Institutional investors, corporate governance and firm performance in an emerging market: evidence from Vietnam

Figures & data

Table 1. Variable summary

	Explanation	Expected outcome
Dependent variables
Greyrate	The grey institutional ownership (rate)
Indrate	The independent institutional ownership (rate)
Prirate	The privately-owned institutional ownership (rate)
Starate	The state-owned institutional ownership (rate)
Independent variables
Adnum	Number of members in the board of directors	(-)
COB	CEO—Chairman duality (dummy)	(-)
Insnum	Number of large institutional shareholders	(+)
SIZE	Firm size (the common logarithm of market capitalization)	(+)
AGE	The common logarithm of firm age	(+)
VN30	Firm’s presence in the VN30 index (dummy)	(+)
TobinsQ	Market capitalization/book value	(+)
STATE	State as ultimate control (dummy)	(-)
ROA	Return on assets (net income/total assets)	(+)
LEV	Firm leverage (total debts/total assets)	(-)
Sgrowth	Annual sales growth	(+)
Mkshare	Firm’s market share compared to the whole industry (Firm’s sales/The whole industry’s sales)^1	(+)

(Source: Author’s summary.)

Table 2. Descriptive statistics

Variables	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Insrate	42.8%	0.243	0%	98.7%
Greyrate	0.4%	0.021	0%	23.1%
Indrate	4.4%	0.111	0%	69.1%
Starate	26.9%	0.241	0%	98.4%
Prirate	15.9%	0.204	0%	90.4%
ROA	0.062	0.096	−1.587	1.798
TobinsQ	1.057	0.493	0.145	9.044
AGE	1.36	0.248	0.301	1.875
SIZE	11.792	0.657	10.128	14.606
LEV	0.509	0.228	0.124	3.491
Sgrowth	1.805	3.307	0.003	16.39
Mkshare	0.020	0.069	0.012	0.806
Adnum	5.505	1.100	3	11
COB	0.288	0.453	0	1
VN30	0.031	0.171	0	1
STATE	0.292	0.455	0	1
Insnum	1.581	1.041	0	7

(Source: Author’s summary in Stata 15).

Table 3. Determinants of institutional ownership—Tobit model

Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Greyrate	Indrate	Prirate	Starate
Adnum	0.01143	−0.01596**	−0.00558	−0.01397***
	(1.91)	(−2.79)	(−1.69)	(−4.27)
COB	−0.01741	−0.08474***	−0.04851***	−0.03833**
	(−1.08)	(−6.15)	(−6.28)	(−5.24)
Insnum	0.07097**	0 .12614**	0.12903**	0.03328**
	(9.97)	(20.04)	(37.56)	(10.13)
SIZE	−0.00021	0.02973*	0.05763**	0.08870**
	(−0.02)	(2.48)	(8.97)	(14.34)
AGE	−0.02829	0.11867**	−0.05929**	0.14254**
	(−1.05)	(4.49)	(−4.23)	(10.68)
VN30	0.00025	0.01366	0.13821**	0.02976
	(0.01)	(0.38)	(6.30)	(1.37)
TobinsQ	−0.02922	0 .05551**	0.05057**	0.01887*
	(−1.93)	(4.43)	(6.60)	(2.56)
STATE	0.05639**	−0.09348***	−0.18119**	0.46086**
	(3.78)	(−5.99)	(−22.56)	(64.16)
ROA	0.04201	0.02398	−0.08380	0.12870*
	(0.49)	(0.33)	(−1.91)	(3.23)
LEV	−0.10322**	−0.17471**	−0.08840**	0.09182**
	(−2.75)	(−5.01)	(−5.03)	(5.53)
Sgrowth	−0.00674	−0.00118	−0.00007	−0.00016
	(−0.59)	(−0.33)	(−0.80)	(−0.95)
Mkshare	0.27883**	0 .10484	0.12977**	0.08572
	(3.96)	(1.31)	(2.63)	(1.74)
Constant	−0.40399*	−1.02091**	−0.60195**	0.90005**
	(−2.80)	(−7.65)	(−8.50)	(13.39)
Observations	4090	4090	4090	4090
R-squared	0.2588	0.2777	0.7726	0.8104

Coefficient estimations, in the first row, ***$\left|p\right|$ < 0.01, **$\left|p\right|$ < 0.05, *$\left|p\right|$ < 0.1

T-statistics, in parentheses.

(Source: Author’s calculation in Stata 15)

Table 4. The effect of institutional ownership on firm value—Pooled OLS model

Variables	(1)	(2)
	TobinsQ	TobinsQ
Greyrate	−0.96126*
	(−2.30)
Indrate	0.12355*
	(2.62)
Prirate		0.28032***
		(5.05)
Starate		0.15493**
		(2.27)
Adnum	0.02629**	0.02842**
	(3.44)	(3.72)
COB	−0.05604**	−0.04694**
	(−3.63)	(−3.05)
Insnum	0.01594*	−0.00863
	(2.03)	(−0.98)
ROA	0.95694**	0.94426**
	(13.41)	(13.26)
SIZE	0.09243**	0.08768**
	(4.69)	(4.38)
LEV	−0.01301	0.00310
	(−0.31)	(0.07)
Sgrowth	0.00013	0.00014
	(0.87	(0.94)
Mkshare	0.25552	0.23527
	(1.49)	(1.37)
STATE	−0.06001**	−0.06091*
	(−2.98)	(−2.12)
Constant	−0.22830	−0.23933
	(−1.02)	(−1.05)
Observations	4090	4090
R-squared	0.1766	0.1867

Coefficient estimations, in the first row, ***$\left|p\right|$ < 0.01, **$\left|p\right|$ < 0.05, *$\left|p\right|$ < 0.1

T-statistics, in parentheses.

(Source: Author’s calculation of Stata 15).

Table 5. Grey and independent institutions and firm value—Tobin’s Q, 3SLS model

Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)
	TobinsQ	Greyrate	Indrate
Greyrate	−0.15911
	(−1.03)
Indrate	0.43411***
	(5.18)
Adnum	0.03040**	0.00021	0.01875**
	(4.48)	(1.23)	(3.48)
COB	−0.06211**	0.00003	−0.03480***
	(−4.01)	(0.10)	(−2.91)
Insnum	0.02315**
	(3.29)
Insnum1		0.08536**	0.20215**
		(138.65)	(16.84)
SIZE	0.06171	−0.00134**	0.02092**
	(−0.02)	(−4.66)	(2.91)
AGE		0.00165	0.07166
		(1.63)	(1.81)
VN30		0.00100	0.07045
		(0.64)	(1.16)
TobinsQ		−0.00735*	−0.60041**
		(−2.22)	(−3.98)
STATE	−0.05941**	−0.00091*	−0.03546*
	(−3.82)	(−2.12)	(−2.53)
ROA	1.93612**	0.01680*	1.22804
	(25.41)	(2.55)	(4.19)
LEV	−0.06778	0.00012	−0.04170*
	(−1.93)	(0.16)	(−1.96)
Sgrowth	0.00018	1.76e-06	0.00014
	(0.91)	(0.40)	(1.27)
Mkshare	0.32973**	0.00862**	0.13602**
	(3.22)	(3.78)	(2.25)
Constant	0.05051	0.01920**	0.13640
	(0.39)	(6.42)	(1.83)
Observations	4090	4090	4090
R-squared	0.2180	0.8104	−5.5107

Coefficient estimations, in the first row, ***$\left|p\right|$ < 0.01, **$\left|p\right|$ < 0.05, *$\left|p\right|$ < 0.1

Z-statistics, parentheses.

(Source: Author’s calculation of Stata 15).

Table 6. Privately-owned and state-owned institutions’ ownership and firm value—Tobin’s Q, 3SLS model

Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)
	TobinsQ	Prirate	Starate
Prirate	3.15261***
	(3.77)
Starate	1.94695**
	(3.47)
Adnum	0.00893	0.00957	0.00381
	(0.74)	(0.48)	(1.42)
COB	−0.23305**	−0.05934	−0.03157***
	(−4.36)	(−1.43)	(−5.67)
Insnum	0.35934**
	(4.04)
Insnum2		0.10706**	0.27622**
		(4.39)	(62.07)
SIZE	0.06765**	0.04873	0.00659
	(3.67)	(1.87)	(1.50)
AGE		−0.23572	0.00147
		(−1.40)	(0.09)
VN30		−0.15113	0.07529**
		(−0.66)	(3.08)
TobinsQ		−0.29092*	−0.24211**
		(−2.49)	(−4.52)
STATE	0.27977*	−0.09861	0.27262**
	(2.44)	(−1.95)	(38.39)
ROA	2.19017**	0.63805	0.49611**
	(17.03)	(0.55)	(4.68)
LEV	−0.19297**	−0.05643	−0.03662**
	(−3.35)	(−0.75)	(−2.97)
Sgrowth	−0.00014	−0.00006	0.00002
	(−0.47)	(−0.16)	(0.42)
Mkshare	0.66204**	0.22514	0.03405
	(3.76)	(0.97)	(1.00)
Constant	0.60351*	0.09978	0.15001**
	(2.20)	(0.37)	(3.37)
Observations	4090	4090	4090
R-squared	−0.9866	−0.1735	0.6125

Coefficient estimations, in the first row, ***$\left|p\right|$ < 0.01, **$\left|p\right|$ < 0.05, *$\left|p\right|$ < 0.1

Z-statistics, in parentheses.

(Source: Author’s calculation of Stata 15).

Table 7. Robustness results from institutional investors’ preferences

Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Greyrate	Indrate	Prirate	Starate
CGI	0.01234	0.01621***	0.01537	0.02452***
	(2.21)	(2.43)	(1.56)	(3.38)
SIZE	−0.00181	0.03563**	0.04521**	0.07250**
	(−0.04)	(2.14)	(6.49)	(12.56)
AGE	0.03258	0.11230*	0.04912*	0.11324**
	(1.25)	(3.54)	(4.34)	(11.52)
VN30	0.00121	0.01523	0.14554**	0.02748
	(0.01)	(0.45)	(5.63)	(1.48)
TobinsQ	−0.03434	0.06468**	0.06327**	0.02769*
	(−1.03)	(4.26)	(6.29)	(2.82)
ROA	0.04683	0.04327	0.07289	0.13589*
	(0.28)	(0.45)	(1.72)	(3.36)
LEV	−0.01426	−0.06325**	−0.09743**	−0.08194**
	(−3.64)	(−4.72)	(−5.36)	(−4.85)
Sgrowth	−0.00579	−0.00217	−0.00085	−0.00037
	(−0.72)	(−0.56)	(−0.69)	(−1.21)
Mkshare	0.16729*	0.10258	0.10826**	0.09269
	(3.28)	(1.45)	(2.34)	(1.82)
Constant	−0.20838*	−0.03069**	−0.70214**	0.92016**
	(−2.64)	(−6.78)	(−8.29)	(12.26)
R-squared	0.2237	0.2568	0.6623	0.7358

Coefficient estimations, in the first row, ***$\left|p\right|$ < 0.01, **$\left|p\right|$ < 0.05, *$\left|p\right|$ < 0.1

T-statistics, in parentheses.

(Source: Author’s calculation in Stata 15).