Does corporate governance affect financial communication transparency? Empirical evidence in the Tunisian context

Figures & data

Table 1. Selection sample

Initial sample	77
Financial firms	(34)
Firms with insufficient data	(15)
Final sample	28
Study duration	5
Total observations	224

Table 2. Information category for a voluntary disclosure index

Information category	Number of items
Categories of information of the Botosan grid analysis (1997)
General corporate information	16
Financial review	14
Non-financial information	13
Future prospects	10
Analysis and discussion of management	13
Categories of information added to the analysis grid Botosan (1997)
Information on intangible assets	4
Social and environmental information	7
Governance information	6
Total	83

Table 3. Summary of variables definitions and measurements

Variable names	Measures
VDI	Voluntary disclosure index consisting of 83 items p, which takes a value 1 if each item is disclosed, and 0 otherwise; scaled to have a value between 0 and 100%
QFI(DA)	The discretionary accruals (DA) (model of Raman and Shahrur (2008))
BSIZE	Board activity is measured by the number of meetings of the board of directors
CEO	Binary variable coded 1 if there is a duality function of the CEO, 0 otherwise
POD	Dividing the number of outside directors with the total number of directors in the board
ACOM	Audit committee data will be coded (1) to indicate the existence of audit committee and (0) to indicate the non-existence
CONC	Proportions of shares held by the majority of shareholders of the company
INVI	Proportions of equities held by institutional investors
LEV	Total liabilities to total assets
BIG	Dummy variable taking the value 1 when the company is audited by at least one “Big four” and 0 otherwise
FSIEZ	Log of firm’s total assets

Table 4. Variables’ descriptive statistics

Numeric variables’ descriptive statistics
Variables	N	Mean	Min	Max	Std. Dev.
VDI	224	0.497	0.120	0.780	0.117
QFI(DA)	224	0.063	−1.058	1.006	0.157
BSIZE	224	8.580	4	12	2.173
POD	224	0.409	0	0.830	0.263
INVI	224	0.148	0	0.890	0.222
LEV	224	0.470	0.080	0.970	0.199
FSIZE	224	17.99	15.50	21.13	0.985
Dichotomous variables’ descriptive statistics
	N		Variable = 1		Variable = 0
CEO	224		149		75
			66.5%		33.5%
ACOM	224		16		208
			7.1%		92.9%
CONC	224		71		153
			31.7%		68.3%
BIG	224		98		126
			43.8%		56.3%

Notes: VDI: voluntary disclosure index consisting of 83 items p, which takes a value 1 if each item is disclosed, and 0 otherwise; scaled to have a value between 0 and 100%; QFI(DA): the discretionary accruals (DA) (model of Raman and Shahrur (2008)); BSIZE: board activity is measured by the number of meetings of the board of directors; CEO: binary variable coded 1 if there is a duality function of the CEO, 0 otherwise; POD: dividing the number of outside directors with the total number of directors in the board; ACOM: audit committee data will be coded (1) to indicate the existence of audit committee and (0) to indicate the non-existence; CONC: proportions of shares held by the majority of shareholders of the company; INVI: proportions of equities held by institutional investors; LEV: total liabilities to total assets; BIG: dummy variable taking the value 1 when the company is audited by at least one “Big four” and 0 otherwise; FSIEZ: log of firm’s total assets.

Table 5. Pearson correlations analysis

	VDI	QFI	BSIZE	CEO	POD	ACOM	CONC	INVI	BIG	LEV	FSIZE	VIF
VDI	1											–
QFI	−0.105	1										–
BSIZE	0.005	−0.048	1									1.451
CEO	−0.078	0.021	0.049	1								1.135
POD	−0.083	0.065	0.122	0.168^*	1							1.324
ACOM	0.030	0.016	0.142	0.087	−0.040	1						1.097
CONC	0.165^*	−0.06	0.080	0.056	0.233^**	−0.077	1					1.262
INVI	−0.042	0.068	−0.031	−0.15^*	0.151^*	−0.017	0.267^*	1				1.192
BIG	−0.108	0.028	−0.015^*	−0.080	0.225^*	0.140^*	−0.19^**	0.159^*	1			1.431
LEV	−0.099	−0.02	0.171^*	−0.076	0.193^**	−0.110	0.054	0.028	−0.125	1		1.297
FSIEZ	−0.060	−0.11	0.475^**	−0.077	0.133^*	0.158^*	0.110	0.140^*	0.148^*	0.335^*	1	1.670

Notes: VDI: voluntary disclosure index consisting of 83 items p, which takes a value 1 if each item is disclosed, and 0 otherwise; scaled to have a value between 0 and 100%; QFI(DA): the discretionary accruals (DA) (model of Raman and Shahrur (2008)); BSIZE: board activity is measured by the number of meetings of the board of directors; CEO: binary variable coded 1 if there is a duality function of the CEO, 0 otherwise; POD: dividing the number of outside directors with the total number of directors in the board; ACOM: audit committee data will be coded (1) to indicate the existence of audit committee and (0) to indicate the non-existence; CONC: proportions of shares held by the majority shareholders of the company; INVI: proportions of equities held by institutional investors; LEV: total liabilities to total assets; BIG: dummy variable taking the value 1 when the company is audited by at least one “Big four” and 0 otherwise; FSIEZ: log of firm’s total assets.

^* Significance at a level lower than 10%.

^** Significance at a level lower than 5%.

Table 6. Fixed effect tests

	Dependant variables
	VDI	QFI
Fisher test	12.55^*** (0.0000)	9.61^*** (0.0000)

^*** Significance at a level lower than 1%.

Table 7. Random effect tests

	Dependant variables
	VDI	QFI
χ^2 Test	63.52^*** (0.0000)	76.45^*** (0.0000)

^*** Significance at a level lower than 1%.

Table 8. Hausman tests

	Dependant variables
	VDI	QFI
χ^2 Test	4.20^*** (0.8979)	1.51^*** (0.9971)

^*** Significance at a level lower than 1%.

Table 9. Regression results

	VDI			QFI
	Coefficients	z-Statistic	P > |z|	Coefficients	z-Statistic	P > |z|
Constant	0.620^*	1.96	0.050	0.277^***	5.27	0.000
BSIZE	−0.026^***	−4.88	0.000	0.005^***	5.04	0.000
CEO	−0.069^***	−2.98	0.003	0.027^***	5.45	0.000
POD	0.121^**	2.69	0.007	−0.035^***	−4.15	0.000
ACOM	0.198^***	4.29	0.000	−0.025^**	−1.87	0.061
CONC	−0.047^*	−1.89	0.059	0.010^**	1.93	0.053
INVI	0.089^*	1.77	0.076	−0.092^***	−9.48	0.000
BIG	−0.051^**	−2.33	0.020	0.160^***	3.42	0.001
LEV	−0.040	−0.80	0.426	0.042^***	3.28	0.001
FSIZE	−0.005	−0.27	0.785	−0.016^***	−5.17	0.000
		N = 224			N = 244
R^2		0.316			0.271
Prob > χ^2		0.000			0.000

Notes: VDI: voluntary disclosure index consisting of 83 items p, which takes a value 1 if each item is disclosed, and 0 otherwise; scaled to have a value between 0 and 100%; QFI(DA): the discretionary accruals (DA) (model of Raman and Shahrur (2008)); BSIZE: board activity is measured by the number of meetings of the board of directors; CEO: binary variable coded 1 if there is a duality function of the CEO, 0 otherwise; POD: dividing the number of outside directors with the total number of directors in the board; ACOM: audit committee data will be coded (1) to indicate the existence of audit committee and (0) to indicate the non-existence; CONC: proportions of shares held by the majority of shareholders of the company; INVI: proportions of equities held by institutional investors; LEV: total liabilities to total assets; BIG: dummy variable taking the value 1 when the company is audited by at least one “Big four” and 0 otherwise; FSIEZ: log of firm’s total assets.

^* Significance at a level lower than 10%.

^** Significance at a level lower than 5%.

*** Significance at a level lower than 1%.

Botosan, C. A. (1997). Disclosure level and the cost of equity capital. The Accounting Review, 72, 323–349.

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Raman, K., & Shahrur, H. (2008). Relationship-specific investments and earnings management: Evidence on corporate suppliers and customers. The Accounting Review, 83, 1041–1081.https://doi.org/10.2308/accr.2008.83.4.1041

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