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Abstract
This paper explores decentralisation’s contribution to post-conflict state building in four Commonwealth countries: UK (Northern Ireland), Sri Lanka, Sierra Leone and Rwanda. Drawing on insights from senior local government officials, it explores post-conflict institutional arrangements and finds that decentralisation policy has made a significant, if varied, contribution to community cohesion, reconciliation and state legitimacy in each country. In Northern Ireland and to a lesser extent Sri Lanka, quasi-federal structures have enabled peace negotiations through greater autonomy and state legitimacy in the eyes of former separatists. This has however limited further devolution to sub-provincial local councils. In Sierra Leone and Rwanda, decentralisation has had a more developmental rationale. Greater equity in basic local service provision and more inclusive local governance has supported community cohesion and reconciliation in all four countries, though there are capacity gaps and coordination issues with central government agencies. There is evidence decentralisation has contributed to peace in all four countries although in Rwanda the restriction on pluralism has limited local government flexibility to address community needs. The case studies offer key lessons and signpost continuing challenges, which may help other governments to consider what features of decentralisation may work best for their post-conflict political settlement and the socio-cultural dynamics of the communities they serve.
Acknowledgements
Gareth would like to thank the elected representatives and staff of the local government sector organisations whose insights formed the bases of the case studies for this paper. He would also like to thank three anonymous reviewers for their valuable insights and suggestions, along with Paul Jackson, Madeleine Hatfield, Lucy Slack, Andrew Nickson, Philip Amis, Benjamin Chemouni, Oliver Walton, Niamh Gaynor, Terry Parker, Lewis Brooks, Alfariany Fatima and Aleks Dubaic for their helpful comments. He would also like to acknowledge the support and encouragement provided by colleagues at Commonwealth Local Government Forum (CLGF) and the International Development Department (IDD) at the University of Birmingham. The views expressed in this paper are his own and not necessarily those of CLGF or any of the organisations interviewed. All errors remain his own.
Notes
1. When the independent nation states of the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, India, Pakistan and Ceylon (Sri Lanka) became the founding members in free association as the Commonwealth of Nations. From an analytical and policy perspective the Commonwealth is an interesting collection of countries given their shared history and similar legal and legislative frameworks. See https://thecommonwealth.org/history-of-the-commonwealth/beginning-modern-commonwealth
2. Uppsala Conflict Data Programme. Armed Conflict Database.
3. ‘In the last quarter century, over 75 countries have attempted to transfer responsibilities of the state to lower tiers of government. Significantly, most of these lower-tier governments have been elected, so that the decentralization is not just administrative or fiscal, but also political.’ World Bank, Decentralization and Service Delivery, 1.
4. This is reflected in the Sustainable Development Goals, especially goal 16 which commits nations to ‘promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels.’ United Nations, Transforming our World, 12. This emphasis recognises the role sub-national and local government plays in ensuring no citizen ‘is left behind’. This acknowledgement is echoed elsewhere in the SDGs, such as through goal 11, the ‘cities goal’ and in other key global declarations as part of the post-2015 agenda, including paragraph 34 of the Addis Ababa Action Agenda on financing development post-2015, the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction and the Paris agreement on climate change. Satterthwaite, “Successful, Safe and Sustainable Cities.”
5. International IDEA, Democracy at the Local Level.
6. Diamond, Promoting Democracy in the 1990s, 8.
7. Ribot, African Decentralization and Crook; and Manor, Democracy and Decentralisation in South Asia and West Africa.
8. Jackson and Scott, Local Government in Post-conflict Environments.
9. Jackson, Local Government and Decentralisation in Post-conflict Contexts.
10. Faguet, Fox and Pöschl “Decentralizing for a Deeper, more Supple Democracy.”
11. Lyons, “The Importance of Winning.”
12. Zack-Williams, “Sierra Leone: The Political Economy of Civil War, 1991–98”; and Jackson “Reshuffling an Old Deck of Cards?”
13. Goodfellow and Smith “From Urban Catastrophe to ‘Model’ City?”
14. Green, “Decentralization and Conflict in Uganda”; and Kauzya, Political Decentralisation in Africa.
15. Cheeseman, “The Kenyan Election of 2007. An Introduction”; and D’Arcy and Cornell, “Devolution and Corruption in Kenya.”
16. O’Neill, “Decentralization as an Electoral Strategy.”
17. Crook, “Decentralization and Poverty Reduction in Africa.”
18. Jackson, “Chiefs, Money and Politicians.”
19. Green, “Decentralization and Conflict in Uganda.”
20. Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy.
21. Faguet, Fox and Pöschl “Decentralizing for a Deeper, More Supple Democracy.”
22. Rustad, Between War and Peace; and Osaghae, “Ethnic Minorities and Federalism in Nigeria.”
23. Gallagher 1998, cited in Bush and Saltarelli, The Two Faces of Education in Ethnic Conflict; see also Fontana, “Educational Decentralisation in Post-Conflict Societies.”
24. Gaynor, Decentralisation, Conflict and Peacebuilding in Rwanda.
25. In 2014, the Rwandan government successfully lobbied the UN Security Council to officially refer to the Rwandan Genocide as the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi: see United Nations, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2150 (2014).
26. Faguet, Fox and Pöschl, “Decentralizing for a Deeper, More Supple Democracy.”
27. Sisk, “Democracy at the Local Level.”
28. World Bank, Decentralization and Service Delivery; Crook and Manor, Democracy and Decentralisation in South Asia and West Africa; Faguet and Pöschl, Is Decentralization Good for Development?
29. Brinkerhoff and Johnson, “Decentralized Local Governance in Fragile States”; Järvinen, “Promoting Inclusive Local Governance and Service Delivery”; and Parker, “Improving Institutional and Service Delivery Capacity in Conflict Affected Areas.”
30. Mcloughlin, “When Does Service Delivery”; and Fisk and Cherney, “Pathways to Institutional Legitimacy.”
31. An earlier version of this paper included a fifth country, the Solomon Islands, where ethnic violent ‘troubles’ from 1998 to 2000 killing over 200 people and displaced at least 20,000 (Jeffrey, “Enduring Tensions,” 153). This prompted a capacity building for Honiara City Council programme to provide more inclusive governance and greater equitable services across communities (for more detail see Parker, “Improving Institutional and Service Delivery Capacity.”)
32. Two or three in-depth interviews were undertaken per country with senior officials or elected representatives of local government associations or ministries responsible for local government in each country. References to the interviews: NILGA = Northern Ireland Local Government Association, FSLGA = Federation of Sri Lankan Local Government Authorities, MLG = Ministry of Local Government Sierra Leone, and RALGA = Rwanda Local Government Association.
33. Whilst the history of the conflict is drawn predominantly from secondary sources, the discussion of the post-conflict decentralisation policies and how these have impacted community cohesion draw on interviews with senior practitioners with additional references added where possible.
34. Minogue, A Consumer’s Guide to Local Government.
35. Knox, “Local Government in Northern Ireland.”
36. Whyte, Interpreting Northern Ireland.
37. Minogue, A Consumer’s Guide to Local Government.
38. Paolini et al., “Effects of Direct and Indirect Cross-Group Friendships.”
39. Bush and Houston, The Story of PEACE Learning.
40. NILGA, interview.
41. In 1995 the Clinton administration appointed George Mitchell as Special Envoy to Northern Ireland, who chaired a commission on disarmament and the negotiations that led to the Good Friday Agreement – see Arthur, Special Relationships.
42. EU Special Support Programme for Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland and the Border Region of Ireland. The four programmes ran consecutively for four-year periods from 1995, with the current fourth phase 2014–2020. To date EU PEACE has totalled almost 2.3 billion Euros, approximately £1.8billion. See Potter and Egerton The EU PEACE and INTERREG Programmes.
43. NILGA, interview.
44. Minogue, A Consumer’s Guide to Local Government.
45. Bush and Houston, The Story of PEACE Learning.
46. UK Government, Northern Ireland Act.
47. One example comes from Belfast City Council where they recently launched their first community plan, the Belfast Agenda, which brought community groups and stakeholders together to develop a vision 2035 for the city. Improved community relations are at the heart of the plan see Belfast City Council, The Belfast Agenda.
48. NILGA, interview.
49. Bush, The Limits and Scope.
50. Rotberg, Creating Peace in Sri Lanka.
51. Uppsala Conflict Data Programme, Armed Conflict Database.
52. Winslow and Woost, Economy, Culture and Civil War in Sri Lanka.
53. Goodhand, Klem, and Walton, “Mediating the Margins.”
54. However, to date there is little evidence of this – see Sarvananthan, “Elusive Economic Peace Dividend in Sri Lanka.”
55. For example, one local government initiative showed how community harmony outweighed need assessment during community allocation of a housing scheme (Bush, The Limits and Scope).
56. FSLGA interview.
57. World Bank, Sri Lanka: Fostering Inclusive Growth.
58. The impact was considered modest (World Bank, Project Performance Assessment Report).
59. FSLGA interview.
60. Ibid.
61. Zack-Williams, “Sierra Leone: The Political Economy of Civil War, 1991–98.”
62. Tangri, “Central-Local Politics in Contemporary Sierra Leone.”
63. Gaima, “Establishing the Legislative, Political, and Administrative Framework”; and, Jackson, “Reshuffling an Old Deck of Cards?”
64. Marc, Verjee and Mogaka, Responding to the Challenge of Fragility and Security in West Africa.
65. Kaldor and Vincent, Evaluation of UNDP Assistance to Conflict-affected Countries.
66. Amedzrator, Breaking the Inertia.
67. Zack-Williams, “Sierra Leone: The Political Economy of Civil War, 1991–98.”
68. Nickson and Cutting, “The Role of Decentralisation in Post-Conflict Reconstruction.”
69. Ministry of Local Government (MINALOC), interview.
70. Ibid.
71. Ibid.
72. e.g. GoBifo, piloted in the Bombali and Bonthe Districts, focused on strengthening trust, collective action, information sharing and communication exchanges, local groups and networks and social inclusion. It has delivered real benefits through the creation of local infrastructure and contributed to community cohesion see Casey, Glennerster, and Miguel, The GoBifo Project Evaluation Report.
73. Nickson and Cutting, “The Role of Decentralisation in Post-Conflict Reconstruction.”
74. CLGF, “The Local Government System in Sierra Leone.”
75. 3,956. See Centres for Disease Control and Prevention, 2014 Ebola Outbreak in West Africa.
76. Throughout the colonial period, the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan monarchy had been supported by colonial powers: first by the Germans and then by the Belgians after the First World War, see Newbury, “Ethnicity and the Politics of History in Rwanda”). The 1933 Belgian administered census was organised to classify all citizens as either Hutu, Tutsi or Twa, see Jean, The Rwandan Genocide.
77. MSU, Imagining Genocide.
78. United Nations, Rwanda: A Brief History of the Outreach Programme.
79. Curtis, “Development Assistance and the Lasting Legacies.”
80. Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, History of a Genocide.
81. RALGA, interview.
82. Hasselskog and Schierenbeck, “National Policy in Local Practice.”
83. Former Minster of Local Government Protasis Musoni in Haussman 2010, “Civil Service Interview 4.”
84. Timothy Longman (1995) shows through case studies of two neighbouring villages during the genocide that the violence was political in nature and dependant in large part on the local elites.
85. Ankut, The Role of Constitution-Building Processes in Democratization.
86. Musoni, How Decentralization Policy is Promoting Reconciliation.
87. Chemouni, “Taking Stock of Rwanda’s Decentralisation”; and Chemouni, “Explaining the Design of the Rwandan Decentralization.”
88. Scher, The Promise of imihigo; and McConnell, Institution [Un]Building.
89. The National Unity and Reconciliation Commission’s own report states that the commission has been ‘pivotal in the process of unity and reconciliation policy implementation, social trust and social cohesion towards the main goal achievement of building a united country’ (NURC National Unity and Reconciliation Commission).
90. The Government of Rwanda’s guiding policy is the 2007 National Policy of Unity and Reconciliation.
91. National Itorero, Commission Strategic Plan (2013–2017) Final Report; Musoni, How Decentralization Policy is Promoting Reconciliation; Nikuze, “The Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda”; Purdeková, Rwanda’s Ingando Camps; and Purdeková, Rwanda’s Ingando Camps.
92. Musoni, How Decentralization Policy is Promoting Reconciliation.
93. Niringiye and Ayebale, “Impact Evaluation of the Ubudehe Programme in Rwanda; and, Musoni, How Decentralization Policy is Promoting Reconciliation.
94. Kim et al., “Cattle Manure Management in Rwanda.”
95. Prior to 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, the proportions of the three Rwandan ethnic groups, Hutu, Tutsi and Twa were estimated at around 85, 14 and 1% respectively (see United Nations Rwanda) and these will have been significantly affected by the genocide, given that it is estimated that the genocide killed over half and possibly up to 70% of Tutsi in Rwanda (see MINALOC. The Counting of the Genocide Victims). In recent official census statistics however, ethnicity is not captured (http://microdata.statistics.gov.rw/index.php/catalog/65).
96. ‘Participants indicated that ethnic stereotypes are commonly expressed in everyday life, either openly or more secretly in the company of the individual’s family or relations from the same ‘ethnic’ background. Workshop participants pointed out that ethnicity shaped mind sets are still a challenge to the process of reconciliation. In its telling, Rwanda’s history is often distorted by different and diverging interests, yet trauma caused by such historical distortion is seen as a hindrance to reconciliation. Participants also spoke of the denial among many Rwandans of the facts of the genocide.’ (Uwimbabazi, Hajayandi, and de Dieu Basabos. Forums for Reconciliation in Rwanda. 4).
97. Buckley-Zistel, “Remembering to Forget.”
98. Williamson, “Genocide, Masculinity and Posttraumatic Growth in Rwanda.”
99. Scher, The Promise of imihigo; and McConnell, Institution [Un]Building; Gaynor, “Beneath the Veneer”; and Gaynor, Decentralisation, Conflict and Peacebuilding in Rwanda.
100. Purdeková, Rwanda’s Ingando Camps; and Purdeková, Making Ubumwe.
101. Ingelaere, “What’s on a Peasant’s Mind?”
102. This is seen in the lack of opposition in the recent presidential elections, August 2017, where Kagame is won 98.8% of the vote.
103. For example, property tax was recently devolved to local councils, but had to be recentralised to the Rwanda Revenue Authority when it became clear there was a lack capacity to manage property tax administration (MINALOC interview).
104. Michael Lipsky (Patterns of Democracy) has called this street-level bureaucracy.
105. The 1998 judgement by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda against the former mayor of Taba, Jean-Paul Akayesu, became the first to hold that rape constituted an act of genocide and a war crime as it was committed with the intent to destroy the Tutsi ethnic group (Samuel, Plight and Fate of Women).
106. Mcloughlin, “When Does Service Delivery.”
107. For an interesting example of how peace objectives and development objective are balanced see Bush, The Limits and Scope.
108. This is not the case in all multi-ethnic post-conflict countries. For example in Kosovo alongside the national Association of Municipalities of Kosova (AMK) there is also the Community of Serb majority Municipalities in Kosovo (ZSO). Such institutional separation contributes to policy fragmentation and weakens the voice of local government (Gjurgjeala and Malazogu, Local Government and Administration in Kosovo).
109. This can be seen in the UK Government’s recent agreement with the DUP and the condition that the power-sharing assembly is reformed. Concerns over managing the Ireland – Northern Ireland border following the UK’s exit of the EU and what this means for the Good Friday agreement are both significant risks to peace.
110. Gaynor, Decentralisation, Conflict and Peacebuilding in Rwanda.
111. Shah, The Paradox of ‘Hidden Democracy’ in Rwanda.
112. Ibid, 125.
113. Gaynor, “Beneath the Veneer.”
114. Faguet et al., “Decentralizing for a Deeper, More Supple Democracy.”