ABSTRACT
This article examines the fall of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych as a failure of authoritarian learning. When confronted by the Euromaidan protests in November 2013, Yanukovych responded in a manner similar to that seen during the Arab Uprisings of 2011, attempting to adopt a series of counter-protest strategies (promise, repress, bribe, mobilise, divide) which preserved most Arab governments against mass protests. However, the strategies which worked in 2011 in the Middle East were not applicable in Ukraine in 2013–2014, as structural and political constraints within Ukrainian society made these strategies ineffective, at best, and counterproductive, at worse.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes on contributor
Thomas Ambrosio is a Professor of Political Science at North Dakota State University. His research interests include authoritarianism, Russian foreign policy, and U.S. threat perceptions.
Notes
1. This was followed by protests on Independence Day in July 2011 as well.
2. Yanukovych subsequently signed the law on 8 August 2011.
3. Emphasis in original.
4. Only Morocco was rated “partly free”.