![Sample our Politics & International Relations journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5947/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Politics-International-Relations.jpg"})
Abstract
In the governance system under China’s unitary administration model, local governments not only have to undertake the overall administration responsibility for the regional development and stability, but also have to accept the professional and functional supervision of various departments of the central government. This compartmentalized management system creates an objective structural constraint on the system innovation of local governments. In a governmental administrative system where the two contrasting logical notions of hierarchical authority (known as a ‘kuai’) and administration based on function (known as a ‘tiao’) are combined, the biggest obstacle to the system innovation in local governance is protecting the interests of various internal departments under the ‘dual leadership’. To make a breakthrough in the systematic protectionism of interests, local leaders with keen determination to reform the governance system must take active initiatives, acquire more political resources, and give full play to new creative forces in order to implement corresponding system innovation in local governance.
Notes
Disclosure statement
The authors report no conflicts of interest. The authors alone are responsible for the content and writing of this article.
Notes on contributors
Xuefei Lin received a doctoral degree from Peking University in 2015, and now in a post-doctoral program at National Academy of Development and Strategy, Renmin University of China. Major research areas include organization and behavior of local government in China, deliberative democracy at the grassroots. Her most recent publications include ‘Organizational Learning among Governments and the Policy Reproduction: the Microscopic Mechanisms of Policy Diffusion—A Case Study on the Policy of City Grid Management,’ Journal of Public Management, 2015, 12(1); ‘When Local Governance System Meets Deliberative Democracy—Based on Case Study of “Deliberative Discussion” System Evolution in Wenling City,’ Journal of Public Management.
Xianglin Xu is Professor of Political Science at the School of Government, Peking University, and serves as the school's associate dean from 2006 to 2016. He holds B.A. from Peking University in 1982, and Master of Social Science in 1993 and Ph.D. of Political Science in 1995 both from University of California, Irvine. He is also a research fellow at the Institute of Political Development and Governance, at Peking University, Director Member of the Council at Chinese Association of Political Science, and Member of the Social Science Committee of the State Ministry of Education of the PRC. He was a visiting scholar at Boston University (2015), Kansai University (1999–2000), and Free University of Berlin (1999). His research interests include Chinese politics and the Chinese Communist Party, Chinese government and governance, and Chinese policy process. He is the author of numerous articles, author and co-author of Reason of Incremental Political Reform in China: Theory, Path, and Policy Process (2009); The Party, Government, and Society in the Process of Chinese Incremental Political Reform, (2004); Chinese Situation and Institutional Innovation, (2004); and Democracy, Political Order, and Social Change (2003).
Notes
1 Zhang, “Administrative examination and approval system reform”.
2 Mainly refers to two levels of government: the municipal and district (county), compared to the provincial and township (street), have relatively complete political power structures and independent financial structures, thus making them more autonomous and able to take stronger initiatives in performing their functions and supplying public goods.
3 Li and Lu, “The Model of Selective Split (Collective) Power in China”.
4 Liao, The Government's Self-Revolution.
5 Zhao, “Rational Considerations of China’s Administrative Examination and Approval System Reform”.
6 Pan, “Institutional Changes from Conflicts of Interest”.
7 Ran, “The Process, Problems and Trends of China's Reform”.
8 Li, and Liu, “The Dilemma and Reflection of China's Administrative Examination and Approval System Reform”
9 Chen, “Research on Discretionary Behavior in Administrative Examination and Approvals”.
10 Di, “The Legal Provisions of Discretion in Administration Examination and Approval System Reforms”.
11 Lv, “The Structure and Historical Changes of China's Administrative Examination and Approval System”.
12 Luo, “The Formation and Elimination of Non-administrative License Examination and Approvals”.
13 Ibid.; Beijing Municipal Government Legislative Affairs Office Research Group, “Review of the present situation and reform of administrative examination and approvals (Part 1)”.
14 Baum pointed out that ‘the transfer (transfer from the free market to the regulated economy) damages the citizens and consumers, since in order to create more consumption, there are things some officials think they should consume, they have to pay more taxes, pay a higher price, but they get less than what they really wanted’. Reprinted from: Lu, “Developments and Enlightenment From Deregulation From the United States”.
15 Yu, and Gao, “The Behavioral Logic and Institutional Foundation of the Local Development-oriented Government”.
16 Elkin and Soltan, A New Constitutionalism.
17 Xie, et al. Chinese Government System Analysis, 91.
18 Zhu and Zhang. “Criticisms of the Function-Responsibility Structure”.
19 Zhou, “From the ‘Huang Zongxi Law’ to the Logic of Empire”.
20 Zhou “The Transformation of Local Government Officials”.
21 Zhou and Liang, “Chinese Government’s Governance Model”.
22 In the strip-line system of government relations, there are different forms of vertical management: the first is the implementation of vertical management at the national level, including the number of ministries and state bureaus, such as the Ministry of Railways, the General Administration of Customs, and the State Administration of Taxation; and the ministries agencies in local governments, such as audit commissioner, provincial bureaus or regional and municipal investigation corps, etc.; second is the vertical management within the province, including the Local Taxation Bureau, land and resources management departments, etc.
23 Ma, “Tiao–kuai Relations in Government Management”; Zhou, “Research on Contemporary China’s “Tiao–kuai” Relations”.
24 Wang Kewen has found that for real estate development projects, there are upwards of 130 different fees (excluding 8 tax-related fees) from developing the land to completing the process of examination and approval, accounting for more than 15% of the cost of the entire real estate sales. This does not include all kinds of hidden costs the enterprise must pay to obtain administrative approval. He points out that the examination and approval authorities are highly combined with departmental interests. See also: Wang, “The Reform of Administrative Examination and Approval System in China and its Legal Regulation”.
25 Shen, “The New Path of the Reform for Administrative Examination and Approval Difficulties”.
26 Zhang, “Analysis of the Path of the Administrative Examination and Approval System Reform at The Grassroots Level Government”.
27 Ma, “Tiao–kuai Relations in Chinese Administrative Management,” 6.
28 A local cadres pointed out that ‘less examinations and approvals means less power, the department is smaller, and it is difficult to establish authority in the local area’. See also: Qian, “No Supervision After Leaving the Examination and Approval System?”.
29 Deng, “Historical Review and Theoretical Considerations of Shunde’s Reform and Development”.
30 Interview material from Shunde government official, citation from Xiao and Guo, “‘Governance Reform’ and Innovation of Local Governance Model”.
31 Huang and Chen, “Tracking and Investigating the Operational Effect of Local Department System Reform”.
32 According to the Guangdong Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China, Guangdong Provincial People’s Government on the Shunde Foshan District to Implement the Comprehensive Reform Experiment Work, Guangdong Commission (2009), Provision No. 35: ‘In addition to Party committees, Commission for Discipline Inspection, supervision, courts, prosecutors and based on the need for a unified and coordinated management of the city’s affairs, all other economic, social, cultural and other aspects of the transaction will be the exercise of Shunde district level city management authorities’.
33 According to a witness of the reform: ‘A year after the reform started to return, Shunde found complaints about the big ministry reform. First people complain, they think the way the department did things after the streamlining was not convenient, and then officials complained that the original administrative examination and approval was relatively stable, and that 16 changes were difficult to execute and supervise. For example, the Market Supervision Bureau was merged from nine departments, and there were obstacles in how to integrate nine sets of procedures and laws. At this time, the Shunde experience had been pushed for by provincial decision-makers to try out in twenty-five areas of the province. The Shunde's reformers felt enormous pressure, they were anxious, and asked how they could consolidate the major part of the reform’. Based on interview materials organized on January 8, 2016.
34 Yin, “Major Streamlining of the Shunde Administrative Examination and Approval System”.
35 Shunde's administrative examination and approval system reform to a large extent borrowed from the Hainan model. The reform of ‘three concentrations in three places’ is a little different from other later city's reforms. The latter was added to the online examination and approval system, referring to ‘the administrative examination and approval departments directed towards one department, undertaken by the municipal administrative service center (hereinafter referred to as “the center”), with centralized administrative approval on the e-government platform, in order to achieve approval service matters in the centralized place, authorization in one place, and supervision in one place’. See also: Li, “Deepening the Reform of the Administrative Examination and Approval System and Promoting the Construction of the Government by Law”.
36 As of September 2012, the city has 508,000 private economic entities, taking up 95% of the entire economy; private enterprises contributed about 70% of the city’s GDP, 76% of tax revenues, 54% of exports and 87% of social employment. See also “Ningbo Federation of industry and Commerce Research Office”
37 In 1999, the two plenary session of the Ten Session of the Committee on the then-governor pointed out that Ningbo, as a national pilot city, must carry out trial work immediately and to maintain it for half a year to produce results, and encouraged the province, and asked the provincial government departments to vigorously cooperate. See also: Internal materials “Ningbo City Examination and Approval System Reform Records,” 5, 11.
38 Based on the statistical data, from July 1999 to December 2000, at the end of the pilot reform, Ningbo’s administrative approval items from the pre-reform time of 1289 was reduced to 668, a decrease of 48.2%. Then, Ningbo continued to promote the deepening of reform from early 2001 to 2002 December, with 668 of the original reservations, an additional 65 in the interm period, and a further reduction of 281, a decrease of 61.7%. See also: Office of the Leading Group for Examination and Approval System Reform in Ningbo City, “Introducing the Examination and Approval System Reform in Ningbo City”.
39 See also: Hong, “A Theoretical Study on the Implementation of the Government's Reform Policy”.
40 Ningbo Municipal Government Documents, “On the Operation Plan of the Economic Development Service Hall in Ningbo City”.
41 He, “Game Theory Analysis of the Operation of the Administrative Service Center”.
42 Ningbo Municipal Committee of the Communist Party China Document, “On the Further Deepening of the Administrative Examination”.
43 According to interviews with relevant officials at the Ningbo Municipal Audit Office: ‘In 2010, the mayor visited the service and met a petitioner, who intended to apply to the Haibin bath house, but because of the fire problem, it was closed down for construction. At that time, the mayor proposed that approvals should be standardized. Functional departments say that our law enforcement is the norm, while the mayor said he wanted a comprehensive specification. If an industry application or business application needs fire protection, planning what conditions are necessary should be as clear as possible, we need a standard! Later, the municipal inspection office came to our administrative examination and approval service center, to explore how to create these standards. We referred to the principle of quality standardization: ‘unification, simplification, coordination, optimization’, and decided to carry out the standardization of reform’.
44 Taizhou’s industries include automobiles, motorcycles and accessories, the pharmaceuticals and chemical industry, plastic tools, household appliances and other pillar industries, with the emergence of private enterprises such as Qianjiang, Geely, Feiyue, SUPOR and other well-known brands.
45 Speech from director of the Taizhou administrative service center at the ‘Theory and practice of Chinese administrative examination and approval system reform’ forum, held in Taizhou on November 28, 2015.
46 The construction of the project’s phases and infrastructure projects are led by the development and reform department; technical improvement projects are led by the economic information department, and they must contact personnel from construction planning, environmental protection, civil defense, fire and other departments for comments or on-site surveys, in order to get limited pre-trial opinions or filings; construction planning permissions are led by the department of construction planning for water conservation and environmental evaluation, synchronization the residential buildings, energy saving, air defense, lightning protection and construction plan review and limited to review opinions; construction permits, led by the department of construction planning, require application materials submitted through the relevant procedures for the owners, construction planning departments must coordinate various departments synchronization for later procedures and the issuance of construction permits.
47 For planning purposes, clear industrial layout is relatively concentrated in the industrial park, with the park management agencies as virtual owners who are responsible for the uniform handling of geological or industrial general approvals, such as geological hazard assessments, mineral resource coverages, soil and water conservation plans of the project, and seven other project evaluation criterion. These procedures do not have to be repeated after obtaining the land.
48 For projects that have not acquired land but whose subject is relatively clear, the subject application may enter the simulation examination and approval system. The examination and approval departments, in accordance with the provisions of the materials submitted for substantive examination and public announcements, may issue a simulation approval documents. Once the land transfer procedures are completed and verified, the simulation and approval documents can be converted into formal documents.
49 Owen, Public Management and Administration.
50 Tang and Zhu, “The Basic Experience and Optimization Path of Administration Examination”.
51 Kingdon proposed a multi-source public policy operation flow pattern. Ideas flowing from the social agenda into the political agenda is a complex process; the situation and problems need to be combined at the origin, while the political origin and policy origin represent an open policy window. The adjustment of key personnel will lead to the transformation of the political agenda, which was reflected in the case. See also: Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies.
52 Former Guangdong provincial Party secretary Wang Yang emphasized while on a field visit, ‘What was proposed to Shunde requires further two-directional support, involves approval from the provincial examination and approval entity, and encourage them to try first…. Although the province does not have authority, the implementation of the new rules does not affect the performance of their duties, so the province agrees to accept the responsibility, agrees to allow you to try first; anything that may influence the performance of duties, influence the effect of decentralization, the provincial Central Committee will give assistance’. See also: Wang, “Speech from Listening to Shunde’s Recent Reform Developments and Work Report on Next Steps”.
53 Zhang, “Political Elite Coalition and Local Administrative Reform in China,” 277–291.
54 Huang, “The Standardization Construction of Administrative Examination”.
55 Wu and Sun, “The Dilemma and Development of China's Public Administration Service Center”.
56 Chen, et al., “The Innovation Behavior of Local Government Administrative Examination”.
57 Zhang, “The “Leverage Effect” in the Grass-roots Administrative Examination and Approval System Reform”.
58 Interview materials from government official in Taizhou’s administrative service center. November 20, 2015.
59 This formulation was proposed for the ‘dual track’ economic system reform of the 1980s, and refers to the ‘new system, old base’ concept of developing system components. It argues for changing components of the new system gradually, with continuous improvement of the economic structure and institutional environment, and incrementally improving the old system.” See also: Fang, “The Characteristics of China's Economic System Reform,” taken from: Wu, “Gradual and Radical,” 11.
60 Heilmann, “The Grading System Policy Experiment in China's Economic Boom”.
61 According to one of the respondents participating in the Shunde trial design: Shunde was invited scholars who developed reform programs and conducted in-depth interviews for 20 days in Hainan, to gain an in-depth understanding and grasp of the Hainan pilot experience, and thus the development of Shunde trial scheme’s numerous institutional arrangements copied the Hainan model. Interview materials from January 8, 2016.
62 Lin, “Intergovernmental Organization Learning and Policy Reproduction”.
63 Yang, “Double-track Policy Experiment”.
64 Xu, “The Party Cadres Under the System of Grassroots Democracy Trial Reform,” 111.
65 Interview materials from relevant official at the Taizhou examination and approval office. December 11, 2015.
66 Ibid.
67 Lieberthal and Oksenberg, Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures, and Processes.
68 Mertha, “Fragmented Authoritarianism 2.0,” 995–1012.
69 Wang and Fan, Chinese Consensus Decision-Making.
70 Zhou, “From the ‘Huang Zongxi Law’ to the Logic of Empire”.
71 Mertha, “China's “soft” Centralization,” 791–810.