Russia in Latin America: an extension of Moscow’s policy in the developing world

ABSTRACT

In the Soviet period the USSR expanded its contacts with the countries of Latin America with the primary goal of converting developing states into Marxist-Leninist states – and thereby reenforcing not only its status as leader of a global communist movement, but also as a “great power” able to compete with and defend itself against the United States, Since the Soviet collapse – especially since the rise to political power of Vladimir Putin, Russian involvement has expanded in Latin America, and in the developing world more broadly, mainly for reasons of economic involvement and part of the Russian objective of re-establishing its position as a great power and undercutting role of the United States.

KEYWORDS:

• USSR
• Russia
• Latin America
• ontological security
• self-image
• identity

Acknowledgements

The authors wishes to express their sincere appreciation for the comments and recommendations of the anonymous reviewer of this article for the journal. They greatly strengthened the development of the argument.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 By “ontological security” we are referring to a state’s ability to respond to fundamentally existential and identity questions. When their actions are reproduced as routines, they create a sense of continuity and order (Giddens, 1991; Della Sala & Akchurina, 2019; Steele, 2008). Ontological security is threatened by the rupture of continuity. This, as a rule, happens in critical situations or at the radical disjuncture of an unpredictable kind that affects substantial numbers of individuals and threatens to destroy institutionalised, “normal” routines (Rossdale, 2015, p. 373). These situations produce anxiety and represent threats to identity. Unlike fear that is tied to a particular situation, anxiety comes from the challenge to one’s identity (Giddens, 1991).

2 For discussions of the importance of ontological security and identity see Innes and Steele (2013) and Krolikowski (2008); Della Sala and Akchurina (2019); Kinnvall and Mitzen (2018); and Subotić (2016).

3 This section draws on (Cuban Revolution, n.d.).

4 For a clear and forceful analysis of the decline and collapse of the USSR see King (2020).

5 For a general discussion of Soviet military assistance policy over the course of the cold war see Kanet (2006).

6 For an excellent discussion of Russian policy in Latin America, focusing on military relations, see Blank and Kim (2015). For Russian views that downplay Russian assertiveness, see Jeifets (2020) and Pyatakov (2020).

7 The essay by Blank and Kim (2015), although now a bit outdated, is possibly the single best brief treatment of Russian policy toward Latin America. For other well-done overviews see Milosevich-Juaristi (2020), Farah and Reyes (2018), and Chaguaceda (2019).

8 Mason Shuya sees recent Russian activity in Latin America as, in part at least, a response to US policy in post-communist Central and Eastern Europe and the expansion of NATO. On this issue see, also, Gurganus (2018). For a different assessment see Allen et al. (2021).

9 The Primakov Doctrine of 1996 has been the defining concept of Russian foreign and defense policies for over two decades. Its major components are:

• View of Russia as an indispensable actor with an independent foreign policy

• Vision of a multipolar world managed by a concert of major powers

• Insistence on Russia’s primacy in the post-Soviet space and the pursuit of Eurasian integration

• Opposition to NATO expansion

• Partnership with China (Rumer, 2019).

10 In the view of Blank and Kim (2015) “commercial interests are very much a means to securing the ends which are Russia’s geopolitical interests. Especially as regards Venezuela, Cuba and Nicaragua those strategic interests aim at countering US influence in Latin America”.

11 As one analyst has put the matter, “Russia is active in Latin America primarily through arms sales, commercial agreements, and high-level political outreach.” While these activities are driven largely by financial incentives, Putin’s motivation to boost Russia’s profile is also firmly rooted in geopolitics (Gurganus, 2018).

12 Russia promises mega projects that rarely come to fruition. Additionally, Russia has signed dozens of memoranda of understanding with Latin American countries that are vague and, if consistent with past behavior, likely to be left unfulfilled (Farah & Reyes, 2018).

13 See Gonzalez (2019), who notes that “Russia has re-emerged in Latin America, specifically operating in unstable, anti-American countries associated with communist or socialist ideals”.

14 These include the Bolivarian bloc of nations (Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Cuba, and El Salvador) as well as Argentina (Farah & Reyes, 2018). On Venezuela’s recent friction with Russia see Rouvinski (2019)’ on Russian relations with individual states see Shuya (2019).

15 As Farah and Reyes (2018) point out, one of the repeat visitors to Latin America has been General Valery Gerasimov. Gerasimov is Chief of Staff of the Russian Federation and architect of the Gerasimov Doctrine, which provides a useful lens for understanding Russian activities in the region. It posits that the rules of war have changed, there is a “blurring of the lines between war and peace,” and “nonmilitary means of achieving military and strategic goals have grown” and, “in many cases exceeded the power of weapons in their effectiveness”. Gerasimov (2013) argues for asymmetrical actions that combine the use of special forces and information warfare that create “a permanently operating front through the entire territory of the enemy state”. He further noted that:

New information technologies have enabled significant reductions in the spatial, temporal, and informational gaps between forces and control organs. Frontal engagements of large formations of forces at the strategic and operational level are gradually becoming a thing of the past. Long-distance, contactless actions against the enemy are becoming the main means of achieving combat and operational goals … The information space opens wide asymmetrical possibilities for reducing the fighting potential of the enemy.

16 Evidence that in certain areas the United States during the Trump Administration seems to have written off its relations with Latin America can be found in the failure to provide anti-Covid-19 vaccines, while both China and Russia have been important suppliers (Serbin & Pont, 2020; Eulich, 2021), with Russia already having supplied at least nine countries (Biller & Sherman, 2121).

17 A similar challenge to democratic values is being waged in the United States by the Trump forces who now dominate the Republican Party.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Roger E. Kanet

Roger E. Kanet is since 2019 professor emeritus in the Department of Political Science at the University of Miami, and since 1997 Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. A leading authority on the politics of Russia, the other Soviet successor states, and Eastern Europe, he has also taught at the University of Kansas and was a joint fellow at the Research Institute on Communist Affairs and Russian Institute at Columbia University. He has made more than 300 presentations to universities and various professional and civic organizations in the United States and abroad, edited 38 scholarly books, and published more than 250 scholarly articles and book chapters.

Dina Moulioukova

Dina Moulioukova is a Lecturer of International Studies at the University of Miami, and Assistant Director and co-founder of the Global Security Initiative. She completed her PhD at the University of Miami with focus on innovative approaches to security studies. Prior to her studies at UM, Dr. Moulioukova received her Master of Law degree (LL.M.) at the University of Cambridge.