Power and politics in public inquiries: bloody sunday 1972

Figures & data

Table 1. Sources of data

Statements to the Bloody Sunday Inquiry
Carver, Lord, (former Chief of the General Staff) 24 July 1999
Ferguson, Lieutenant Colonel James, 13 January 2003
Ford, General Sir Robert, 23 March 2000
Heath, Sir Edward, 15 March 2000
Inq 406, Operations Officer of 22 Light Air Defence Regiment, 2000
Jackson, Colonel Roy, March 2000
Jackson, Colonel Roy. Supplemental statement. 10 October 2003
MacLellan, General Andrew Patrick, 2000
McCullagh, Patrick Mary, 20 July 2000 and 4 April 2002
Ramsbotham, General Sir David (military assistant to the CGS in 1972) 6 March 2000
Steele, Major-General Michael, 6 October 2000
Welsh, Major-General Peter, 3 August 2000
Wilford, Colonel Derek, 2000
Wright, Sir Oliver, former ‘UK Government Representative’ in Northern Ireland, 30 August 1999
Witness evidence and oral statements to the Bloody Sunday Inquiry
Clarke, Christopher QC, Counsel to the Inquiry. Opening Statement of 27 and 28 March 2000
Clarke, Christopher QC. Closing Submission 22 and 23 November 2004
Ferguson, Lieutenant Colonel James, 13 January 2003
Ford, General Sir Robert, 29 − 31 Oct, 4–6 November 2011–12 November 2002
Lord Gifford (Senior Counsel representing families) Closing Submission, 14 June 2004
Glasgow, Edwin (Senior Counsel representing armed forces), Opening statement, 27 November 2000.
Glasgow, Edwin, Closing Submission, 9 June 2004
Jackson, Colonel Roy, 20–22 January 2003
Kitson, Frank (former commander of 39 Brigade, Belfast) 24 September 2002
MacLellan, General Andrew Patrick, 19–22 and 25 November 2002
McCullagh, Patrick Mary, (former RUC Superintendent in Derry) 11 and 12 September 2002
Ramsbotham, General Sir David, 30 October 2002
Smith, William (former secretary to the Widgery Inquiry) 26 September 2002
Steele, Major-General Michael, 26–28 November 2002
Welsh, Major-General Peter, 14–15 January 2003
White, Kelvin, (former senior Foreign Office official) 3 December 2002
Wilford, Colonel Derek, 25–26 March 2003
Inquiry Reports
Great Britain. Parliament. Report of the Tribunal appointed to inquire into the events on Sunday, 30 January 1972, which led to loss of life in connection with the procession in Londonderry on that day. [Widgery Report, HC 220] London: HMSO, 1972.
Saville Report, Especially Volumes I, II and VIII. Archived at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20101103103930/http://report.bloody-sunday-inquiry.org/
Other primary sources
Ford, Major General Robert, ‘Future military policy for Londonderry. An appreciation of the situation by CLF’. 14 December 1971. Attached to General Ford’s Statement to the BSI.
Ford, General Sir Robert. ‘Interview with Desmond Hamill’. Attached to General Ford’s Statement to the BSI. 1984.
MacLellan, Brigadier Andrew Patrick. Letter to Major General Robert Ford, 15 March 1972. Attached to General MacLellan’s statement to the Bloody Sunday Inquiry.
MacLellan, General Andrew Patrick. ‘Interview with Desmond Hamill’ 1984. Attached to MacLellan’s Statement to the Bloody Sunday Inquiry.
Wilford, Colonel Derek, 1972, Statement to the Widgery Inquiry
attached to Wilford’s Statement to the Bloody Sunday Inquiry.

Figure 1. Individuals and roles

Table 2. Power and politics, and how these were analysed

Themes	Sub-themes	Findings from Inquiry Evidence	Inquiry Report Interpretation	Conceptual Question
1. Politics of operational decision-making	Repression in Derry Attitudes to Repression as Situated	Attitudes to repression appeared to influence operational decisions. This represented an attempt to alter the overall outcome both for those in favour of restraint, and those opposed to the policy. These attitudes were influenced by where individuals were located and those they were in contact with.	Individual witnesses were personally dissatisfied with the behaviours of certain actors, but this did not represent either an overall dissatisfiaction or support for official policy (and in any case it is irrelevant) This did not represent an attempt to alter the overall outcome. This was not relevant	What are the most immediate, most local power relations at work? Contra to the findings, attitudes to repression appeared key. How do these enable certain kinds of discourse to emerge? The report’s interpretation (that is, its disregarding) of these enables an understanding of power as disconnected from personal attitudes and biases, to emerge in this setting. As above
2. Politics of justifying actions	Rationality as rationalization	Clear attempts by individuals to modify the ultimate outcome were justified in narrow technical terms, by the witnesses. Witnesses drew on a logic of rationality to do this.	Justifications in narrow technical terms were accepted as such. Logics of rationality were not queried.	How is the emergent discursive nexus linked to an overall strategy that then appears unitarist and voluntary? The ubiquitiy of discourses of ‘rationalization as rationality’ within public inquiries is noted by other scholars. This is both drawn upon and strengthened here by its use in practice.
3. Politics of Affective Connections	Friendship and Trust Emotional investment	A ‘shadow hierarchy’ was in operation such that informal relationships were at odds with people’s ‘official’ position of power. Senior figures appeared to be emotionally involved in decisions made on the day, fuelled by ideologies and personal relationships	These elements were disregarded and marginalized as irrelevant The report asks only whether behaviour is proper and conforms with formal structures and official role requirements. As above	How do subjects’ passionate attachments to power influence the overall discursive nexus? Despite appearing to be an important driver of actions and decisions, emotion and affect are downplayed at the Inquiry, thus negating and ignoring this important dynamic of power activity.