The ‘presidential accordion’ in times of crisis: is it still well tuned?

ABSTRACT

The article analyses the role of the President of the Italian Republic (PoR) as it relates to the process of government formation during the political, economic, and pandemic crises of the last three legislatures. The analysis focuses on the political actions of Giorgio Napolitano and Sergio Mattarella, the two Presidents of the Republic elected (and re-elected) as heads of state during those crises. To explain how the PoR operates when forming a government, the article examines the conditions allowing the functioning of the ‘presidential accordion’, i.e. the expansion and contraction of the presidential powers in the process of government formation. The presidential accordion hypothesis has been supported by many empirical studies focussing on the role of the PoR in the Italian parliamentary system. The aim of this study is further empirically to test the hypothesis in order to verify whether profound exogenous crises, such as recent economic and pandemic crises, can be considered as independent or intervening variables strengthening or weakening the PoR in the Italian political system.

KEYWORDS:

• President of the republic
• government formation
• COVID-19 pandemic
• Italian political system
• political institutions

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. The concept of potential majority refers to the party coalition having the greatest possibility of forming the effective parliamentary majority given every technically possible parliamentary majority. The robustness of the potential majority depends on the strength of the electoral mandate, on the effectiveness of the coalition agreement and on the internal cohesion of the parties.

2. On 21 July 2022 the PoR accepted the resignation of the Prime Minister, Mario Draghi, and decreed the early dissolution of the XVIII legislature. The Draghi government formally ceased to exist on 22 October 2022.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the University of Sassari Research Found 2020 (Fondo di Ateneo per la ricerca 2020).

Notes on contributors

Mauro Tebaldi

Mauro Tebaldi is Full Professor of Political Science in the Department of Law of the University of Sassari, Italy, where he teaches Political Science and Public Policy Analysis. His research interests mainly concern Italian politics and policy making, neo-institutional theory and comparative policy analysis