Ownership structure and debt structure as determinants of discretionary accruals: An empirical study of Pakistan

Figures & data

Table 1. Sample details and data sources

Companies	No. of companies
Total number of companies listed in KSE in 2014	579
Financial firms excluded	282
Total non-financial firms	297
Sample firms (annual reports available from 2008 to 2014)	158
Sample firms included in the analysis	100
Document or data sources
Annual reports of firm
Company handbooks
Companies ordinance 1984
SECP 1997
Securities Act, 2015

Sources: Author’s calculation.

Table 2. Variables descriptions

Variables		Measured By
Ownership concentration	BH	Shareholder holding more than 5% (Kurawa & Saheed, 2014; Qu, 2004)
Managerial ownership	MO	Percentage of common stock held by management (Kamran & Shah, 2014; Ruan, Tian, & Ma, 2011)
Financial institutional ownership	FIO	Percentage of common stock held by financial institution
Nonfinancial institutional ownership	NFIO	Percentage of common stock held by nonfinancial institution
Family owned	FamO	Dummy variable (Miller et al., 2010)
Short-Term Liability	STL	Percentage value of Short term Liability/Total Assets (Rodríguez-Pérez & van Hemmen, 2010)
Long-Term Liability	LTL	Percentage value of long term Liability/Total Assets (Rodríguez-Pérez & van Hemmen, 2010)
Firm Size	Fsize	Log of total assets (Roodposhti & Chashmi, 2011)
Leverage	LEV	Ratio of total Liabilities to total assets (Roodposhti & Chashmi, 2011)
Sales Growth	SG	Percentage growth in sales (Rodríguez-Pérez & van Hemmen, 2010)
Return on assets	ROA	Ratio of Net income to total assets (Bekiris & Doukakis, 2011)
Return on Equity	ROE	Ratio of net income to shareholders equity (Chen & Yaun, 2004)

Table 3. Descriptive statistics

Variable	Firm	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. deviation	Variance
DA	600	1.898	9.574	6.04	1.266	1.603
BH	600	0.001	0.998	0.644	0.245	0.06
MO	600	0.000	0.984	0.169	0.246	0.06
FIO	600	0.000	0.983	0.111	0.153	0.023
NFIO	600	0.000	0.893	0.086	0.175	0.031
FamO	600	0.000	1.000	0.694	0.461	0.213
STL	600	0.054	1.045	0.681	0.263	0.069
LTL	600	0.000	1.404	0.316	0.265	0.07
LEV	600	0.001	6.423	0.611	0.465	0.216
ROE	600	−8.52	5.951	0.129	0.67	0.449
SG	600	−0.999	9.817	0.200	1.019	1.038
ROA	600	−1.961	42.832	0.146	1.914	3.662
FSize	600	4.542	10.525	7.551	1.169	1.367

Source: Author’s calculations.

Table 4. Correlation matrix

	DA	BH	MO	FIO	NFIO	FamO	STL	LTL	LEV	ROE	SG	ROA	FSize
DA	1
BH	−0.118**	1
MO	0.045	−0.023	1
FIO	0.058	−0.153**	−0.199**	1
NFIO	0.045	−0.066	−0.191**	0.052	1
FamO	−0.011	−0.038	−0.051	0.047	0.083	1
STL	−0.104*	−0.016	−0.085	0.052	0.120**	0.028	1
LTL	0.107*	0.006	0.066	−0.044	−0.113*	−0.035	−0.977**	1
LEV	0.025	−0.113*	0.036	0.016	0.054	0.049	0.082	−0.089*	1
ROE	0.089*	0.048	−0.03	0.003	0.085	0.012	−0.025	0.037	−0.059	1
SG	0.001	−0.071	0.055	−0.035	0.009	−0.021	0.097*	−0.089*	0.008	0.042	1
ROA	0.03	0.02	0.098*	−0.039	−0.017	−0.065	−0.078	0.078	−0.02	0.025	−0.035	1
FSize	0.469**	−0.02	−0.023	0.021	−0.023	0.046	−0.203**	0.207**	0.003	0.041	−0.038	−0.058	1

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table 5. Results for DAC regressed on blockholder

Variables	Coefficients	t-statistics	p-value
BH	−0.323	−2.746	0.006
FSize	0.292	11.917	0.000
LEV	0.020	0.318	0.750
ROA	0.023	1.512	0.131
SG	0.000	0.413	0.680
R			0.485
R^2			0.236
Adjusted R^2			0.228
Durbin-Watson			1.310
F statistics			38.400
Significance level			0.000

Note: Standard errors are presented in the table for clustering at company’s level and significance level presented with value of t statistics denoted by “***”, “**”, “*” at 1, 5, and 10% respectively.

Source: Authors calculations.

Table 6. Results for DAC regressed on ownership structure

Variables	Coefficients	t-statistics	p-value
MO	0.224	1.839	0.067
FIO	0.295	1.539	0.124
NFIO	0.287	1.710	0.088
FamO	−0.021	−0.333	0.739
FSize	0.295	11.980	0.000
LEV	0.028	0.455	0.649
ROA	0.020	1.334	0.183
SG	0.000	0.348	0.728
R			0.485
R^2			0.235
Adjusted R^2			0.222
Durbin Watson			1.309
F statistics			18.984
Significance level			0.000

Note: Standard errors are presented in the table for clustering at company’s level and significance level presented with value of t statistics denoted by “***”, “**”, “*” at 1, 5, and 10% respectively.

Source: Authors calculations.

Table 7. Results for DAC regressed on long-term liability

Variables	Coefficients	t-statistics	p-value
LTL	−0.065	−3.922	0.000
FSize	−0.013	−3.567	0.000
LEV	0.015	4.055	0.000
ROA	0.000	−0.196	0.845
SG	0.000	−0.494	−0.494
R			0.672
R^2			0.451
Adjusted R^2			0.448
Durbin Watson			1.257
F statistics			0.830
Significance level			0.000

Note: Standard errors are presented in the table for clustering at company’s level and significance level presented with value of t statistics denoted by “***”, “**”, “*” at 1, 5, and 10% respectively.

Source: Authors calculations.

Table 8. Results for DAC regressed on short-term liability

Variables	Coefficients	t-statistics	p-value
STL	0.064	3.881	0.000
FSize	0.711	19.477	0.000
LEV	0.015	4.050	0.000
ROA	0.000	−0.193	0.847
SG	0.000	−0.495	0.621
R			0.304
R^2			0.093
Adjusted R^2			0.459
Durbin Watson			1.290
F statistics			72.090
Significance level			0.000

Note: Standard errors are presented in the table for clustering at company’s level and significance level presented with value of t statistics denoted by “***”, “**”, “*” at 1, 5, and 10% respectively.

Source: Authors calculations.

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