Turnout and voting behaviour in constitutional referendums: a regional analysis of the Italian case

Figures & data

Figure 1. ‘No’ vote in the constitutional referendum of 2001 (NUTS-3 level).

Table 1. Main characteristics of the referendum.

	2001	2006	2016
Turnout (%)	34%	52.3%	65.5%
Result (%)	Yes 64.2%	No 61.3%	No 59.1%
Main opposition parties	Forza Italia, Alleanza Nazionale, Lega Nord, UDC, NPSI, PRI	L’ulivo, Rifondazione Comunista, La Rosa nel Pugno, Comunisti Italiani, Di Pietro Italia dei Valori, Federazione dei Verdi, U.D. Eur Popolari	Forza Italia, Lega Nord, Fratelli d'Italia, M5S
Characteristics of the proposal
Local autonomy	More powers to the regions. The regions will have legislative power on any matter not expressly reserved for state legislation Increased power to the regions about education, the environment and justice. Fiscal autonomy of the regions	Increased legislative power to the regions, giving them control of education, healthcare, law and order, and representation in the Supreme Court	Reduction of legislative power of the regions, but a clearer division of power with central government. Abolishing the so-called ‘concurrence competence’, according to which state laws set out the principles that later become regional law
Structure of parliament		No symmetrical bicameralism The Chamber of Deputies would have responsibility for foreign policy, defence, immigration, budget, etc. The Senate would have responsibility for federal law Both chambers will be directly elected	No symmetrical bicameralism Bills could be adopted by a vote of the Chamber of Deputies The Senate shares the legislative power with the Chamber of Deputies, but the vote will be required to enact law on specific matters Members of the Senate will be elected in an indirect way to provide representation of the regions
Relationship between parliament and government		More power to the prime minister. The prime minister will have the power to dissolve parliament, appoint and sack ministers, and control government policy Less power to the President of the Republic	Reduction of power of the Senate. The government does not need to have the confidence of the Senate, and the Senate cannot pass a motion of no confidence to the government

Figure 2. ‘No’ vote in the constitutional referendums of 2006 and 2016 (NUTS-3 level).

Table 2. Descriptive statistics (n = 103).

	2016	2006	2001
Turnout	0.66	0.53	0.34
Vote for no	0.59	0.61	0.36
Short-term unemployment	0.12	0.07	0.10
Long-term unemployment	0.07	0.07	0.07
Government satisfaction	3.11	3.82	3.91
Higher education	0.07	0.07	0.06
‘No’ parties	0.63	0.51	0.44
Regional council	0.27	0.58	0.61
Newspapers	0.05	0.10	0.10
Age	0.39	0.38	0.37
Female	0.51	0.51	0.51
Population density	261	260	244
Foreign change	0.15	0.27	0.08
IQI	0.60	0.57	0.59^a

Notes: ^aInstitutional quality index (IQI) for the 2001 referendum relates to 2004.

Vales are means.

Table 3. Determinants of turnout in the Italian constitutional referendums.

Y = Turnout	2001		2006		2016
	(a)	(b)	(a)	(b)	(a)	(b)
Short-term unemployment	−0.002* (0.001)	–	−0.661*** (0.215)	–	−0.402*** (0.094)	–
Long-term unemployment	–	−0.003* (0.001)	–	−0.572*** (0.156)	–	−0.667*** (0.146)
‘No’ parties	−0.433*** (0.062)	−0.438*** (0.063)	−0.007* (0.004)	−0.003* (0.001)	−0.124*** (0.042)	−0.123*** (0.042)
Newspapers	0.012** (0.005)	0.012** (0.005)	0.002 (0.009)	0.002* (0.001)	0.333*** (0.050)	0.086* (0.044)
Higher education	0.122 (1.228)	0.193 (1.263)	0.243 (0.569)	0.450 (0.499)	0.282 (0.223)	0.065 (0.239)
Age	0.097 (0.940)	0.212 (0.946)	1.237** (0.539)	1.223** (0.504)	0.578* (0.319)	0.523* (0.297)
Female	−0.411 (1.164)	−0.523 (1.170)	−0.257 (0.930)	−0.528 (0.793)	−1.168** (0.559)	−0.573 (0.615)
Population density	0.004 (0.006)	0.004 (0.006)	0.003 (0.006)	0.003 (0.006)	−0.004 (0.002)	−0.003 (0.002)
IQI	0.104** (0.042)	0.113*** (0.037)	0.026 (0.040)	0.005 (0.041)	0.120*** (0.024)	0.120*** (0.025)
North	0.061*** (0.016)	0.066*** (0.016)	0.026 (0.025)	0.034 (0.012)	0.031*** (0.010)	0.016 (0.011)
Centre	0.041*** (0.014)	0.044*** (0.044)	0.040*** (0.014)	0.043*** (0.013)	0.019** (0.010)	0.001 (0.001)
Observations	103	103	103	103	103	103
R^2	0.859	0.859	0.808	0.816	0.921	0.920

Notes: ***, ** and *Statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.

Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. A constant term is included but not shown.

Table 4. Determinants of the share of ‘no’ votes in the Italian constitutional referendums.

	2001		2006		2016
Y = Vote for no	(a)	(b)	(a)	(b)	(a)	(b)
Short-term unemployment	−0.003** (0.001)		1.102*** (0.170)		0.491** (0.251)
Long-term unemployment		−0.011*** (0.003)		0.999*** (0.141)		0.482** (0.221)
‘No’ parties	0.831*** (0.083)	0.828*** (0.298)	0.846*** (0.069)	0.862*** (0.069)	0.258* (0.154)	0.256* (0.153)
Regional council	−0.001 (0.014)	−0.002 (0.014)	0.025*** (0.009)	0.025*** (0.009)	0.040*** (0.011)	0.038*** (0.011)
Government satisfaction	−0.018** (0.008)	−0.019*** (0.007)	−0.032*** (0.105)	−0.036*** (0.010)	−0.036*** (0.011)	−0.034*** (0.011)
Higher education	−1.174*** (0.325)	−1.065*** (0.295)	0.963*** (0.257)	0.936*** (0.236)	−0.002 (0.301)	0.113 (0.305)
Female	−0.063 (0.945)	−0.482 (0.909)	−0.244 (0.738)	−0.537 (0.744)	−0.892** (0.441)	−1.244* (0.698)
Foreign change	−0.459 (1.199)	−0.761 (1.050)	−0.110** (0.046)	−0.037 (0.046)	0.051 (0.048)	0.029 (0.043)
IQI	−0.003 (0.051)	−0.047 (0.048)	−0.148*** (0.037)	−0.135*** (0.031)	−0.132*** (0.038)	−0.123*** (0.036)
Observations	103	103	103	103	103	103
R^2	0.718	0.743	0.920	0.930	0.758	0.760

Notes: ***, **, and *Indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.

Robust standard errors in parentheses. Constant term included but not shown.

Table 5. Further results on the determinants of the share of ‘no’ votes.

Y = Vote for no	2001		2006		2016
GDP per capita	0.001 (0.001)	–	−0.006*** (0.001)	–	−0.003** (0.001)	–
‘No’ parties	0.825*** (0.084)	0.792*** (0.083)	0.847*** (0.081)	0.815*** (0.063)	0.319*** (0.114)	0.379** (0.149)
Regional council	0.001 (0.014)	0.001 (0.010)	0.022** (0.010)	0.033*** (0.010)	0.042*** (0.011)	0.033*** (0.011)
Government satisfaction	−0.017** (0.007)	−0.029*** (0.010)	−0.030** (0.014)	−0.026** (0.011)	−0.029*** (0.008)	−0.039*** (0.011)
Higher education	−0.981 (0.343)	−1.138*** (0.384)	−1.697*** (0.418)	0.509 (0.420)	−0.523 (0.411)	−0.143 (0.272)
Female	−0.026 (0.933)	−0.174 (0.898)	−0.594 (0.887)	−1.297* (0.695)	−1.118 (0.765)	−0.256 (0.879)
Foreign change	1.531 (1.076)	0.261 (1.239)	−0.108 (0.086)	0.066 (0.050)	−0.055 (0.042)	−0.073 (0.042)
IQI	−0.117*** (0.033)	−0.128*** (0.038)	−0.190*** (0.037)	−0.122*** (0.024)	−0.117 (0.030)	−0.113*** (0.031)
North	–	0.036 (0.031)	–	−0.129*** (0.013)	–	−0.029* (0.017)
Centre	–	0.008 (0.015)	–	−0.083*** (0.012)	–	−0.043 (0.023)
Observations	103	103	103	103	103	103
R^2	0.693	0.700	0.903	0.944	0.777	0.762

***, ** and *Statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.

Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. A constant term is included but not shown.