Last place aversion, labour market competition or welfare state model? Explaining anti-immigrant sentiment in Hungary with a conjoint experiment

Figures & data

Table 1. The hypotheses tested in this paper, the conjoint features (attributes) operationalizing them and their respective formal tests.

Hypothesis	Variables	Expectation
Last-place aversion	Device	Respondents without phone and computer will prefer refugees who also does not possess either of these devices
Last-place aversion	Cash	Respondents with max. 100,000 HUF will prefer refugees without any cash more
Last-place aversion	Education	Respondents with 8 years of primary education will prefer refugees who did not finish elementary school
Labour market competition	Education	Subgroup differences between respondents (same versus different educational attainment as fictive refugee profile)
Welfare state model	Education	Refugees with low levels of educations (8 years of primary or less) will be disliked

Figure 1. Average marginal component effects.

Figure 2. Marginal means.

Figure 3. Differences in marginal means between respondents who are last with respect to education (i.e. finished elementary school only) and those who are not.

Figure 4. Differences in marginal means between respondent groups, distinguished by being last (i.e. earning a monthly salary of max. 100,000 HUF) and not last based on their income level.

Figure 5. Differences in marginal means between respondents who possess the same level of education as fictive refugees and respondents with either more or less schooling.

Figure 6. Unadjusted (raw) marginal means indicating preferences for skill/education level of refugees.