Party and power: between representation and mobilisation in contemporary Russia

Abstract

The reasons for the under-development of the Russian party system remain contested, yet significant changes took place in the 2000s. The system became more regulated and streamlined. There were far fewer parties, but the rights of those that survived were consolidated. Above all, the regime identified itself with a single major party, United Russia, although the relationship between the regime and the party was problematical. Russia practises a heavily presidential model of executive dominance, but the polity is characterised by a dominant power system. This system was careful to preserve its autonomy, and thus guarded against the emergence of a dominant party system. The regime party and its allies acted less as instruments of representation than as tools to achieve political mobilisation, and by the same token the role of political opposition was marginalised. However, the dual state character of the political order allowed contradictions to develop that made possible the strengthening of the constitutional state, and with it a greater autonomous representative role for political parties. The accelerated political reforms following the flawed December 2011 parliamentary elections sought to limit the arbitrariness of the administrative regime to permit the emergence of a more genuinely competitive political environment.

Keywords:

• dominant power system
• United Russia
• dual state
• political competition

Notes

Although the party's name was United Russia, on a number of dimensions the moniker Disunited Russia is more appropriate. Its various ‘clubs’ reflected distinct ideological orientations, each one of which could form the basis of a separate party if UR lost its privileged status as the dominant power system's pedestal party. Equally, rather than UR's regional branches acting as a mechanism of national integration, they typically acted as instruments in the hands of regional executives. The notion of ‘time bomb’ here simply means that at any time, if UR emerged as a potential threat to the power system, any one of its various lines of fragmentation could be detonated to destroy the challenge.

For example, in his live interview on the main Russian television channels, ‘Itogi goda s prezidentom Rossii’, 24 December 2010, http://www.kremlin.ru/transcripts/9888, last accessed 18 January 2011.

For example, speech to the State Council on 22 January 2010, ‘Predsedatel’ pravitel'stva Rossii V. V. Putin vystupil na zasedanii Gosudarstvennogo soveta Rossiiskoi Federatsii’, http://premier.gov.ru/events/news/9065/.

In other words, various ‘time bombs’ were detonated, of the sort that could potentially be used against UR if it, like Rodina, went ‘rogue’.

For a study of the Moscow Duma election as a rehearsal for the national elections, see Ryabov (2006, pp. 44–52) and for the success of liberal unity, see Ryabov (2006, pp. 47–48).

All data are from the All-Russia Centre for the Study of Public Opinion (VTsIOM) and Byzov (2006, pp. 36–37, at p. 36).

Nadezhda Kevorkova, Interview with the head of VTsIOM, Fedorov (2007, p. 10).

‘Poslanie Federal'nomu Sobraniyu Rossiiskoi Federatsii’, 5 November 2008, http://www.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2008/11/208749.shtml.

Data are from the Levada Centre, www.levada.ru/tabl06.html.

Citizen's Force was based on the Free Russia (Svobodnaya Rossiya) party created in 2004 but was renamed at an extraordinary congress in March 2004. It was a classic project party designed to draw votes away from other liberal parties. It was headed by the presidential representative to the Supreme Court, the well-known lawyer and publicist Mikhail Barshchevsky. The DPR was one of Russia's most venerable parties, having been established in 1990 by Nikolai Travkin as part of the Democratic Russia coalition, although it was always rather more ‘patriotic’ than the mainstream liberals, a characteristic that was accentuated later when Sergei Glaz'ev and Stanislav Govorukhin became leaders. After various splits, the party was reformed by Mikhail Prusak, the governor of Novgorod oblast’, in 2001, and in 2005 the former prime minister, Mikhail Kasyanov, tried to be elected its leader but lost out to Andrei Bogdanov. By then the DPR had become just another project party.

Available from: www.rusolidarnost.ru.

Out of Moscow falsification was more prevalent but even here, as Mitrokhin himself witnessed (even his vote for himself failed to register in the count), it was certainly widespread, accompanied by ‘the misuse of absentee ballots, the improper use of administrative resources and pressure on people to vote for United Russia’ (Twickel 2009).

‘Moskvichi o vyborakh v Moskovskuyu gorodskuyu Dumu’, 2 October 2009, http://www.levada.ru/press/2009100200.html.

‘Predstavleniya rossiyan o demokratii’, http://www.levada.ru/press/2009101501.html.

‘Presedatel’ Pravitel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii V. V. Putin vstretilsya s politologami’, 6 February 2012; http://premier.gov.ru/events/news/18008/.