Corporate governance mechanisms and earnings management: The moderating role of female directors

Figures & data

Table 1. Sample selection

Country of sampled firms	Number of non-financial firms whose annual reports data were sourced from Africanfinancials and Machameratios databases for the study period	Number of firms with missing annual reports data over the study period	Number of firms annual reports data retained in the study sample
Ghana	5	0	5
Kenya	11	5	6
Malawi	2	0	2
Mauritius	5	3	2
Nigeria	40	27	13
Namibia	2	0	2
South Africa	35	18	17
Tanzania	3	0	3
Zambia	4	2	2
Total	107	55	52

Source: Authors’ compilation of annual reports from Africanfinancials and Machameratios websites

Table 2. Measurement of variables used in the study’s models

Variable		Scale		Source		Expected Sign
Dependent Variables: DA Discretionary Accruals (Proxy for Earnings Management)		This is measured using the Pae (2005) Discretionary Accrual’s Model; $ND{A}_t={\alpha }_{1}1/T{A}_{t-1}+{\alpha }_2\mathrm{\Delta }\mathrm{R}\mathrm{e}{\mathrm{v}}_t/T{A}_{t-1}+{\alpha }_3\mathrm{P}\mathrm{P}{\mathrm{E}}_t/T{A}_{t-1}+{\alpha }_4\mathrm{C}\mathrm{F}{\mathrm{O}}_t/T{A}_{t-1}+{\alpha }_5\mathrm{C}\mathrm{F}{\mathrm{O}}_{t-1}/T{A}_{t-1}$ Where: $ND{A}_t$ = non-discretionary accruals in the year t $T{A}_{t-1}$= total assets in the year t-1 $\mathrm{\Delta }\mathrm{R}\mathrm{e}{\mathrm{v}}_t$= the change in revenues from the preceding year $\mathrm{P}\mathrm{P}{\mathrm{E}}_t$= the gross value of property, plant and equipment in the year t $\mathrm{C}\mathrm{F}{\mathrm{O}}_t$= operating cash flows in the year t $CF{O}_{t-1}$= operating cash flows in the year t-1 $a_1$, $a_2$, $a_3,a_4,a_5$= firm-specific parameters Estimates of the firm specific parameters are done via the model: $TAC{C}_t/T{A}_{t-1}$ = ${\alpha }_{1}1/T{A}_{t-1}$+${\alpha }_2\mathrm{\Delta }\mathrm{R}\mathrm{e}{\mathrm{v}}_t/T{A}_{t-1}$+${\alpha }_3\mathrm{P}\mathrm{P}{\mathrm{E}}_t/T{A}_{t-1}$ +${\alpha }_4\mathrm{C}\mathrm{F}{\mathrm{O}}_t/T{A}_{t-1}$ +${\alpha }_5\mathrm{C}\mathrm{F}{\mathrm{O}}_{t-1}/T{A}_{t-1}$ + ${\epsilon }_t$ Where: Total accruals (TACC) is defined as income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations minus operating cash flows, that is, $TAC{C}_t$ = $NOP{I}_t$—$CF{O}_t$ ${\epsilon }_t$ is discretionary accruals (DA) in the year t.		Annual reports of firms		±
Independent Variables: BGENDIV Gender-diversity		This is measured as the proportion of female directors on the board to the total size of the board (see, Finegold et al., 2007; Low et al., 2015; Alqatan, 2019)		Annual reports of firms		±
BINDE Board independence		This is measured as proportion of non-executive directors on the board to the total board size (Al-Thuneibat et al., 2016; Zhou et al., 2017).		Annual reports of firms		±
BMEET Board Meetings		This is measured as the number of times the board meets in a year (R.B. Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Almasarwah, 2015).		Annual reports of firms		±
MOC Managerial Ownership Concentration		This is measured as the proportion of shares owned by management members for firm i in year t. It has been represented in logarithmic form (Bhuiyan et al., 2010).		Annual reports of firms		±
BSIZE Board size		This is measured as the number of members on company boards for firm i in year t (Sow & Tozo, 2019; Almasarwah, 2015).		Annual reports of firms		±
Control Variables:
ROA Return on Assets (Proxy for Firm-Performance/ Profitability)	This is measured by $\mathrm{R}\mathrm{O}{\mathrm{A}}_{i,t}$= $EBI{T}_{i,t}/T{A}_{i,t}$ Where: $EBI{T}_{i,t}$ = Profit before interest and tax for firm i in year t; $T{A}_{i,t}$ = Total assets for firm i in year t (Sow & Tozo, 2019).		Annual reports of firms
LEV Leverage	This is measured by the total liabilities to total assets. It is represented in logarithm form (Sow & Tozo, 2019).		Annual reports of firms		-
SIZE Firm size	This is measured as the logarithm of a firm’s total assets (Zhou et al., 2017; Pham et al., 2019).		Annual reports of firms		+
GROP Growth Opportunities	This is measured as the price-to-book ratio for firm i in year t (Kothari et al., 2002; Pham et al., 2019).		Annual reports of firms		+
IFRS IFRS Adoption	This is a dummy variable measured as 1 since a firm’s adoption of IFRS and 0 otherwise (Bakker, 2017).		Annual reports of firms		±
AT Asset Tangibility	This is measured as the ratio of tangible assets to total assets of firm i in year t (Bakker, 2017).		Annual reports of firms		+
AGE Age of Firm	The is measured as the age of a firm from the date of listing on the stock market to the end of the sample period. It is represented in logarithm form (Lin and Fu, 2017).		Annual reports of firms		+
${\epsilon }_{i,t}$ Error term	The error term

Source: Authors’ Compilation, 2022.

Table 3. Descriptive statistics of study variables

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
VARIABLES	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
SIZE	676	5.294	0.724	3.705	7.183
GROP	676	3.724	5.620	−0.0900	62.34
IFRS	676	0.846	0.361	0	1
AT	676	0.364	0.213	0.00140	0.995
MOC	624	−0.0734	3.033	−10.36	4.484
AGE	676	3.802	0.745	0	5.136
ROA	676	8.029	15.63	−122.1	295.7
DA	676	0.0159	0.250	−2.268	4.131
LEV	676	3.814	0.685	−1.643	4.553
BSIZE	676	9.834	3.030	4	25
BMEET	676	4.817	1.334	2	12
BINDE	676	0.668	0.160	0	1
BGENDIV	676	0.139	0.122	0	0.667
Number of groups	48	48	48	48	48

Note: This table reports descriptive statistics based on a balanced panel with 676 observations. The variables are as defined in Table 2. For interpretation purposes, the descriptive statistics are calculated on the basis of levels with the exception of IFRS which was computed from a dummy scale. MOC, AGE, LEV and SIZE were calculated on the basis of logarithmic form.

Table 4. Correlation coefficients among study variables

Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	VIFS
(1) DA	1.000
(2) BSIZE	−0.031	1.000												1.57
	(0.418)
(3) BGENDIV	0.036	0.103***	1.000											1.40
	(0.345)	(0.008)
(4) BINDE	0.019	0.139***	−0.002	1.000										1.23
	(0.615)	(0.000)	(0.969)
(5) BMEET	−0.021	0.118***	0.097**	0.226***	1.000									1.13
	(0.590)	(0.002)	(0.011)	(0.000)
(6) MOC	−0.041	−0.202***	−0.286***	−0.134***	−0.095**	1.000								1.98
	(0.304)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.017)
(7) ROA	0.585***	0.005	0.010	0.029	−0.125***	−0.072*	1.000							1.17
	(0.000)	(0.887)	(0.786)	(0.453)	(0.001)	(0.071)
(8) SIZE	−0.008	0.579***	0.215***	0.253***	0.205***	−0.153***	−0.029	1.000						2.21
	(0.842)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.458)
(9) GROP	−0.061	0.051	0.088**	−0.099**	−0.100***	−0.204***	0.304***	0.027	1.000					1.23
	(0.116)	(0.188)	(0.022)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.486)
(10) AGE	0.007	0.102***	0.156***	0.232***	0.196***	−0.360***	0.007	0.290***	0.043	1.000				1.42
	(0.849)	(0.008)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.851)	(0.000)	(0.260)
(11) IFRS	0.023	−0.030	0.281***	0.019	0.123***	−0.048	−0.065*	0.126***	−0.073*	0.053	1.000			1.44
	(0.551)	(0.434)	(0.000)	(0.624)	(0.001)	(0.228)	(0.090)	(0.001)	(0.058)	(0.167)
(12) AT	−0.033	0.090**	−0.158***	0.275***	0.033	−0.218***	0.142***	0.055	0.165***	0.160***	−0.129***	1.000		1.27
	(0.390)	(0.019)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.393)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.154)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)
(13) LEV	−0.027	0.000	0.069*	−0.017	0.099***	−0.154***	−0.033	−0.025	0.116***	0.174***	0.013	0.064*	1.000	1.09
	(0.480)	(0.996)	(0.073)	(0.655)	(0.010)	(0.000)	(0.391)	(0.515)	(0.002)	(0.000)	(0.732)	(0.098)

Note: This table presents pair-wise correlation coefficients which are based on a balanced panel with 676 observations. The variables are as defined in Table 2. Asterisks indicate significance at 10% (*) 5% (**) and 1% (***).

Table 5. Baseline models of the role and moderating effect of gender diversity in the CG—EM nexus using the pooled OLS estimator

	(1)	(2)	(3)
VARIABLES	Pooled OLS with RSE Model	Pooled OLS with RSE Model	Pooled OLS with RSE Model
BSIZE		−0.00390	0.000135
		(0.00293)	(0.00316)
BGENDIV		0.0389	−0.595*
		(0.109)	(0.348)
BINDE		−0.0243	−0.0320
		(0.0544)	(0.0644)
BMEET		0.00265	−0.0152
		(0.00955)	(0.0129)
MOC		−0.00310	0.00742*
		(0.00207)	(0.00399)
ROA	0.0108***	0.0110***	0.0117***
	(0.00254)	(0.00257)	(0.00220)
SIZE	0.0148	0.0220	0.0217
	(0.0120)	(0.0192)	(0.0185)
GROP	−0.0115*	−0.0122*	−0.0130*
	(0.00617)	(0.00663)	(0.00656)
AGE	−0.00184	−0.00514	−0.00325
	(0.0101)	(0.0111)	(0.0102)
IFRS	0.0190	0.0194	0.0362*
	(0.0159)	(0.0209)	(0.0186)
AT	−0.112***	−0.101***	−0.0809***
	(0.0317)	(0.0295)	(0.0260)
LEV	0.0107	0.00742	0.00844
	(0.0131)	(0.0137)	(0.0134)
BSIZE#BGENDIV			−0.0274
			(0.0243)
BINDE#BGENDIV			0.287
			(0.375)
BMEET#BGENDIV			0.125**
			(0.0589)
MOC#BGENDIV			−0.0794***
			(0.0235)
Constant	0.511	3.108	5.409
	(5.188)	(5.715)	(5.484)
Country fixed-effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed-effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	676	624	624
R-squared	0.418	0.424	0.447
F-statistic	7.08***	6.29***	8.38***

Note: This table reports empirical results from estimating equation (1)(1) $D{A}_{it}={\alpha }_0+{\alpha }_{1}RO{A}_{it}+{\alpha }_{2}SIZ{E}_{it}+{\alpha }_{3}LE{V}_{it}+{\alpha }_{4}GRO{P}_{it}+{\alpha }_{5}AG{E}_{it}+{\alpha }_{6}IFR{S}_{it}+{\alpha }_{7}A{T}_{it}+{\nu }_t+{\mu }_t+{\eta }_t+{\epsilon }_{it}$(1) , (2(2) $\begin{array}{rl}& D{A}_{it}={\alpha }_0+{\alpha }_{1}RO{A}_{it}+{\alpha }_{2}SIZ{E}_{it}+{\alpha }_{3}LE{V}_{it}+{\alpha }_{4}GRO{P}_{it}+{\alpha }_{5}AG{E}_{it}\\ & +{\alpha }_{6}IFR{S}_{it}+{\alpha }_{7}A{T}_{it}+{\alpha }_{8}BSIZ{E}_{it}+{\alpha }_{9}BIND{E}_{it}+{\alpha }_{10}BMEE{T}_{it}\\ & +{\alpha }_{11}MO{C}_{it}+{\alpha }_{12}BGENDI{V}_{it}+{\nu }_t++{\mu }_t+{\eta }_t+{\epsilon }_{it}\end{array}$(2) ) and (3(3) $\begin{array}{rl}& D{A}_{it}={\alpha }_0+{\alpha }_{1}RO{A}_{it}+{\alpha }_{2}SIZ{E}_{it}+{\alpha }_{3}LE{V}_{it}+{\alpha }_{4}GRO{P}_{it}+{\alpha }_{5}AG{E}_{it}\\ & +{\alpha }_{6}IFR{S}_{it}+{\alpha }_{7}A{T}_{it}+{\alpha }_{8}BSIZ{E}_{it}+{\alpha }_{9}BIND{E}_{it}+{\alpha }_{10}BMEE{T}_{it}\\ & +{\alpha }_{11}MO{C}_{it}+{\alpha }_{12}BGENDI{V}_{it}+{\alpha }_{13}BGENDIV\mathrm{\#}BSIZ{E}_{it}\\ & +{\alpha }_{14}BGENDIV\mathrm{\#}BIND{E}_{it}+{\alpha }_{15}BGENDIV\mathrm{\#}BMEE{T}_{it}\\ & +{\alpha }_{16}BGENDIV\mathrm{\#}MO{C}_{it}+{\nu }_t+{\mu }_t+{\eta }_t+{\epsilon }_{it}\end{array}$(3) ) through the pooled OLS technique with cluster robust standard errors. Asterisks indicate significance at 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***). The notations in all the regression tables are as defined and measured in Table 2.

Table 6. Robustness test models of the moderating role of gender diversity in the CG—EM nexus using the PCSE estimator

	(1)	(2)	(3)
VARIABLES	PCSE with PSAR1	PCSE with PSAR1	PCSE with PSAR1
BSIZE		−0.00467	0.000543
		(0.00284)	(0.00312)
BGENDIV		−0.0243	−0.577**
		(0.0908)	(0.282)
BINDE		−0.00747	−0.0319
		(0.0397)	(0.0555)
BMEET		−0.00109	−0.0197***
		(0.00592)	(0.00730)
MOC		0.00105	0.00608
		(0.00358)	(0.00436)
ROA	0.0111***	0.0113***	0.0113***
	(0.000821)	(0.000878)	(0.000848)
SIZE	0.0200*	0.0303**	0.0189
	(0.0114)	(0.0140)	(0.0129)
GROP	−0.00803**	−0.00825**	−0.00922**
	(0.00398)	(0.00415)	(0.00421)
AGE	−0.0102	−0.00757	−0.00864
	(0.0107)	(0.0105)	(0.0107)
IFRS	0.0440*	0.0434*	0.0604***
	(0.0228)	(0.0235)	(0.0234)
AT	−0.138**	−0.134**	−0.114*
	(0.0564)	(0.0638)	(0.0659)
LEV	0.0218*	0.0188	0.0150
	(0.0121)	(0.0122)	(0.0129)
BSIZE#BGENDIV			−0.0438***
			(0.0157)
BINDE#BGENDIV			0.445
			(0.352)
BMEET#BGENDIV			0.145***
			(0.0428)
MOC#BGENDIV			−0.0568*
			(0.0304)
Constant	8.131	9.635	13.43*
	(6.300)	(8.138)	(8.002)
Country fixed-effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed-effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	676	624	624
R-squared	0.480	0.482	0.488
Number of groups	52	48	48
Wald chi-square statistic	250.04***	250.91***	267.71***

Note: This table reports robustness test results from estimating equation (1)(1) $D{A}_{it}={\alpha }_0+{\alpha }_{1}RO{A}_{it}+{\alpha }_{2}SIZ{E}_{it}+{\alpha }_{3}LE{V}_{it}+{\alpha }_{4}GRO{P}_{it}+{\alpha }_{5}AG{E}_{it}+{\alpha }_{6}IFR{S}_{it}+{\alpha }_{7}A{T}_{it}+{\nu }_t+{\mu }_t+{\eta }_t+{\epsilon }_{it}$(1) , (2(2) $\begin{array}{rl}& D{A}_{it}={\alpha }_0+{\alpha }_{1}RO{A}_{it}+{\alpha }_{2}SIZ{E}_{it}+{\alpha }_{3}LE{V}_{it}+{\alpha }_{4}GRO{P}_{it}+{\alpha }_{5}AG{E}_{it}\\ & +{\alpha }_{6}IFR{S}_{it}+{\alpha }_{7}A{T}_{it}+{\alpha }_{8}BSIZ{E}_{it}+{\alpha }_{9}BIND{E}_{it}+{\alpha }_{10}BMEE{T}_{it}\\ & +{\alpha }_{11}MO{C}_{it}+{\alpha }_{12}BGENDI{V}_{it}+{\nu }_t++{\mu }_t+{\eta }_t+{\epsilon }_{it}\end{array}$(2) ) and (3(3) $\begin{array}{rl}& D{A}_{it}={\alpha }_0+{\alpha }_{1}RO{A}_{it}+{\alpha }_{2}SIZ{E}_{it}+{\alpha }_{3}LE{V}_{it}+{\alpha }_{4}GRO{P}_{it}+{\alpha }_{5}AG{E}_{it}\\ & +{\alpha }_{6}IFR{S}_{it}+{\alpha }_{7}A{T}_{it}+{\alpha }_{8}BSIZ{E}_{it}+{\alpha }_{9}BIND{E}_{it}+{\alpha }_{10}BMEE{T}_{it}\\ & +{\alpha }_{11}MO{C}_{it}+{\alpha }_{12}BGENDI{V}_{it}+{\alpha }_{13}BGENDIV\mathrm{\#}BSIZ{E}_{it}\\ & +{\alpha }_{14}BGENDIV\mathrm{\#}BIND{E}_{it}+{\alpha }_{15}BGENDIV\mathrm{\#}BMEE{T}_{it}\\ & +{\alpha }_{16}BGENDIV\mathrm{\#}MO{C}_{it}+{\nu }_t+{\mu }_t+{\eta }_t+{\epsilon }_{it}\end{array}$(3) ) through the Prais Winsten PCSE estimation technique with panel-specific AR(1). Asterisks indicate significance at 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***). The notations in all the regression tables are as defined and measured in Table 2.

Table 7. Additional robustness test models of the moderating role of gender diversity in the CG—EM nexus using the FE estimator

	(1)	(2)	(3)
VARIABLES	FE with RSE Model	FE with RSE Model	FE with RSE Model
BSIZE		−0.00685	−0.000315
		(0.00526)	(0.00402)
BGENDIV		−0.0399	−1.004**
		(0.0801)	(0.448)
BINDE		0.0115	−0.0797
		(0.0679)	(0.0825)
BMEET		0.000730	−0.0208
		(0.0142)	(0.0183)
MOC		−0.00953	2.24e-05
		(0.00630)	(0.00716)
ROA	0.0118***	0.0121***	0.0125***
	(0.00263)	(0.00255)	(0.00229)
SIZE	0.115	0.142	0.101
	(0.131)	(0.137)	(0.108)
GROP	−0.0138	−0.0139	−0.0155
	(0.0121)	(0.0127)	(0.0127)
AGE	−0.0395	−0.0337	−0.0343
	(0.0672)	(0.0664)	(0.0533)
IFRS	0.00782	0.0152	0.0346
	(0.0199)	(0.0237)	(0.0273)
AT	−0.0349	−0.0445	−0.0300
	(0.0613)	(0.0678)	(0.0559)
LEV	−0.00753	−0.0223	−0.00246
	(0.0648)	(0.0655)	(0.0616)
BSIZE#BGENDIV			−0.0228
			(0.0238)
BINDE#BGENDIV			0.739**
			(0.341)
BMEET#BGENDIV			0.128**
			(0.0556)
MOC#BGENDIV			−0.0807**
			(0.0377)
Constant	−2.194	1.325	4.605
	(8.074)	(9.678)	(10.16)
Country fixed-effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed-effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	676	624	624
R-squared	0.424	0.433	0.452
Number of groups	52	48	48
F-statistic	4.98***	3.53***	4.05***

Note: This table reports additional robustness test results from estimating equation (1)(1) $D{A}_{it}={\alpha }_0+{\alpha }_{1}RO{A}_{it}+{\alpha }_{2}SIZ{E}_{it}+{\alpha }_{3}LE{V}_{it}+{\alpha }_{4}GRO{P}_{it}+{\alpha }_{5}AG{E}_{it}+{\alpha }_{6}IFR{S}_{it}+{\alpha }_{7}A{T}_{it}+{\nu }_t+{\mu }_t+{\eta }_t+{\epsilon }_{it}$(1) , (2(2) $\begin{array}{rl}& D{A}_{it}={\alpha }_0+{\alpha }_{1}RO{A}_{it}+{\alpha }_{2}SIZ{E}_{it}+{\alpha }_{3}LE{V}_{it}+{\alpha }_{4}GRO{P}_{it}+{\alpha }_{5}AG{E}_{it}\\ & +{\alpha }_{6}IFR{S}_{it}+{\alpha }_{7}A{T}_{it}+{\alpha }_{8}BSIZ{E}_{it}+{\alpha }_{9}BIND{E}_{it}+{\alpha }_{10}BMEE{T}_{it}\\ & +{\alpha }_{11}MO{C}_{it}+{\alpha }_{12}BGENDI{V}_{it}+{\nu }_t++{\mu }_t+{\eta }_t+{\epsilon }_{it}\end{array}$(2) ) and (3(3) $\begin{array}{rl}& D{A}_{it}={\alpha }_0+{\alpha }_{1}RO{A}_{it}+{\alpha }_{2}SIZ{E}_{it}+{\alpha }_{3}LE{V}_{it}+{\alpha }_{4}GRO{P}_{it}+{\alpha }_{5}AG{E}_{it}\\ & +{\alpha }_{6}IFR{S}_{it}+{\alpha }_{7}A{T}_{it}+{\alpha }_{8}BSIZ{E}_{it}+{\alpha }_{9}BIND{E}_{it}+{\alpha }_{10}BMEE{T}_{it}\\ & +{\alpha }_{11}MO{C}_{it}+{\alpha }_{12}BGENDI{V}_{it}+{\alpha }_{13}BGENDIV\mathrm{\#}BSIZ{E}_{it}\\ & +{\alpha }_{14}BGENDIV\mathrm{\#}BIND{E}_{it}+{\alpha }_{15}BGENDIV\mathrm{\#}BMEE{T}_{it}\\ & +{\alpha }_{16}BGENDIV\mathrm{\#}MO{C}_{it}+{\nu }_t+{\mu }_t+{\eta }_t+{\epsilon }_{it}\end{array}$(3) ) through the fixed effect (FE) estimation technique with robust standard errors. Asterisks indicate significance at 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***). The notations in all the regression tables are as defined and measured in Table 2.

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