Why should we care about the definition of power?

Abstract

Being pluralist about the concept of power does not mean that all definitions are equally valid. Many definitions are non-rival and gain their utility from the specific contexts in which they are applied. Others are rival and their relative utility derives from how good an explanation is provided by the theory of which they are part. Such explanation is constrained by the world because good explanation is constrained by the expectations it engenders. Some conceptions of power and related terms do similar explanatory work but hold different normative values. The contestability of ‘power’ derives from the normative work it does in different contexts and explanations. By making our concepts as non-normative as possible we can ensure that the moral or political disagreement is brought more clearly into the open. How we define social and political power does matter in some contexts for both explanatory and normative reasons.

Keywords:

• power
• zero- and positive-sum
• conceptual construction
• essential contestability

Notes

1. The terms ‘moron’, ‘imbecile’ and ‘idiot’ were originally descriptive terms applying to people who were assessed in terms of IQ (or forerunner intelligence tests such as the Binet scale) – where an idiot has an IQ of 0–25, imbecile 26–50, and a moron 51–70. Psychologists saw these terms simply as descriptive. Some might say their original use was completely descriptive being defined scientifically by relationship to an objective intelligence test. Some would argue that the IQ test is not in reality objective, and certainly it measures only some elements of intelligence and is affected by environmental factors, notably the degree to which different cultures find the need to generalize. More pertinently some would argue that even if IQ is an objective measure in some sense, since we tend to value intelligence positively to give a class of people a name such as ‘imbecile’ or ‘moron’ can never be simply descriptive. It has to be evaluative as well. Psychologists rarely use such terms now and no longer claim them to be simple descriptors partly for these reasons but largely because the terms came into usage amongst the general population as terms of simple abuse. Nevertheless, they were not defined deliberately by psychologists for specific normative reasons. The term ‘special’ to cover all learning-disabled children was. Unfortunately, such attempts to give classes of people positive labels such as ‘special’ are not likely to succeed in the long-run. We cannot quickly change attitudes through simplistic strategic discourse.