The power of a promise: whom do governments’ security justifications convince to accept surveillance?

Figures & data

Table 1. Final linear mixed effect random coefficient model.

Corresponding Hypotheses		Random coefficient model (linear mixed effects)
H1	Security-justification	0.216*** (0.051)
H2	Government support = yes × security-justification	0.002 (0.035)
H3	Political orientation × security-justification	−0.022 (0.066)
H4	Level of liberal democracy × security-justification	0.175* (0.087)
	Government support = yes	0.116** (0.039)
	Political orientation (left-right)	0.225*** (0.055)
	Level of liberal democracy	0.109 (0.119)
	Age	0.102*** (0.024)
	Gender = female	−0.012 (0.017)
	Education = low	reference category
	Education = medium	−0.038 (0.020)
	Education = high	−0.085*** (0.024)
	Terror legacy	0.327** (0.106)
	Intercept	2.228*** (0.050)
	Level 1 variance (σ2)	0.053*** (0.006)
	Level 2 variance (τ2)	0.763*** (0.020)
	Level 3 variance (φ2)	0.158*** (0.009)
	Random slope Frame dummy	0.851*** (0.013)
	N	44886
	Number of respondents	22443
	Number of countries	29
	AIC	170.451
	BIC	205.298
	ICC	0.419
	Log Likelihood	−81.225
	Degrees of Freedom	12

Stacked data set; Robust standard errors in parentheses

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Figure 1. Attitudinal differences depending on presence of justification.

Figure 2. Predictive margins of interactions of justification dummy and explaining variables.¹⁴