Impact of China’s comprehensive financial reform pilot zone on digital transformation of manufacturing companies. Evidence from listed companies

Figures & data

Table 1. Descriptive statistics

Variables	N	mean	p50	sd	max	min
$DCG$	13911	1.199	0.693	1.260	6.140	0
$DID$	13911	0.108	0	0.310	1	0
$Age$	13911	1.912	2.079	0.931	3.434	0
$Size$	13911	22.14	21.99	1.203	27.55	17.81
$Roa$	13911	0.0590	0.0490	0.0990	10.40	−0.058
$Lev$	13911	0.383	0.377	0.187	2.176	0.008
$Profit$	13911	19.03	18.97	1.521	25.04	11.35
$Cash$	13911	0.214	0.171	0.148	0.946	0.001
$Tobin$	13911	2.115	1.674	1.643	92.25	0.684
$Inde$	13911	3.781	3	1.168	13	2
$Top1$	13911	34.36	32.32	14.67	89.99	2.790

Table 2. Baseline regression results

Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	DCG	DCG	DCG	DCG
$DID$	1.028***	0.249***	0.355***	0.240***
	(0.068)	(0.070)	(0.067)	(0.067)
$Age$			0.400***	0.048
			(0.027)	(0.034)
$Size$			0.441***	0.209***
			(0.035)	(0.036)
$Roa$			−0.088	0.003
			(0.064)	(0.044)
$Lev$			−0.550***	0.001
			(0.124)	(0.118)
$Profit$			0.027**	0.013
			(0.011)	(0.011)
$Cash$			−0.013	−0.113
			(0.096)	(0.102)
$Tobin$			0.003	0.004
			(0.006)	(0.006)
$Inde$			0.010*	0.010*
			(0.006)	(0.006)
$Top1$			−0.007***	−0.003
			(0.002)	(0.002)
Corporate fixed effects	$YES$	$YES$	$YES$	$YES$
Time fixed effects	$NO$	$YES$	$NO$	$YES$
$\mathrm{\_}cons$	1.088***	1.172***	−9.468***	−3.709***
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.715)	(0.763)
$N$	13911.000	13911.000	13911.000	13911.000
$r2$	0.643	0.759	0.745	0.764

Standard errors in parentheses

*p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Figure 1. Parallel trend test.

Figure 2. PSM (pairwise four nearest neighbor matching method).

Table 3. Robustness tests

Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)
	DCG	Delete Green Finance Pilot Zone	Replacing the explanatory variable
$DID$	0.240***	0.199***	0.079*
	(0.067)	(0.072)	(0.044)
Control variables	$YES$	$YES$	$YES$
Time fixed effects	$YES$	$YES$	$YES$
Corporate fixed effects	$YES$	$YES$	$YES$
_cons	−3.666***	−3.489***	−0.783
	(0.767)	(0.779)	(0.503)
$N$	13907	13210	13536
$r2$	0.764	0.763	0.757

Standard errors in parentheses

*p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Figure 3. Placebo test.

Table 4. Intermediary mechanism test

Variables	(1)	(2)
	Cost	Invt
$DID$	−0.006**	0.008**
	(0.003)	(0.003)
Control variables	$Yes$	$Yes$
Time fixed effects	$Yes$	$Yes$
Corporate fixed effects	$Yes$	$Yes$
$\mathrm{\_}cons$	0.008	−0.055
	(0.044)	(0.040)
$N$	13910	13899
$r2$	0.227	0.520

Standard errors in parentheses

*p< 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.

Table 5. Heterogeneity analysis

Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Nature of ownership	Industry Characteristics	Industry Nature Differences
$DID$* State-owned Holdings	0.202
	(0.137)
$DID$* Non-State Holding	0.251***
	(0.075)
$DID$* Regulated industries		−0.072
		(0.128)
$DID$* Competitive industries		0.287***
		(0.073)
$DID$*Labor-intensive			0.300***
			(0.111)
$DID$*Capital intensive			0.268
			(0.232)
$DID$* Technology intensive			0.203***
			(0.078)
Time fixed effects	$YES$	$YES$	$YES$
Corporate fixed effects	$YES$	$YES$	$YES$
$\mathrm{\_}cons$	−3.635***	−3.718***	−3.730***
	(0.815)	(0.764)	(0.765)
$N$	13911	13911	13911
$r2$	0.764	0.764	0.764

Standard errors in parentheses

*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.