Legislative Cooperation and Selective Benefits: An experimental investigation on the limits of credit claiming

Figures & data

Table 1 Experimental Respondents by Condition

	Republican Member	Democratic Member
Cooperative Bill	D Respondents: 113	D Respondents: 102
	R Respondents: 112	R Respondents: 86
Non-Cooperative Bill	D Respondents: 122	D Respondents: 103
	R Respondents: 85	R Respondents: 85

Table 2 Testing for Spillover Effects

	Democrats	MC	Republicans
Intercept	74.29	66.77	36.05
	(2.40)	(2.10)	(2.55)
Republican	–41.54	–6.38	34.96
	(3.57)	(3.10)	(3.73)
Cooperative Rep	–4.54	–3.25	6.92
	(3.31)	(2.89)	(3.49)
Cooperative Dem	–1.60	0.50	0.02
	(3.26)	(2.84)	(3.43)
Non-Cooperative Rep	–1.75	-7.69	1.71
	(3.38)	(2.96)	(3.57)
Republican X Cooperative Rep	4.63	10.06	–8.57
	(4.83)	(4.19)	(5.04)
Republican X Non-Cooperative Dem	8.03	–4.97	0.84
	(4.96)	(4.31)	(5.16)
Republican X Non-Cooperative Rep	2.59	13.46	–1.92
	(5.04)	(4.39)	(5.25)
R^2	0.38	0.03	0.30
Num. obs.	795	808	793
Bold coefficients indicate p < 0.05

Table 3 Effect of Legislative Process on Feelings towards Congress

	Feelings towards Congress
Intercept	54.61
	(1.71)
Cooperative	1.26
	(2.39)
Copartisan	0.58
	(2.37)
Cooperative X Copartisan	–1.33
	(3.31)
R^2	0.00
Num. obs.	806

Table 4 Which Party Deserves Credit for the Passage of the Bill?

	Republicans	Democrats	Both
Cooperative Rep	–0.11	0.86	0.43
	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.27)
Non-Cooperative Dem	–0.16	0.58	–0.50
	(0.30)	(0.29)	(0.29)
Non-Cooperative Rep	–0.10	0.74	0.02
	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.27)
Co-Partisan	–0.85	1.30	0.02
	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.27)
Cooperative Rep:Copartisan	1.50	–2.45	–0.63
	(0.39)	(0.39)	(0.37)
Non-Cooperative Dem:Copartisan	–0.33	0.24	–0.48
	(0.40)	(0.40)	(0.39)
Non-Cooperative Rep:Copartisan	2.27	–2.85	–0.67
	(0.41)	(0.42)	(0.39)
1—2	–1.60	–1.03	–1.81
	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.21)
2—3	1.06	1.56	0.24
	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.20)
Log Likelihood	–761.56	–753.35	–812.64
Num. obs.	807	806	804
Bold coefficients indicate p < 0.05

Table 1 Feelings towards Member Giving Federal District, by Co-partisanship and Process

	Feelings towards MC
Intercept	57.66
	(1.54)
Cooperative Rep	4.51
(Dummy)	(2.15)
Co-partisan	9.16
(Dummy)	(2.13)
Cooperation X	–4.33
Co-partisan	(2.98)
R^2	0.03
Num. obs.	808
Bold coefficients indicate p < 0.05
Model is OLS Regression

Table 2 Effects of Cooperation on Polarization

Absolute Difference Between Party
Intercept	39.88
	(2.13)
Cooperative Rep	–2.66
(Dummy)	(2.97)
Co-Partisan	1.63
(Dummy)	(2.95)
Cooperative X	0.33
Co-Partisan	(4.14)
R^2	0.00
Num. obs.	783
Bold coefficients indicate p < 0.05
Model is OLS Regression

Figure 1 Example of Credit Claiming from Congresswoman Lizzie Fletcher (D-TX)

Figure 2 Example of Bipartisanship Credit Claiming from Congressman Van Taylor (R-TX)

Figure 3 Example of Credit Claiming from Congressman Ron Estes (R-KS)

Figure 1 Hypothetical Press Release Given to Experimental Subjects

Figure 2 Feelings Towards the Political Parties by Treatment Assignment