Democracy after post-politics: a reply to Näsström and Kalm

Abstract

This is a reply to:

Näsström, S., and S. Kalm. 2015. “A democratic critique of precarity.” Global Discourse 5 (4): 556–573. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23269995.2014.992119.

Notes

1. Expanding on this association of modern democracy with shared responsibility, and drawing on the work of Montesquieu, Näsström and Kalm (2015, 557), argue

[t]he point is that the revolution against the divine right of kings is both liberating and demanding. It creates a sense of absolute freedom, but also of absolute responsibility. The burden of judgement and decision-making that arises in revolutions can be taken on by human beings only through an act of sharing. This is what the modern form of democracy does: it unburdens human beings from absolute responsibility by sharing and dividing it equally.

2. The authors make use of Pierre Bourdieu and others’ work to define ‘precarity’ as ‘a generalized state of insecurity that cuts across traditional social-status divisions. The insecurities are, on the one hand, objective and material, and on the other, subjective and emotional’ (Näsström and Kalm 2015, 557).

3. As Brown (2015, 202) notes, the category of ‘the people’ is also relatively undetermined and frequently contested.

4. Foucault (1982, 790). Näsström and Kalm (2015, 565) draw on the work of Ulrich Beck and Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim, describing institutionalised individualisation as

a macro-sociological process … It reflects a conception of society where individuals must actively make decisions in an ever-increasing number of societal fields, ranging from household labour, childcare, education and employment to ethical questions of life and death … If freedom of choice is institutionally imposed, so is responsibility in case of failure.

5. Näsström and Kalm (2015, 562–564) also refer to the debates around ‘the precariat’, including in terms of the capacity for a social and political actor to emerge out of such heterogeneity.