Eurasian Economic Union integration in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan

ABSTRACT

This article analyses the political and social discourses towards Eurasian integration in Central Asia. I concentrate on the independent non-Russian political elites and wider popular responses to the integration in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan and on the motivations leading these decision makers and societies to Eurasian economic integration. The focus is on Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the only Central Asian countries in the Eurasian Economic Union, and on their respective populations. I demonstrate how post-Soviet Kazakhstani and Kyrgyz regimes facilitated ideas and ideals of Eurasianism so closely connected to their own interests in economic and socio-political contexts. The article also aims to reveal the complex web of interests, identities and mobilities of groups and individuals behind the political façade of integration talks in Central Eurasia. In doing so the study focuses on the historical approach and political elite-led discourses combined with the sociological data of social responses to the integration projects at different stages of their development.

KEYWORDS:

• Eurasia
• Eurasian Economic Union
• political elites
• integration
• migration

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. Higley and Pakulski (2000) ‘Elite Theory versus Marxism. The twentieth century’s verdict’, p. 229.

2. Many mid-range businesses in Kazakhstan view the country’s participation in the Customs Union as actually harmful to the local producers who are not able to compete with the cheaper Russian, Byelorussian and now also Kyrgyz products. ‘Our middle and small-range local producers are not able to compete within the Customs Union framework with Belarus and Russia [ … ]’ commented Timur Nazkhanov, Vice-President of the Independent Association of Entrepreneurs (Kazakhstan). ‘Look, the majority of the products we consume at the moment are already imported. Russia already almost entirely expanded to our [Kazakhstani] market’ (Ikonnikov, 2012).

3. Laruelle (2014), for example, mentions how the renaming of the Leo Gumilev University in Astana was one of the attempts to highlight Kazakhstan’s goals towards achieving a common ‘humanitarian’ and cultural Eurasian space. See also prominent Kazakh writer Olzhas Suleimenov’s interview (Suleimenov, 2014).

4. See Georgy Mamedov’s forthcoming chapter on ‘The illusions of the Soviet: Conservative turn in Kyrgyzstan.’ Forthcoming in Mamedov and Shatalova (Eds.). The concepts of the Sovietness (Ponyatiia o sovetskom), Bishkek: SHTAB. The author discusses the parliamentarian and political discourses on the ‘gay propaganda’ amendments, for example, to the Criminal Law (seeking punishment for the positive propaganda for LGBTQ). A number of similar laws were widely discussed in Russia and an amendment to the protection of children from gay propaganda came into force in Russia in June 2013.

5. Anderson and Klimov (2012, p. 13) also stress Uzbekistan’s protectionist ‘trade regime’ and note that even though ‘Uzbekistan has bilateral free trade agreements’ with a number of post-Soviet countries including ‘Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, [ … ] Russia’ and other countries ‘these agreements are implemented (at least partially), but have narrow coverage’.

6. Islam Karimov’s speech, retrieved September 1, 2014, http://president.uz/ru/news/5001/

7. Islam Karimov’s speech, retrieved September 1, 2014, http://president.uz/ru/news/5001/

8. The share of ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan decreased since independence. In 1989, ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking Slavs outnumbered ethnic Kazakhs (only 39.7%). The ethnic Russian share of the population reached 37.8% in the 1989 census but in 2009 their share had dropped to 23.7% whereas the share of ethnic Kazakhs had increased to 63.1%. This representation, however, does not cover either the substantial linguistic divide where many urban ethnic Kazakhs remain largely Russophone nor the geographical spread of Russian-speaking minorities who primarily reside in the northern borderlands along the Russo–Kazakh border. In the mid-1990s Kazakhstan saw a vast wave of Russian out-migration due to economic instability. The Russian-speaking minority in Kyrgyzstan is also a visible political issue. Ethnic Russians constituted 21.5% in 1989 but according to the official censuses, this figure was down to 12.5% in 1999 and just 7.8% in 2009. The russophone Kyrgyz population is also predominantly urban as in Kazakhstan.

9. Popov (2013), for example, mentions the complex web of interests among political and economic elites in Kazakhstan. This complexity is defined by the ‘existence of the several large groups of influence with differentiated interests who are oriented to Russia, the West, China and Turkey’. He states that the Kazakh regime’s continued support for the Eurasian Economic Union and further integration with Russia in particular would depend on the power and establishment of one of the groups in a ‘post-Nazarbayev period’.

10. In the light of the most recent currency crisis and differences in import prices for goods, small and mid-range businesses were put in a particularly vulnerable position. In 2013, their share in the country’s GDP constituted less than 20% (Savina, 2013). Many politicians also feared the reflection of anti-Russian sanctions on Kazakhstan especially in terms of the decrease of the country’s credit ratings (Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s just in 2014 fell to 4.5% ‘mirroring’ Russia). See Satpayev ‘Treshini v Tamozhennom Soyuze’ [‘Cracks in the Customs Union’].

11. Satpayev, Dosym. 2014. ‘Evraziiski ekonomicheskii soyuz – poezd ili podlodka?’ [‘Eurasian Economic Union – a train or a submarine?’].

12. see Savina (2013).

13. Nazarbayev, pp. 406–408.

14. President Nazarbayev’s interview to ‘Hokkaido Sinbun,’ Op. 1, F. 7 ‘President of KazSSR,’ Presidential Archive of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Almaty.

15. Tazhin (1994).

16. Akayev (2004, p.169).

17. Akayev (2004, p.169).

18. In 2013 this accounted to one-fifth of the total population (5.72 million).

19. ‘Labor Migration and Human Capital of Kyrgyzstan: Impact of the Customs Union,’ 2013.

20. From the Kyrgyz migrant worker in Kazakhstan, interview excerpt from the ‘Labor Migration and Human Capital of Kyrgyzstan: Impact of the Customs Union,’ 2013 EDB report, p. 13.

21. Conducted since 2012 by the Eurasian Bank for Development. The 2015 poll was conducted in Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan and Ukraine with a random sample of 11,000.

22. ‘Komkon-2 Eurasia’ survey in Almaty, 13–14 March 2003 among 300 respondents (random sample) in Almaty.

23. Eurasian Integration Barometer 2014 data.

24. EDB Integration Barometer 2012 Data. Kyrgyz sample – 1000 respondents in 2012.

25. EDB Integration Barometer 2013 Data.

26. Bannikov 2015, retrieved from http://www.news-asia.ru/view/ks/politics/8643

27. EDB Integration Barometer 2014 Data.

28. Gallup data quoted in gezitter.org, retrieved from http://www.gezitter.org/politic/40920_Gallup_v_kyirgyizstane_dominiruet_vliyanie_kremlya__/