Untangling threat perception in international relations: an empirical analysis of threats posed by China and their implications for security discourse

Figures & data

Figure 1. Conceptual diagram of the developing. Source: Author.

Figure 2. A research framework. Source: Author.

Table 1. Pre-test summary of threat-perception.

Dimension	Pre-test question	t-Value	Dimension	Pre-test question	t-Value	Dimension	Pre-test question	t-Value
Identity-level	A 1 A 2 A 3 A 4 A 5 A 6 A 7 A 8 A 9 A 10 A 11 A 12	3.563** 3.413** 6.504** 1.377 2.526** 3.413** 5.003** 3.987** 4.055** 4.274** 1.012 5.606**	Power-perception	A 13 A 14 A 15 A 16 A 17	2.334** 3.633** 6.465** 5.215** 3.274**	Threat- perception	A 25 A 26 A 27 A 28 A 29 A 30	4.840** 4.352** 3.612** 2.483** 5.141** 4.083**
			Intention-perception	A 18 A 19 A 20 A 21 A 22 A 23 A 24	1.415 5.117** 4.112** 3.256** 2.445** 5.367** 2.372**

Source: Author.

Table 2. Post-test summary of threat-perception.

Dimension	Pre-test question	t-Value	Dimension	Pre-test question	t-Value	Dimension	Pre-test question	t-Value
Identity-level	B 1 B 2 B 3 B 4 B 5 B 6 B 7 B 8	3.462** 3.232** 5.764** 2.483** 3.025** 3.336** 4.365** 5.116**	Power-perception	B 9 B 10 B 11 B 12	4.216** 4.334** 3.366** 6.015**	Threat-perception	B 15 B 16 B 17 B 18 B 19 B 20	5.652** 4.515** 2.317** 2.483** 5.261** 4.022**
			Intention-perception	B 13 B 14	3.521** 3.134**

Note: **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05.

Source: Author.

Table 3. Cronbach’s α coefficients of the pre-test for threat-perception.

Category	Dimension	Cronbach’s α
Pre-test questionnaire	Identity-level	0.878
	Power-perception	0.838
	Intention-perception	0.897
	Threat-perception	0.855
Post-test questionnaire	Identity-level	0.936
	Power-perception	0.964
	Intention-perception	0.945
	Threat-perception	0.922

Source: Author.

Table 4. Quasi-experimental design table.

Groups	Controlled variables (Pre-test)	Dependent variables (experimental input)	Independent variables (post-test)
Four experimental groups	O1	X1	O3
Four controlled groups	O2		O4

Source: Author.

Table 5. Basic data of research subjects (n = 66).

Basic information	Valid sample	Percentage (%)	Basic information	Valid sample	Percentage (%)
Nationality			Management experience
Taiwan	54	81.8	None	46	69.7
Others	12	18.2	5 years+	8	12.1
Gender			6–10 years	4	6.1
Male	42	63.6	11 years+	8	12.1
Female	24	36.4	Occupation
Education			None (include student)	40	60.6
Master’s student	61	92.4	Military	13	19.7
PhD student	5	7.6	Public servant/Teacher	4	6.1
			Service	3	4.5
			Finance/insurance	1	1.5
			Others	5	7.6

Source: Author.

Table 6. Independent variable t-tests for each dimension of developing threats: Taiwanese versus foreigners (n = 66).

Dimension	Nationality	Sample	Mean	Standard deviation	t-Test
Identity-level	Taiwanese	54	1.82	0.42	−1.82
	Foreigner	12	2.06	0.39
Power-perception	Taiwanese	54	4.12	0.70	0.32*
	Foreigner	12	4.00	1.31
Harmful-intention	Taiwanese	54	3.88	0.62	1.19
	Foreigner	12	3.65	0.66

Note: *p < 0.05.

Source: Author.

Table 7. Independent variables t-tests for each dimension of developing threat – Military Personnel versus others (n = 66).

Dimension	Occupation	Sample	Mean	Standard deviation	t-Test
Identity-level	Military personnel	13	1.76	0.55	−1.01
	Others	53	1.89	0.38
Power-perception	Military personnel	13	3.51	1.31	−1.97
	Others	53	4.25	0.61
Harmful-intention	Military personnel	13	4.10	0.70	1.65
	Others	53	3.78	0.60

Note: *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01.

Source: Author.

Table 8. Paired samples t-test after accepting experimental inputs (n = 66).

Groups	Tests	Mean	Standard deviation	t-Test	p
Experimental groups (n = 36)	Pre-test	3.21	0.38	−3.18	0.003**
	Post-test	3.43	0.465
Controlled groups (n = 30)	Pre-test	3.34	0.33	−4.34	0.000***
	Post-test	3.59	0.39

Note: *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.

Source: Author.

Table 9. Paired samples t-test after accepting experimental inputs – three dimension (n = 66).

Groups	Dimension	Mean	Standard deviation	t-Test	p
Experimental groups (n = 36)	Identity-pevel pre-test	1.84	0.43	−2.66	0.012*
	Identity-pevel post-test	2.08	0.64
	Power-perception pre-test	3.93	1.02	−0.48	0.637
	Power-perception post-test	3.97	0.88
	Intention-perception pre-test	3.85	0.69	−2.07	0.046*
	Intention-perception post-test	4.22	1.07
Controlled groups (n = 30)	Identity-level pre-test	1.90	0.42	−3.82	0.001***
	Identity-level post-test	2.19	0.54
	Power-perception pre-test	4.31	0.47	−0.81	0.423
	Power-perception post-test	4.37	0.47
	Intention-perception pre-test	3.83	0.57	−2.35	0.026*
	Intention-perception post-test	4.20	0.81

Note: *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.

Source: Author.

Table 10. Descriptive statistics analysis–pre-test and post-test of the questionnaires for each dimension versus developing threats (n = 66).

Groups	Dimension	Tests	Minimum	Maximum	Sum	Mean	Standard deviation
Experimental groups (n = 36)	Identity-level	Pre-test	1.00	2.86	66.14	1.84	0.43
		Post-test	1.00	4.00	74.45	2.08	0.64
	Power-perception	Pre-test	1.00	5.00	141.33	3.93	1.02
		Post-test	1.00	5.00	143.50	3.97	0.88
	Intention-perception	Pre-test	2.25	5.00	138.75	3.85	0.69
		Post-test	1.00	5.00	152.00	4.22	1.07
	Overall scores	Pre-test	2.45	3.81	115.41	3.21	0.38
		Post-test	2.33	4.50	123.42	3.43	0.46
Controlled groups (n = 30)	Identity-level	Pre-test	1.00	2.57	56.86	1.90	0.42
		Post-test	1.25	3.25	65.75	2.19	0.54
	Power-perception	Pre-test	3.67	5.00	129.33	4.31	0.47
		Post-test	3.50	5.00	131.00	4.37	0.47
	Intention-perception	Pre-test	2.50	5.00	114.75	3.83	0.57
		Post-test	2.00	5.00	126.00	4.20	0.81
	Overall scores	Pre-test	2.64	4.10	100.31	3.34	0.33
		Post-test	2.42	4.08	107.58	3.59	0.39

Source: Author.

Table 11. Levene test: the questionnaires for each dimension versus developing threat (n = 66).

Dimension	Degree of freedom: 1	Degree of freedom: 2	F-test	Significance
Identity-level	1	64	0.751	0.389
Power-perception	1	64	2.574	0.114
Intention-perception	1	64	0.200	0.656

Source: Author.

Table 12. Intra-group homogeneity test: the questionnaires for each dimension versus developing threat (n = 66).

Dimension	Source of variance	Type-III square Sum (SS)	Degree of freedom (df)	Mean of squared sum (MS)	F-test (F)	Significance (Sig)
Identity-level	Group*Pre-test	0.000	1	0.000	0.001	0.978
	Error	15.103	62	0.244
Power-perception	Group*Pre-test	0.043	1	0.043	0.150	0.700
	Error	17.657	62	0.285
Intention-perception	Group*Pre-test	0.203	1	0.203	0.234	0.630
	Error	53.751	62	0.867
Overall	Group*Pre-test	0.026	1	0.026	0.201	0.656
	Error	8.041	62	0.130

Source: Author.

Table 13. ANCOVA: the questionnaires of controlled groups for each dimension versus developing threat (n = 66).

Dimension	Source of variance	Type-III square sum (SS)	Degree of freedom (df)	Mean of square sum	F-test (F)	Significance (Sig)	Influence
Identity-level	Group	0.074	1	0.074	0.311	0.579	0.005
	Error	15.103	63	0.240
Power-perception	Group	0.327	1	0.327	1.163	0.285	0.018
	Error	17.699	63	0.281
Intention-perception	Group	0.001	1	0.001	0.002	0.968	0.000
	Error	53.954	63	0.856
Overall	Group	0.063	1	0.063	0.492	0.486	0.008
	Error	8.067	63	0.128

Note: *p < 0.05.

Source: Author.

Table 14. The original and adjusted mean: the questionnaires for each dimension versus developing threat (n = 66).

Group	Dimension	Mean (the overall original post-test scores)	Standard deviation	Adjusted mean
Experimental groups (n = 36)	Identity-level	2.08	0.64	2.10
	Power-perception	3.99	0.88	4.09
	Intention-perception	4.22	1.07	4.22
	Overall scores	3.43	0.46	3.47
Controlled groups (n = 30)	Identity-level	2.19	0.54	2.17
	Power-perception	4.37	0.47	4.24
	Intention-perception	4.20	0.81	4.21
	Overall scores	3.59	0.39	3.53

Source: Author.

Table 15. Product moment correlation between identity level, power perception, intention perception and threat perception (n = 66).

Dimension	Identity-level	Power-perception	Intention-perception	Threat-perception
Identity-level	1	0.123	0.012	−0.118
Power-perception	0.123	1	−0.128	0.051
Intention-perception	0.012	−0.128	1	0.547**
Threat-perception	−0.118	0.051	0.547**	1

Note: **p < 0.001.

Source: Authors.

Table 16. Product moment correlation-power-perception versus intention-perception (n = 66).

Changing order	Multiple correlation coefficient (R)	Coefficient of determination (R^2)	Increased explanatory power (△R^2)	F-value	Standardized regression coefficients (β)	Tolerance	VIF
Power-perception	0.304	0.092	0.092	6.515	0.313	1.000	1.000
Intention-perception	0.390	0.152	0.059	4.417	0.244	0.999	1.001

Source: Author.

Table 17. Actions taken by all groups in Scenario 1.

Scenario	Controlled group	Experimental groups
⋆ Scenario 1(1330) Peking University builds Taiwan Strait Strategic Awareness Program Website providing real-time and dynamics reports to the situation of the waters surrounding Taiwan. In addition, according to the National Security Law, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that importing all weapons to Taiwan is Illegal and prohibited	Group-China: Taiwan is a part of China. The Taiwan Strait Strategic Situational Awareness Program Website is built to efficiently monitor the ships in China’s territorial waters based on maintaining PRC’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Other countries have no right to interfere! Group-Internationals: Japan: This Website threatens security; Japan will establish a dedicated responding network to share information about the Taiwan Strait with neighboring countries. Philippines: The establishment of the Website is welcome. It will provide the countries requiring numerous practical and accurate oceanographic data. ROC-3: A national security conference meeting is initiated, and the General Secretary of the National Security Council analyzes the issue without taking the information security into account. ROC-5: Domestic universities and research institutions established a research project on the dynamics of the waters surrounding the Taiwan Strait.	Group-USA: The USA urges China not to become a peace-breaker in the region and is unpleased to see any unilateral changes to the status quo. ROC-1: The Website shows that China attempts to invade ROC (Taiwan). Given ROC is a sovereign and independent country accepting no intimidation, China is urged not to undermine the peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and the region. ROC-2: ROC is a sovereign and independent country possessing Effective Exclusive Jurisdiction, and the international community has been calling to condemn this misconduct. ROC-4: The National Security Council has stated that the ROC military forces are fully aware of and constantly monitoring the movements in Taiwan Strait. In addition, free sailing in the waters around Taiwan and on the international sea lanes is protected by international law. Unilateral violation of international rules is not allowed.

Source: Authors.

Table 18. Actions taken by all groups in Scenario 2.

Scenario	Controlled group	Experimental groups
⋆ Scenario 2 (1333) The Taiwan Strategic Situational Awareness Program Website shows an aerial image of a USA boat ‘LNGPOWERED’ loaded with weapons sold to Taiwan. CMA CGM in San Diego owns the boat.	Group-China: No foreign parties are allowed to undermine the unity of the Chinese. The USA has violated the 817 Communiqué committing to gradually decrease arms sales to Taiwan. The arms sale from the USA to Taiwan is strongly condemned, given the stability and security of the Taiwan Strait are negatively impacted. Group-Internationals: Japan is interpreting the images shared by the Taiwan Strait Strategic Awareness Program. ROC-3: The arms sales from the USA to Taiwan always follow the Taiwan Relations Act regulating that only necessary defensive weapons are provided to Taiwan. China does not need to overreact in regular arms sales. ROC-5: The information released on the Taiwan Strategic Situation Awareness Program Website is not helpful to the peaceful development between China and Taiwan. It is suggested that China does not need to be overly concerned and speculative.	Group-USA: The USA deeply regrets that China’s self-initiated messages are not to maintain the stability of the Taiwan Strait. The USA emphasizes that any attack on USA vessels will be considered an act of war. ROC-1: Because the reported claims are inconsistent with the facts, this is a general business transaction with the USA for transporting civilian goods; China does not need to be over speculating. ROC-2: Given the unidentified sources and inaccurate information on the Website, the international society is suggested not to be misled by the CCP, and excessive interpretations and speculations are unnecessary. ROC-4: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs holds a press conference to emphasize that Taiwan does not belong to PRC and China has no right to interfere in any matters related to the sovereignty of the ROC.

Source: Author.

Table 19. Actions taken by all groups in Scenario 3.

Scenario	Controlled group	Experimental groups
⋆ Scenario 3 (1335) The Indo-Pacific Command formally invites Taiwan to participate as an observer in the Rim of the Pacific Exercise. China’s Global Times reports: The Central Military Commission convenes closed-door meetings with theater commanders to escalate combat readiness.	Group-China: China strongly condemns Taiwan’s participation in this exercise; this action violates the One-China principle of the Shanghai Communiqué and Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations. The closed-door meeting to safeguard the integrity of China’s sovereignty is a necessary action against foreign threats. Group-Internationals: Japan, Philippines and Indonesia do not oppose Taiwan’s participation in the exercise as an observer and remain vigilant about China’s movements. They urge China to be calm and restrained and not to become a peace-breaker in the region. ROC-3: Appreciate USA in offering the opportunity of participating in military exchanges. Enhancing Taiwan’s defense capabilities is beneficial to the peace of the region. To cope with China’s closed-door meeting, Taiwan will monitor the status of the air and sea surrounding Taiwan to prepare for responding a crisis based on relevant information. ROC-5: We thank the USA for the invitation and believe that it will help our country learn the skills to work together with multinational forces in combat. We also urge China not to make military provocations with wrong judgments to undermine regional peace and stability. We hope to restore the mechanism of cross-strait dialogue.	Group-USA: Inviting Taiwan to participate in RIMPAC as an observer is to stabilize the peaceful development in the region and free the democratic countries from oppression. To cope with China’s closed-door meeting, we enhance military mobilization and combat readiness, increase patrols of our frigate fleets in the South China Sea, and pay attention to China’s dynamics in the region. ROC-1: We thank the USA’s invitation, Taiwan is willing to assume responsibility for maintaining peace in the Asia-Pacific region. We reaffirm the sovereignty of the ROC, urge China to remain calm and restrained to avoid escalating conflicts impacting regional security and condemn any disruption of peace in the Taiwan Strait. ROC-2: We are grateful for the support from friendly countries in the RIMPAC. We will learn from this experience and continue maintaining the region’s stability. In response to China’s closed-door meeting, maintaining regular trainings, enhancing the awareness of air fighters and combat vessels, and comprehensively collecting intelligence. ROC-4: The invitation to the RIMPAC is a manifestation of Taiwan-USA relations and a milestone in security cooperation that highlights the role of Taiwan in the USA’s Indo-Pacific strategy. Taiwan and China should continue maintaining communication channels. We hope that China will not overreact to this event and weaken the relationship between the people on both sides.

Source: Author.

Table 20. Actions taken by all groups in Scenario 4.

Scenario	Controlled group	Experimental groups
⋆ Scenario 4 (1401) The Maritime Safety Administration of PRC announced that armed exercises are immediately launched within the triangle area (north of 21°N; east of 121°30’ E; west of 122°E) in the southeastern waters of Taiwan, and entering this area is prohibited. On the Taiwan Strait Strategic Awareness Program Website, aerial images showed that the LNGPOWERED was advancing to the middle of Hawaii and Guam. The Japanese frigate Izumo (DDH183) and the USS Ronald Reagan CVN-76 appeared together in the Bashi Channel.	Group-China: It is our natural right to exercise in our waters, and other countries are not allowed to interfere. The USA and Japan are trying to disrupt the regional order. China strongly condemns such a provocative act and immediately urges to correct the mistaken provocation. So as not to damage regional peace and stability, China will take necessary measures to defend its sovereignty and security. Group-Internationals: Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam strongly condemned China for undermining regional security. The Philippines and Vietnam stressed and urged China to act consistently with its self-commitment to its responsibilities as a superpower. They called on the USA, China and Japan to assume their duties as superpowers and not escalate conflicts easily. ROC-3: Adopt protests through diplomatic approaches to address the peace across the Taiwan Strait is threatened. PRC should immediately stop the exercises in this region. The Executive Yuan convened an inter-ministerial meeting and requested the relevant ministries prohibit this area’s access. ROC-5: The MND uses surveillance to be aware of the current situation, commands air fighters and surface ships to monitor the area and maintains close communication with the USA and Japan.	Group-USA: We strongly condemn China’s act of sending a destroyer to the periphery of the potential conflict area for routine training. We clarify the exercise with Japan is a routine and ask China not to over-interpret. We reiterate that the Asia-Pacific region’s situation is stable and will not sit back and watch any attempts or acts that undermine regional stability! ROC-1: We condemn China’s live-fire exercise considered as military aggression. Taiwan will expand the scale of annual exercises, calling on China not to underestimate the determination of defending our territory to the end. Monitor activities in Bashi Channel and work closely with the USA to participate in the USA and Japan joint exercise. ROC-2: The military forces immediately upgrade their combat readiness. They closely monitor the situation and exchange information with the USA and Japan. They urge China to be self-restraint, maintain regional peace and stability, and avoid any measures escalating the situation. They also closely liaise with the USA and Japanese combat fleets around the Bashi Channel and deepen the military exchanges with the USA and Japan. ROC-4: Taiwan is comprehensively monitoring the dynamics of China’s maritime exercises, adopting preventive deployment, and appeal China not to take the opportunity to cause trouble. We also appeal to the region’s countries to share the responsibility of maintaining peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region, keeping track of and monitoring the ship movements in the Bashi Channel. We dispatch naval vessels to patrol the area to deal with unexpected situations.

Source: Authors.

Table 21. Actions taken by all groups in Scenario 5.

Scenario	Controlled group	Experimental groups
⋆ Scenario 5 (1403) The CCP’s Eastern Theater Command invites the Chief of the General Staff (CGS) to their ship next to Pinnacle Islands by messaging Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND). They aim to build a communication channel to avoid accident conflicts that may escalate to war	Group-China: Taiwan authorities should carefully consider ‘the 1992 Consensus’ and the long-lasting ‘One country, two systems’ policy. Making wrong choices will lead to irreparable mistakes. Besides exchanging with the CGS, all local governments of counties and cities are also welcome to take the initiative to discuss with the mother country to avoid hurting innocent Taiwanese. Group-Internationals: In order to avoid the expansion and escalation of conflicts, Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam are willing to provide venues for third-party discussions. They also appealed to the USA, China and Taiwan to manage the conflicts peacefully. ROC-3: Taiwan is optimistic about inviting the CGS to the Pinnacle Islands for communication onboard the landing ship. Our country advocates responding to sovereignty disputes peacefully and rationally and maintaining regional security in East Asia by conducting multilateral talks with all parties on sovereignty, sea lanes of communication, and natural resources to support our national interests. ROC-5: Based on the Cross-Strait interaction and reciprocity principle, we will not assign the CGS to the meeting but appoint the commander of the Third Combat Theater instead. We will also invite the Chief of Liaison Section in AIT, the Japanese Military Attaché in Taiwan, to form an international delegation and invite international and domestic media reporters to witness the meeting.	Group-USA: The USA does not allow unilateral changes to the status quo. If China acts irrationally, the USA will assist Taiwan. We negotiate and appeal to China to be calm and restrained. If China withdraws, the USA will also withdraw its actions. ROC-1: In response to the tense situation on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, the Mainland Affairs Council suggested activating the evacuation mechanism to withdraw Taiwanese from China using chartered flights or subsidies. ROC-2: Taiwan is open to dialogue conducive to cross-strait stability through reciprocal channels. We regret that the invitation was from the PRC Eastern Theater Commander, and exchanging with the GCS belittles the sovereignty of Taiwan. ROC-4: Taiwan has always agreed to maintain a smooth channel of peaceful communication. It has the sincerity to reduce possible conflicts in the region. Still, all dialogues should be comparable to the Koo-Wang talks in 1993 and 1998. Both sides met on an equal footing and invited the USA and Japan to negotiate and build a multi-party meeting mechanism to reduce the possibility of regional conflicts.

Source: Author.

Table 22. Actions taken by all groups in Scenario 6.

Scenario	Controlled group	Experimental groups
⋆ Scenario 6 (1426) A Cruising Mission is conducted by CCP’s KJ-500 Air Early Warning, a KJ-200 Anti-submarine Aircraft, and a 052C Destroyer (Haikou-171) with a Z-9 Anti-submarine Helicopters onboard in Bashi Channel. The third reading text: ‘Power Threat’ – China’s Military Development Report 2020 illustrates that the capabilities of CCP’s Navy and Nuclear Weapons surpass the United States	Group-China: The PLA’s patrol mission is necessary to defend the national unity and territorial security. Group-Internationals: Japan: We reiterated our call for China to stop unnecessary military cruises from building confidence in China among regional countries. Philippines: China’s long-standing attitude has forced the countries in the region to worry about its intentions. We will strengthen cooperation with the USA and other countries to deal with China’s threat. ROC-3: In response to the PRC’s actions in the Bashi Channel, Taiwan Air Force fighters were dispatched to track enemy aircraft. The Taiwan Navy keeps tracking the maritime movements of the enemy to ensure Taiwan’s overall security. ROC-5: We appeal to China not to be a peace-breaker and immediately stop the military interference and threats in our surroundings because the Taiwanese will not accept such an act and will not succeed.	Group-USA: We condemn China’s repeated aircraft patrols in the vicinity of the Bashi Channel to intimidate the countries in the region. We reaffirm the USA’s commitment and responsibility to protect regional stability and security and relevant allies from Chinese military threats. ROC-1: Taiwan’s government has implemented an inventory check of war resources and funding. We have formulated policies to maintain people’s living stability and asked the Taiwanese to maintain regular life without extra worries. We denounce China’s ongoing cruise missions in the region as a way to disintegrate peace. ROC-2: The MND, and related diplomatic and intelligence units continue to monitor PRC’s developments and appeal to China not to harm Cross-Strait relations and undermine regional peace and stability. ROC-4: We keep monitoring and concerning the PRC’s patrol missions using air and sea surveillance. A press release from the Mainland Affairs Council appeals that China has the right and obligation to integrate and participate in regional peace-making policies, not to be the factor of discord and destabilization.

Source: Author.

Table 23. WEIS values in different scenarios.

Groups		WEIS values in different scenarios
		Scenario 1	Scenario 2	Scenario 3	Scenario 4	Scenario 5	Scenario 6
Controlled group	Group-China (not included)	Discussion/0.0	Condemn/−3.4	Condemn/−3.4	Exercise/−7.6	Deny/−1.1	Threat/−7.0
	Group-Internationals	Action/−0.1	Comment/0.0	Urge/−0.2	Condemn/−3.4	Facilitate/−0.1	Criticize/−2.2
	ROC-3	Discussion/−0.2	Urge/−0.2	Monitor/−1.1	Objection/−2.4	Agree/3.0	Monitor/−1.1
	ROC-5	Action/−0.2	Urge/−0.2	Urge/−0.2	Monitor/−1.1	Consult/2.8	Criticize/−2.2
	Mean-Controlled Groups	−0.16	−0.13	−0.5	−2.3	1.9	−1.83
Experimental group	Group-USA	Comment/−0.1	Warning/−3.0	Exercise/−7.6	Threat/−4.4	Warning/−3.0	Condemn/−3.4
	ROC-1	Comment/−0.2	Reject/−0.9	Condemn/−3.4	Exercise/−7.6	Evacuate /−4.1	Condemn/−3.4
	ROC-2	Comment/−0.2	Reject/−0.9	Monitor/−1.1	Warning/−3.0	Reject/−0.1	Criticize/−2.2
	ROC-4	Comment/−0.2	Sovereignty /−2.4	Criticize/−2.2	Warning/−3.0	Reject/−0.1	Criticize/−2.2
	Mean-experimental groups	−0.18	−1.8	−3.6	−4.5	−1.8	−2.8

Source: Author.

Table 24. Research hypotheses results and analysis.

Research hypotheses	Results
H1: The various dimensions of ‘threat perception’ differed significantly among respondents from different backgrounds
H1-1: The dimensions of threat perception were more strongly perceived by local respondents than by foreign respondents	Partially support
H1-2: Military personnel perceive the threat perception dimensions more strongly than other respondents	Reject
H2: Participants’ reading of the experimental text will affect their threat perceptions (quantitative/qualitative analysis)	Partially support
H3: Identity level, power perception, intention perception andthreat perception are correlated	(Quantitative statistics-reject/qualitative observations-support)
H3-1: Identity level, power perception, intention perception andthreat perception are positively correlated	Partially support
H3-2: Identity level, power and intention are capable of predicting threat perception	Partially support

Source: Author.

Figure 3. Average WEIS values in different Scenarios. Source: Author.