakan Yavuz, ‘Islam and Europeanization in Turkish-Muslim Socio-Political Movements’ in Peter J. Katzenstein and Timothy A. Byrnes (eds) Religion in an Expanding Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 225–255.

25 Whether they were genuine in their desire to join the EU or it was intended as a tactical move to undermine the Kemalist state structure has amplified the current debate considering Erdoğan’s recent authoritarian policies.

26 Jenny B. White, Islamist Mobilization in Turkey: A Study in Vernacular Politics (Seattle: University Washington Press, 2003); M. Hakan Yavuz, Islamic Political Identity (London: Oxford University Press, 2003).

27 Ibrahim Kalın, ‘Ak Party in Turkey’ in John L. Esposito and Emad El-Din Shahin (eds) Oxford Handbook of Political Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 423–430.

28 Serif Mardin, Religion and Social Change in Modern Turkey: The Case of Bediuzzaman Said Nursi (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1989); Yavuz, Islamic Political Identity.

29 More on the similarities and differences between Said Nursi and Gülen, see Yavuz, The Gülen Movement, pp. 30–34.

30 There are several different approaches to outlining the periods of development within the Gülen movement. This particular period structure is based on the movement’s evolving relationship with politics and development of its political objectives. For a different perspective on periodization, see David Tittensor, The House of Service: The Gülen Movement and Islam’s Third Way (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 71. Tittensor introduces three distinct stages, arguing: ‘(1) the 1960 and 1970s were years of religious community building; (2) the 1980s witnessed domestic community expansion, and lastly (3) in the 1990s a global vision was born that instigated rapid expansion’.

31 Interview with IB on 2 July 2017, Ankara.

32 Interview with KA on July 2, 2017, Ankara.

33 Interview with YA on 6 May 2017, Ankara.

34 Interview with HY on 2 July 2017, Ankara.

35 Interview with IG on 2 July 2017, Ankara.

36 Interview with ÖÇ on 3 July 2017, Ankara.

37 When Abdullah Gül was a foreign minister, he sent regulation to all embassies on 16 April 2003 and called upon embassies to work closely with the Gülenists and visit their schools and provide necessary support. This regulation of the Foreign Ministry was removed on 18 May 2014. See http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/turkiye/73301/Cemaat_genelgesine_iptal.html. Although Gül totally rejected any ties with the Gülen movement in his letter to the Turkish Grand National Assembly Commission of Inquiry convened to investigate the 2016 coup, he had maintained close ties with the Gülen movement.

38 Interview with Ambassador EA, 12 May 2017.

39 Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, ‘Kulturkampf in Turkey: The Constitutional Referendum of 12 September 2010’ South European Society and Politics 17:1 (2012), pp. 1–22.

40 Interview with KB, 21 June 2017, Istanbul.

41 Interview with ÖÇ, 6 May 2017, Ankara.

42 M. Hakan Yavuz and Rasım Koç, ‘The Turkish Coup Attempt: The Gülen Movement vs. the State’, Middle East Policy 23:4 (2016), pp. 20–39.

43 More on the wiretapping is available here: ‘MIT’ten böçek harekatı’ Hürriyet, 25 December 2012; http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/mit-ten-bocek-harek-ti-22227306.

44 Reports on torture and human rights violations in Turkey continue to stream across many channels. One report by Amnesty International summarized the instances: ‘Turkey: Independent Monitors Must Be Allowed to Access Detainees Amid Torture Allegations’, see https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/07/turkey-independent-monitors-must-be-allowed-to-access-detainees-amid-torture-allegations/

45 Amanda Paul and Demir Murat Seyrek, ‘Constitutional Changes in Turkey: A Presidential System or the President’s System?’ 24 January 2017, http://aei.pitt.edu/83866/1/pub_7374_conschangesinturkey.pdf; Şule Özsoy Boyunsuz, ‘The AKP’S Proposal for a “Turkish Type of Presidentialism” in Comparative Context’ Turkish Studies, 17:1 (2016), pp. 68–90.

46 See the report of the OSCE, ‘Turkey, Constitutional Referendum, 16 April 2017: Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions’. http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/turkey/311726.

47 Kalaycıoğlu, Ersin. ‘Turkish Popular Presidential Elections: Deepening Legitimacy Issues and Looming Regime Change’, South European Society and Politics, 20:3 (2015), pp. 1–23.

48 Interview with ES on 21 May 2017, Istanbul.

49 Venice Commission Declaration on Interference with Judicial Independence in Turkey (20 June 2015) http://venice.coe.int/files/turkish%20declaration%20June%202015.pdf.

50 Erdoğan: ‘This Uprising Is a Gift from God to Us Because This Will Be a Reason to Cleanse Our Army’. https://www.rt.com/news/351630-Erdoğan-turkish-military-relationships/ (accessed 2 November 2017).

51 Mehul Srivastava, ‘Assets Worth $11bn Seized in Turkey Crackdown’, Financial Times, 7 July 2017.

52 ‘Turkey’s Purges Are Hitting Its Business Class’, The Economist, 4 February 2017.