https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6249-7671
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ABSTRACT
Against the backdrop of the COVID-19 pandemic, this paper documents how ordinary digital technologies, such as WhatsApp, were (re)appropriated for communication and pandemic coordination at a time when face-to-face meetings were impossible. However, there was also an emergent ‘dark’ side to its use. In the context of India’s democratic backsliding, middle-class Resident Welfare Associations (RWAs) deployed everyday technologies to (re)configure exclusionary digital socio-spatial boundaries through practices of ‘grassroots authoritarianism’. The paper documents how the national government co-opted RWAs in the implementation of COVID-19 rules and examines their role as an extension of the state within a longer history of middle-class power in India’s cities. We evidence how the ‘WhatsApp panopticon’ was mobilized as a tool of everyday community care and surveillance to shape morality regimes and influence the compliance of residents with national and locally enforced rules. We argue that digital socio-spatial practices of securitization, fear and compliance represent forms of ‘grassroots authoritarianism’ that echo and ensconce state-led ideological change in India. Building on ‘everyday authoritarianism’ we show how digital technologies and middle-class organizations are mediating India’s authoritarian shift from below.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
We thank the participants at conference panels and workshops where the paper was presented and received helpful feedback. We would also like to express our gratitude to Carwyn Morris and Chenchen Zhang for coordinating the special issue.
DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
Our research project was funded by WhatsApp, for which we are grateful, but Meta has not shared data with us, it did not direct the research process and does not have editorial oversight of our publications. We recognize the practical and ethical challenges Big Tech funding has for research and have written more extensively about the politics of this elsewhere (Williams & Kamra, Citation2022).
Notes
1 The lockdown was later extended to 70 days (https://www.gpminstitute.com/publications-resources/Global-Payroll-Magazine/june-2020/india's-lockdown-3.0-the-latest-guidelines).
2 See https://www.timesnownews.com/spiritual/religion/article/covid-19-this-chapter-from-ramayana-will-tell-you-why-you-must-not-cross-the-lakshman-rekha/573388 (last accessed 19 July 2022).
3 As with other BJP government policies, Aarogya Setu draws on Sanskrit terminology, translated as ‘bridge to liberation from disease’ or ‘health bridge’, in a bid to frame modern, digital India in a particular ‘traditional’ Hindu image (https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-52659520; Williams, Citation2021).
4 See https://www.gpminstitute.com/publications-resources/Global-Payroll-Magazine/june-2020/india's-lockdown-3.0-the-latest-guidelines (last accessed 12 December 2022).
5 See www.whatsapppolitics.com.
6 Others have also written about how respondents were sometimes more comfortable with online interviews (e.g., Howlett, Citation2022).
7 Pushpendra Johar (Pushp) carried out the majority of empirical research for this paper, whilst Lipika and Philippa conducted the literature review, analysis, writing and editing. We also extend our gratitude to Ekta Oza, Fatma Matin Khan and Mukesh Kumar who were also employed as research assistants between January and July 2019 during the first phase of the project (www.whatsapppolitics.com).
8 See https://housing.com/news/everything-you-need-to-know-about-residents-welfare-associations-in-india/ (last accessed 12 December 2022).
11 See https://www.thehindu.com/news/cities/bangalore/rwas-hold-neighbourhood-camps-to-get-more-citizens-inoculated/article34853502.ece (last accessed 19 January 2022).
12 See https://theprint.in/india/the-dictatorial-republic-of-rwas-the-other-big-problem-covid-created-for-india/524819/ (last accessed 2 February 2022).
13 RWAS are not the first neighbourhood-level organizations to be the grassroots level of Hindu nationalism. Since the 1950s, there have been Mohalla Sudhar Samitis (neighbourhood improvement groups), some of which were closely affiliated to the RSS, the parent organization of the BJP. Thanks to Hilal Ahmed for pointing this out.
14 In India the urban administrative and bureaucratic hierarchy is structured around the national, state and district levels.
15 SOP, standard operating procedure.
16 See https://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2020/apr/07/cops-probe-ban-on-entry-of-muslims-2126757.html (last accessed 18 December 2021); https://time.com/5815264/coronavirus-india-islamophobia-coronajihad/ (last accessed 18 December 2021).
17 See https://www.hindustantimes.com/cities/delhi-news (last accessed 12 May 2022).
18 See https://theprint.in/opinion/pov/rwas-acting-like-the-first-line-of-defence-against-coronavirus-they-are-modis-soldiers/386770/ (last accessed 29 June 2022).
19 See https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/chennai/residents-vs-resident-welfare-associations-are-rwas-acting-high-and-mighty-in-these-times-of-corona/articleshow/76947832.cms (last accessed 1 December 2021) (emphasis added).
20 See https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-52873384 (last accessed 1 November 2021).