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Abstract
In the Xi Jinping era of rising central power and reduced local autonomy, is there still room for policy experimentation? If any, what is the nature of this innovative behavior? This article argues that the party state still allows much room for policy innovation, only that this space for innovation is conditioned by the Party’s concern for political control. Drawing on original field research, the article examines two cases of the Chinese Communist Party’s innovation in personnel management, with a particular focus on reforming the Performance Evaluation System (PES) to better incentivize cadres to fulfill work targets. The analyses of the systemic changes of the PES resulting from the Party’s innovation efforts as well as the nature of such changes show that despite the Party’s tireless efforts to reinvent the PES regime so as to better motivate cadres to fulfill work targets, these efforts are undermined at the same time by the Party’s pursuit of bureaucratic stability, personnel control, and grip on power. The research seeks to bring findings about the PES into more meaningful conversations with the scholarship on policy innovation and experimentation.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 Li. Chinese Leadership in the Xi Jinping; Fewsmith. “The 19th Party Congress”; Economy. The Third Revolution.
2 Heilmann. “Policy Experimentation in China’s Economic,” 1–26; Heilmann. Red Swan; Heilmann and Perry. “Embracing Uncertainty,” 1–29.
3 The two terms of “experimentation” and “innovation” are used interchangeably in this article, unless specified otherwise.
4 Heilmann. Red Swan; Teets et al., “The Incentive to Innovate?” 505–517.
5 See, e.g. O’Brien and Li (1999, 172) call the system “cadre responsibility system” whereas Chan and Gao (2008, 4) and Gao (2015a, 618) refer to it as “the target-based responsibility system.”
6 Kinkel and Hurst. “The Judicial Cadre Evaluation System,” 939; Manion. “The Cadre Management System, Post-Mao,” 203–233.
7 Whiting. “The Cadre Evaluation System at the Grass,” 109–112.
8 Chan and Gao. “Performance Measurement in Chinese Local,” 4–9; O'Brien and Li. “Selective Policy Implementation in Rural China,” 167–186; Edin. “State Capacity and Local Agent,” 35–52; Gao. “Pernicious Manipulation of Performance Measures,” 618–637; Heberer and Trappel. “Evaluation Processes, Local Cadres,” 1048–1066; Heimer. “The Cadre Responsibility System,” 122–138; Minzner. “Riots and Cover-Ups,” 53–123; Liu and Li. “Divergence and Convergence in the Diffusion of Performance,” 630–654; Wang. “Reassessing the Performance Evaluation System,” 59–77; Whiting. Power and Wealth in Rural China; See note 7 above; Kinkel et al. “The Judicial Cadre Evaluation System,” 933–954.
9 Bulman. Incentivized Development in China; Whiting. Power and Wealth in Rural China.
10 Edin. “State Capacity and Local Agent,” 35–52; see note 7 above.
11 O'Brien and Li. “Selective Policy Implementation in Rural China,” 167–186; Ahlers and Schubert. “Strategic Modelling,” 831–849.
12 Minzner. “Riots and Cover-Ups,”: 53–123; Kinkel and Hurst, “The Judicial Cadre Evaluation System,” 933–954.
13 Wang, “Using the Performance Evaluation System,” 389–410.
14 For definition of policy innovation, see Gobel and Heberer, “The Policy Innovation Imperative,” 286.
15 See, for example, economic reform and development [Rawski, “Implications of China’s Reform Experience,” 1150–1173; Mukand and Rodrik, “In Search of the Holy Grail,” 374–383; Heilmann,“Policy Experimentation in China’s Economic,” 1–26; Heilmann, “Maximum Tinkering under Uncertainty,” 450–462], tax reform (Wang, “Principle-Guided Policy Experimentation,” 38–57) and financial reform (Zeng, “Did Policy Experimentation in China,” 338–356), land management (Heilmann, “Policy Experimentation in China’s Economic,” 1–26; Cai, “Flying Land,” 60–83), building a new socialist countryside (Perry, “From Mass Campaigns to Managed,” 30–61; Ahlers and Schubert, “Strategic Modelling,” 831–849), health care (Heilmann, “Policy Experimentation in China’s Economic,” 1–26. Wang, “Learning through Practice and Experimentation,” 102–137; Husain, “Policy Experimentation and Innovation as a Response,” 1–13), the media (Zhao, “Sustaining and Contesting Revolutionary Legacies,” 201–236) and civil society (Dillon, 2011. “Governing Civil Society,” 138–164; Farid, “China’s Grassroots NGOs and the Local State,” 117–140), legal reform (Liebman, “A Return to Populist Legality?” 165–200) as well as local governance (Fewsmith, “The Elusive Search for Effective Sub-County,” 269–296; Teets and Hurst, “Introduction,” 1–24; Teets et al., “The Incentive to Innovate?” 505–517) and central-local dynamics (Chung 2011), to name only a few.
16 Wang, “Conducting Fieldwork and Interviews: Researching China's Performance Evaluation System”; Greitens and Truex, “Repressive Experiences among China Scholars.”
17 Mei and Pearson, “Diffusion of Policy Defiance among Chinese,” 25–41; Kennedy and Chen, “Election Reform from the Middle,” 154–173.
18 Gobel and Heberer, “The Policy Innovation Imperative,” 283–308; Heilmann and Melton, “The Reinvention of Development Planning,” 580–628; Teets et al., “The Incentive to Innovate?” 505–517.
19 Gobel and Heberer. 2017. “The Policy Innovation Imperative,” 283–308.
20 Heilmann, “From Local Experiments to National Policy,” 1–30.
21 Teets and Hurst, (eds.), Local Governance Innovation in China, 154–173.
22 Zeng, “Did Policy Experimentation in China,” 338–356.
23 Gobel and Heberer, “The Policy Innovation Imperative,” 283–308.
24 See note note 22 above.
25 See note note 21 above.
26 Bulman. Incentivized Development in China; Edin, “Remaking the Communist Party-State,” 11; Minzner, “Riots and Cover-Ups,” 53–123.
27 Heimer, “Field Sites, Research Design,” 58–77.
28 Gao, “Performance Measurement and Management in the Public Sector,” 86–96.
29 Baicker and Jacobson, “Finders Keepers,” 2113–2136; Muralidharan and Sundararaman, “Teacher Performance Pay,” 39–77.
30 O'Brien and Li, “Selective Policy Implementation in Rural China,” 170.
31 Chan and Gao. “Performance Measurement in Chinese Local,” 6,7.
32 Gao, “Hitting the Target but Missing the Point,” 56S–76S.
33 Zhou, “Governing China’s Local Officials,” 36–50.
34 Xiangshan County Target Management Evaluation Office, “The 2018 Target Management”; For scholars doing field research, it is worth noting that I was fortunate to receive a copy of this collection through an official at the local county PES office which serves as the liaison apparatus for all PES work of the county. But usually, my experience suggests that such comprehensive PES dossiers with extremely detailed and lengthy instructions can be difficult to come by because of the sheer number of various evaluations that are formulated by respective government or party units in charge of appraising certain areas of work. Instead, more openly available PES documents at official government websites are often brief and individual evaluations.
35 Kinkel and Hurst, “The Judicial Cadre Evaluation System,” 933–954; Wang, “Using the Performance Evaluation System,” 389–410.
36 Gong’an County PES Leading Group, “Notice on Releasing Four 2016 PES Implementation.”
37 Kaiping District Party Committee Leading Group on Comprehensively Deepen Reform, “Notice on Evaluation Methods on the Work.”
38 Nanping Township Party Committee Office and Township Government Office, “Notice on Releasing the Methods for Nanping.”
39 Interview with a township official, Gong’an county, Hubei, 18 June 2016.
40 See note 30 above.
41 Nanping Township Party Committee Office and Township Government Office, “Notice on Releasing the Methods for Nanping.”
42 See note 36 above.
43 Gong’an County PES Leading Group, “Notice on Releasing Four 2015 PES.”
44 Interview with a township official, Gong’an county, Hubei, 16 June 2016.
45 Xiangshan County Party Committee and County Government, “Suggestions on Implementing the 2018 Annual Target,” 6.
46 Xiangshan County Target Management Evaluation Office, “The 2018 Target Management.”
47 Xiangshan County Party Committee and County Government, “Suggestions on Implementing the 2017 Annual Target.”
48 Interview with the party boss and organization committee director (zuzhi weiyuan 组织委员) of a township in Xiangshan county, Zhejiang, 12 June 2017.
49 Multiple interviews with a party school scholar of Xiangshan county, June 2017 and June 2019.
50 Changyang County Party Committee Office and Changyang County Government Office, “Notice on Releasing the 2015 Annual Evaluation.”
51 See note 36 above.
52 Interview with a township official, Nanping, Hubei, 13 July 2016.
53 Interview with a township official, Nanping, Hubei, 18 June 2016.
54 Interview with a township official, Yangjiachang, Hubei, 16 June 2016.
55 Interviews: county PES official, Gong’an, 12 June 2016 and 1 June 2017; township official, Yangjiachang, 16 June 2016; township official, Nanping, 18 June 2016.
56 See note 36 above; Gong’an County PES Leading Group, “Notice on Releasing Four 2019 PES.”
57 While it is debatable about the intention of the Party for reserving discretion for the political leadership and what constitutes the best method to assess performance between quantitative measurement and subjective discretion, addressing this debate, however, is beyond the scope of this research and deserves another study equipped with evidence focusing on this issue.
58 Interview with a county official, Hubei, 28 May 2019.
59 See note 6 above.
60 Edin. “State Capacity and Local Agent,” 41–42; See note 7 above.
61 Burns and Zhiren, “Performance Management in the Government,” 1–34; Burns and Xiaoqi, “Civil Service Reform in China,” 58–78.
62 Interviews: standing deputy county government head, township deputy party secretary, and village party secretary, Xuan’en, Hubei, 2 June 2017; county official, Gong’an, Hubei, 28 May 2019.
63 Interview with a township official, Zhengzhuangzi, Hebei, 19 June 2017.
64 Chinese Communist Party Central Committee General Office and State Council General Office, “Notice on Releasing the Suggestions on Establishing.”
65 Xinhuanet.com, “The Decision by the National People’s Congress.”
66 Gov.cn, 2019. “Chinese Communist Party Central.”
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
70 Interviews: county official, Gong’an, 16 June 2016; township official, Yangjiachang, 16 June 2016; township official, Xuan’en, 2 June 2017.
71 See note 32 above; Heberer, Heberer and Trappel. “Evaluation Processes, Local Cadres,” 1048–1066.
72 Interviews: PES official, Fuyang, Anhui, 19 June 2014; municipal official, Yichang, Hubei, 8 July 2014; PES official of Changyang, Hubei, 8 July 2016.
73 Interview with a PES official, Fuyang, Anhui, 19 June 2014.
74 Interview with a municipal official, Yichang, Hubei, 8 July 2014.
75 Changyang County Party Committee Office and Changyang County Government Office. Notice on Releasing the 2015–Working Methods.”
76 Interview with PES officials, Dandong Neighborhood, Zhejiang, 5 June 2019.
77 Gong’an County PES Leading Group, “Notice on Releasing the Implementation Methods”; See note 43 above.
78 See note 36 above.
79 Interviews with a PES official, Gong’an, Hubei, 12 June 2016 and 1 June 2017.
80 Interview with county Organization Department officials, Lixin, Anhui, 12 June 2014.
81 Nanping Township Party Committee Office and Township Government Office, “Notice on Releasing the Methods for Nanping.”
82 See note 41 above.
83 Interview with township officials, Huangbi’ao, Zhejiang, 12 June 2017.
84 Interview, 12 June 2017.
85 Xiangshan County Target Management Evaluation Office, “Notice on the Results for 2016 County Target.”
86 Interview with a county party school scholar, 3 June 2019.
87 Manion. “The Cadre Management System, Post-Mao,” 203–233..
88 Interviews: county official, Gong’an, Hubei, 9 June 2016 and 28 May 2019; municipal official, Shanghai, 20 June 2019.
89 Zhu et al., “Eating, Drinking, and Power Signaling,” 337–352.
90 Xinhuanet.com, “The Central Discipline Inspection Commission.”
91 Interview with a county party school official, Xiangshan, Zhejiang, 9 June 2017.
92 Interview with a township official, Zhengzhuangzi, Hebei, 19 June 2017.
93 Interview with a township official, Zhengzhuangzi, Hebei, 19 June 2017.
94 Heilmann, “Policy Experimentation in China,” 1–26.
95 Heilmann and Perry, “Embracing Uncertainty,” 1–29.
96 Bell, The China Model.
97 Nathan, “Authoritarian Resilience,” 6–17; Shambaugh, China’s Communist Party.
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Zhen Wang
Zhen Wang received her Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Minnesota, Twin Cities in 2013. Her research and teaching interests include Chinese and East Asian politics, and comparative politics. Her current research examines the adaptability of the Chinese Communist Party with a particular focus on its institutions of personnel management, especially the Performance Evaluation System. She has published articles in The China Quarterly, East Asia: An International Quarterly, and Chinese Political Science Review as well as a methodological case study at SAGE Research Methods Cases and a book review in the American Journal of Chinese Studies. Wang also holds a Master’s degree in Public Administration from Northern Arizona University and a B.A. in English Language and Literature from the University of International Relations (Beijing, China).