A test of behavioural changes to electronic levy: Evidence from mobile money transactions in a developing country

Figures & data

Table 1. Analysis of behavioural response to e-electronic levy

Behavioural Response	Frequency	Percent
I will continue to use mobile money like nothing has changed (Keep the status quo)	292	10.65
I will rather increase my mobile money transactions	32	1.17
I will reduce my transactions on mobile money (MoMo)	1,134	41.37
I will stop using mobile money (MoMo)	1,283	46.81
Total	2,741	100

Table 2. Analysis of positive & negative behavioural response to E-electronic levy

Positive and Negative Behavioural Responses	Frequency	Percent
Negative Behavioural Response	2,417	88.18
Positive Behavioural Response	324	11.82
Total	2,741	100

Table 3. Regression results of behavioural change to E-levy

	(1)	Average Marginal Effects	(2)	Average Marginal Effects
VARIABLES	Logit		Logit (Fixed Effects)
Income (log)	0.2183***	0.0449***	0.1886***	0.0384***
	(0.061)	(0.012)	(0.065)	(0.013)
Marital Status (married)	−0.4861***	−0.1009***	−0.4342***	−0.0891***
	(0.103)	(0.021)	(0.106)	(0.020)
Subjective Knowledge	0.0628	0.0129	0.0571	0.0116
	(0.174)	(0.035)	(0.176)	(0.036)
Objective Knowledge	0.4333***	0.0894***	0.4160***	0.0849***
	(0.100)	(0.020)	(0.102)	(0.019)
Education	−0.7637*	−0.1572*	−0.7928*	−0.1613*
	(0.420)	(0.086)	(0.430)	(0.087)
Trust in Government	1.0831***	0.2140***	1.0814***	0.2110 ***
	(0.328)	(0.057)	(0.332)	(0.056)
E-Levy Implementation Time frame
Future (Passed after 2022)	3.4777***	0.4999***	3.5046***	0.4988***
	(0.327)	(0.016)	(0.329)	(0.016)
Now (Passed in 2022)	1.6771***	0.3504 ***	1.6503***	0.3425***
	(0.254)	(0.039)	(0.256)	(0.040)
Constant	−1.1759*		−2.1690**
	(0.629)		(0.884)
Regional Fixed Effects	No		Yes
Observations	2,351	2,351	2,351	2,351

Dependent Variable: Behavioural Change (Behavioural Change=1, No Behavioural Change=0) Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 4. Regression results of positive behavioural responses

	(1)		(2)
VARIABLES	Logit	Average marginal effects (Delta-method)	Logit	Average marginal effects (Delta-method)
Trust in Government	0.6549**	0.0555**	0.6924**	0.0582**
	(0.269)	(0.025)	(0.273)	(0.025)
E-Levy Implementation Timeframe
Future (Passed after 2022)	4.3389***	0.6861***	4.3892***	0.6815***
	(0.230)	(0.028)	(0.239)	(0.028)
Now (Passed in 2022)	2.0671***	0.1820***	2.1525***	0.1918***
	(0.304)	(0.041)	(0.313)	(0.042)
Other Determinants	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Regional Dummies	No	No	Yes	Yes
Constant	−4.4297***		−4.0694**
	(1.239)		(2.000)
LR chi2(8/25)	692.60***		703.43***
Pseudo R2	0.4836		0.4912
Observations	1,364	1,364	1,364	1,364

Dep Variable: Positive Behavioural Responses Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A1. Descriptive statistics

	Behavioural Dummy	Income	Marital Status	SubKnow	Objknow	Age	Edu	Trust	Elmpl
Mean	0.52	3189.98	0.68	0.91	0.66	35.87	0.97	0.05	0.23
Median	1.00	2300.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	34.00	1.00	0.00	0.00
Standard Dev.	0.50	2810.33	0.47	0.29	0.47	10.02	0.17	0.23	0.52
Skewness	−0.08	1.21	−0.77	−2.81	−0.70	0.75	−5.42	3.91	2.24
Kurtosis	1.01	3.39	1.60	8.87	1.49	3.89	30.33	16.30	7.06
Minimum	0.00	203.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	18.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Maximum	1.00	10000.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	75.00	1.00	1.00	2.00
N	2810.00	2601.00	2810.00	2810.00	2805.00	2810.00	2810.00	2810.00	2810.00