Katangale or kuba?: development assistance and the experiences and perceptions of local corruption in Malawi

Figures & data

Table 1. Variables used in the analysis.

	Variable	Mean/Percent	Std Deviation	Source
Perceptions of Corruption	High	79%		Afrobarometer Rounds 2–5
District Level Aid (Average per Survey Round)	Aid Disbursements Per Capita	2.9	6.68	Malawi Aid Management Platform
Demographics	(Age) 18–30 years old	46%		Afrobarometer Rounds 2–5
	(Age) 31–40 years old	27%
	(Age) 41 and older	27%
	Male Gender	50%
	Secondary Education or More	20%
	Urban Residence	16%
	Lived Poverty Index	8.76	5.1
Corruption Experiences & Perceptions	Perceive President as Corrupt	63%
	Have Personal Experience of Corruption	11%
Political Attitudes and Partisanship	Political Interest (High)	65%
	Voted for the President's Party	32%
	Media Exposure (High/Medium/Low)	71%
Potential for Conflict	Ethnic Group Treated Fairly (Yes)	53%
	Ethnic Group Treated Fairly (No)	40%
	Ethnic Group Treated Fairly (Undecided)	7%
	Ethnic Fragmentation in the District	0.190	0.110
Ethnicity	Chewa	38%
	Tumbuka	10%
	Yao	14%
	Lomwe	14%
	Other	25%
Membership in Patron or Ethnic Networks	Contact with Local Patrons	37%
	Communitarian Beliefs (High)	43%
	Member of Group	68%
	Ethnic Attachment (High)	48%
Development	Service Availability Index	2.95	1.950	Afrobarometer Rounds 2–5
	Income Inequality	0.370	0.0500	Atlas of Social Statistics

Notes: N = 5860 respondents; taken from the Table 2, column 2, Heckman probit selection model estimation sample.

Percentages for some categories may add up to more than 100% due to rounding.

Table 2. Aid and perception of local corruption.

	Model 1 (Logistic regression)	Model 2 (Heckman probit)	Model 3 (External instruments)	Model 4 (Generated instruments)
Main Explanatory Variables	Second Stage
Mean Aid Per Capita (log)	0.0174	0.009	−0.246	0.009
	(0.311)	(0.169)	(0.363)	(0.0421)
Perception Presidential Corruption	2.220**	1.213***	0.355**	0.357**
	(0.109)	(0.073)	(0.0172)	(0.017)
Experience Paying Bribe	0.652**	0.337***	0.0733**	0.070**
	(0.173)	(0.088)	(0.0167)	(0.016)
Strength of Ethnic Attachment	0.174^^	0.078	0.0230^^	0.0215
	(0.100)	(0.054)	(0.0136)	(0.013)
Communitarian Feelings	0.0843	0.073	0.0124	0.0146
	(0.148)	(0.082)	(0.0182)	(0.018)
Level of Political Interest	0.0173	−0.004	0.00310	0.003
	(0.105)	(0.059)	(0.0134)	(0.013)
Media Exposure	0.143	0.081	0.0191	0.020
	(0.0933)	(0.051)	(0.0144)	(0.014)
Ethnic Group Treated Fairly (yes)	−0.316**	−0.171**	−0.0440**	−0.044**
	(0.0999)	(0.055)	(0.0138)	(0.014)
Ethnic Group Treated Fairly (undecided)	−0.212	−0.092	−0.0272	−0.024
	(0.191)	(0.103)	(0.0269)	(0.026)
Ethnic Fragmentation	−0.103	−0.113	−0.0151	−0.009
	(0.488)	(0.254)	(0.0567)	(0.056)
Gini Coefficient	0.913	0.393	0.0719	0.096
	(2.390)	(1.233)	(0.299)	(0.294)
Demographics	First, Selection Stage
31–40 Age Group	−0.128	−0.113*	−0.0114	−0.015
	(0.115)	(0.049)	(0.0154)	(0.014)
41 & Older Age Group	−0.215^^	−0.245***	−0.0250	−0.027^^
	(0.116)	(0.049)	(0.0154)	(0.015)
Male Gender	−0.0465	0.303***	−0.00663	−0.007
	(0.0773)	(0.039)	(0.0122)	(0.012)
Educational Attainment	0.541**	0.311***	0.0679**	0.065**
	(0.140)	(0.071)	(0.0166)	(0.016)
Urban Residency	−0.0977	0.073	−0.00167	−0.007
	(0.193)	(0.078)	(0.0325)	(0.031)
Index of Lived Poverty	0.0233	0.005	0.000158	0.0002
	(0.0295)	(0.005)		(0.001)
Ethnicity
Yao	0.0478	0.003	0.00226	0.008
	(0.187)	(0.068)	(0.0241)	(0.023)
Lomwe	0.00344	0.056	−0.00243	0.002
	(0.186)	(0.078)	(0.0244)	(0.023)
Chewa	−0.0229	0.015	−0.00623	0.000
	(0.158)	(0.066)	(0.0216)	(0.019)
Tumbuka	0.274	0.242**	0.0410	0.043
	(0.243)	(0.084)	(0.0328)	(0.033)
Membership in Patron Networks
Patron Contact	0.0234	0.283***	0.00303	0.004
	(0.0920)	(0.050)	(0.0128)	(0.013)
Group Membership	−0.158	0.100*	−0.0206	−0.020
	(0.106)	(0.048)	(0.0138)	(0.014)
Closeness to President’s Party	0.0178	0.421***	0.00687	0.004
	(0.105)	(0.053)	(0.0138)	(0.013)
District Level Development
Service Availability Index	0.0233	0.045**	0.00158	0.003
	(0.0295)	(0.014)	(0.00397)	(0.004)
Instrumental Variable Post-estimation Test Results
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic			22.053	244.058
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic)			32.449	244.058
Under-identification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic)			44.502***	1464.750***
Over-identification test (Hansen J statistic)			0.859	75.318*
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values: 10% IV size			19.93	11.09
Heckman Probit Post-estimation Test Results
Number of censored observations		1040
Number of uncensored observations		4820
Likelihood-ratio test (Independent Equations) (rho = 0):		χ^2  = 5.96*
Observations	4820	5860	5860	4820

Notes: Marginal effects reported; robust standard errors are reported in parentheses for Models 1 and 2 and survey adjusted standard errors are reported in for Models 3 and 4).

The table reports the marginal effects of each variable on the probability of a survey respondent reporting high corruption in local leaders. In addition to the variables listed in the table, models also include dummy variables for district and survey round.

^{^}p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.

Table 3. Aid and experience of bribery.

Aid and experience of bribery	Model 1 (Logistic regression)	Model 2 (Heckman probit)	Model 3 (External instruments)	Model 4 (Generated instruments)
Aid Per Capita (log)	0.684^^ (0.352)	0.386* (0.189)	0.619** (0.233)	0.065* (0.032)
Instrumental Variable Post-estimation Test Results
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic			48.70	292.41
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic)			68.013	244.058
Under-identification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic)			97.058***	1801.55***
Over-identification test (Hansen J statistic)			1.261	82.349**
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values: 10% IV size			19.93	11.09
Heckman Probit Post-estimation Test Results
Number of censored observations		222
Number of uncensored observations		5,596
Likelihood-ratio test (Independent Equations) (rho = 0):		χ^2  = 3.80^^
Observations		5818	5810	5810
Alternative Aid Specifications^a
Number of Projects Per Capita (1000)	0.112** (0.0380)	0.443** (0.103)	1.893* (0.779)	0.849** (0.202)
Relative Number of Projects Per Capita (log)	4.368** (1.161)	2.402** (0.611)	3.428** (1.228)	4.642** (1.158)
NGO Implemented Aid (log)	−0.0555* (0.0222)	−2.655*** (0.775)	−0.084* (0.034)	−0.449** (0.157)

Notes: Marginal effects reported; robust standard errors are reported in parentheses for Models 1 and 2 and survey adjusted standard errors are reported in for Models 3 and 4).

The table reports the marginal effects of aid on the probability of survey respondents reporting that they have had to pay a bribe in the past year. Included in the models are all of the covariates listed above in Table 2, except bribe payments. This includes fixed effects for district and survey round.

^p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.

^aExternal instruments passed tests of weak instruments, under- and over-identification.

Table 4. Aid and perceptions of local corruption: interaction.

Perceived local corruption	External instrument model
Mean Aid Per Capita (log) per district-year	−0.317 (0.446)
Communitarian Values	−0.0434 (0.0901)
Aid & Comm. Values	0.209 (0.316)

Notes: Marginal effects reported; robust standard errors in parentheses.

The table reports the marginal effects of each variable on the probability of a survey respondent reporting high corruption in local leaders. Included in the models are all of the covariates listed above in Table 2 including fixed effects for district and survey round. External instruments passed tests of weak instruments, under- and over-identification.

^{^}p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001, N = 4820.