The dilemma of violence

Figures & data

Table 1. The estimated effects of expansion in size on violence using NAVCO data.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	LPM	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit
Expansion in participation (lagged)	−0.048***	−25.279**	−25.279**	−25.278**	−25.277**
	(0.02)	(10.95)	(10.94)	(10.94)	(10.94)
Expansion in participation^2 (lagged)	0.006***	2.935**	2.935**	2.935**	2.935**
	(0.00)	(1.32)	(1.31)	(1.31)	(1.31)
Size (lagged)	0.010	1.794*	1.794*	1.794*	1.794*
	(0.01)	(1.07)	(1.07)	(1.07)	(1.07)
Size decrease (lagged)	0.005	1.963*	1.963*	1.963*	1.963*
	(0.01)	(1.13)	(1.14)	(1.14)	(1.13)
Repression (lagged)	−0.014	−2.671	−2.671	−2.670	−2.670
	(0.03)	(2.15)	(2.14)	(2.14)	(2.15)
Democracy (lagged)	−0.032	4.077	4.077	4.077	4.077
	(0.03)	(2.65)	(2.67)	(2.67)	(2.65)
Goal (lagged)
significant institutional reform	0.020	−15.416**	−15.416**	−15.418**	−15.417**
	(0.04)	(6.73)	(6.74)	(6.74)	(6.74)
policy change	−0.242	−33.484*	−33.484*	−33.483*	−33.481*
	(0.19)	(17.23)	(17.23)	(17.22)	(17.22)
territorial secession	0.003	−0.543	−0.543	−0.543	−0.543
	(0.04)	(1.52)	(1.51)	(1.51)	(1.52)
greater autonomy	−0.041	6.995**	6.995**	6.997**	6.997**
	(0.03)	(3.25)	(3.24)	(3.25)	(3.26)
anti-occupation	0.051	−5.815**	−5.815**	−5.814**	−5.814**
	(0.05)	(2.69)	(2.69)	(2.69)	(2.69)
Hierarchical structure (lagged)	−0.000	2.472**	2.472**	2.472**	2.472**
	(0.02)	(0.98)	(0.99)	(0.99)	(0.98)
Intercept	0.999***	17.671*	17.671*	17.761*	17.760*
	(0.14)	(9.69)	(9.67)	(10.12)	(10.14)
N	939	806	806	806	806
adj. R-squared	0.472
Log-likelihood		−18.715	−18.715	−18.715	−18.715
Robust	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Nonviolent cubic spline	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Location-Fixed Effect	Campaign			Campaign
Time-Fixed Effect	Year	Year	Year	Year	Year
Cluster	Country	Country	Campaign
Multilevel				Campaign	Country Campaign

Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table 2. The estimated effects of expansion in size on violence using MDMV data.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	LPM	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit
Expansion in participation (lagged)	−0.810**	−9.188***	−9.188***	−5.289**	−5.289**
	(0.35)	(2.37)	(2.49)	(2.11)	(2.26)
Expansion in participation^2 (lagged)	0.507**	4.875**	4.875**	2.506**	2.506***
	(0.19)	(2.21)	(2.38)	(1.09)	(0.96)
Size decrease (lagged)	−0.076***	−1.447***	−1.447***	−0.591***	−0.591***
	(0.01)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Size (lagged)	0.162	3.430*	3.430**	2.082*	2.082*
	(0.20)	(1.76)	(1.40)	(1.21)	(1.21)
Repression (lagged)	0.036*	1.136***	1.136***	0.398***	0.398***
	(0.02)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.15)
Intercept	1.100***	3.549***	3.549***	5.865***	5.865***
	(0.02)	(1.30)	(1.21)	(1.21)	(1.04)
N	18,939	18,789	18,789	18,789	18,789
adj. R-squared	0.067
Log-likelihood		−4450.38	−4450.38	−3783.81	3783.81
Robust	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Nonviolent cubic spline	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Location-FE	Movement			Movement
Time-FE	week	week	week	week	week
Cluster	Republic	Republic	Movement
Multilevel				Movement	Republic Movement

Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Figure 1. The marginal effects of expansion in size on violent dissent with 90% confidence intervals using NAVCO dataset (a) and MDMV dataset (b)

Figure 2. The predicted probabilities of violent dissent at different levels of expansion in size with 90% confidence intervals using NAVCO dataset (a) and MDMV dataset (b).