Abstract
As one of the oldest independent fiscal institutions in the world, the CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (CPB) has a long history of providing evidence for policy-making. Uniquely, its activities include the analysis of election manifestos, the national budget and the coalition agreement, as a derivative from its provision of leading macroeconomic forecasts. This paper analyses the CPB's role within the Dutch political system, its place in public administration and the different methods it employs to provide evidence for policy-makers. It then focuses on two different types of activities, the costing of election manifestos and ageing studies, using a multi-methods approach to illustrate how the CPB's influence extends to setting policy agendas and policy targets, and to reveal critical factors for success and failure. Although the CPB model cannot easily be transposed to other countries, a number of general principles can be deduced from it for application elsewhere.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Frits Bos and Bas ter Weel for their assistance, and Linda Hantrais and Ashley Lenihan for their comments and suggestions.
Notes on contributor
Edwin van de Haar has been the Executive Secretary and Head of Communications at CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis since August 2010. He received his Ph.D. in international political theory from Maastricht University and holds an MSc in international relations from the London School of Economics and Political Science, and an MA in Political Science from Leiden University. In his academic works, he specialises in the liberal tradition in (international) political theory. His publications include Degrees of freedom. Liberal political philosophy and ideology (Transaction Publishers, 2015) and Classical liberalism and international relations theory: Hume, Smith, Mises and Hayek (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).