Asian views of China in the age of China’s rise: interpreting the results of pew survey and Asian student survey in chronological and comparative perspectives, 2002-2019

Figures & data

Figure 1. Favorable Views of China: 2002–2019 (%).

Note: Number shows percentage of those who answered that their view of China is“favorable” (“very favorable” and “somewhat favorable” combined)

Source: Pew Research Center, Global Attitudes Survey.

Figure 2. Standard Deviation in Views of China: 2005–2017.

Source: Pew Research Center, Global Attitudes Survey.

Figure 3. Correlation between Views of US and China: 2005–2017.

Note: Figure shows Pearson’s correlation coefficient between evaluation of influence from US and evaluation of influence from China

Source: Pew Research Center, Global Attitudes Survey.

Table 1. Evaluation toward China’s Growing Economy

“Overall do you think that China’s growing economy is a good thing or a bad thing for our country?”
		Good thing	Bad thing	Don’t know	Refused
Japan	2006	67.7%	28.3%	4.0%
	2010	62.7%	28.1%	8.7%	0.4%
	2011	60.0%	33.0%	7.0%
	2013	48.3%	38.7%	13.0%
	2017	54.0%	34.2%	11.8%
South Korea	2010	45.2%	49.0%	5.8%
	2014	57.7%	36.0%	5.7%	0.6%
	2017	45.9%	48.1%	5.2%	0.7%
Vietnam	2014	21.5%	71.7%	6.4%	0.4%
	2017	27.9%	64.0%	7.9%	0.2%
Indonesia	2005	69.5%	23.4%	6.7%	0.5%
	2010	60.8%	27.6%	11.6%
	2011	62.5%	25.0%	12.5%
	2013	53.5%	33.4%	13.0%	0.1%
	2014	56.3%	27.3%	15.9%	0.5%
	2017	52.1%	33.7%	14.0%	0.2%

Source: Pew Research Center, Global Attitudes Survey.

Table 2. Evaluation toward China’s Growing Military Power

“Overall do you think that China’s growing military power is a good thing or a bad thing for our country?”
		Good thing	Bad thing	Don’t know	Refused
Japan	2006	3.2%	93.4%	3.4%
	2010	4.1%	88.7%	6.6%	0.6%
	2011	6.6%	88.0%	5.4%
	2013	2.1%	95.7%	2.1%
	2017	3.5%	91.2%	5.3%	0.1%
South Korea	2010	7.6%	86.3%	5.9%	0.1%
	2017	4.2%	92.9%	2.3%	0.7%
Vietnam	2017	4.3%	90.7%	5.0%
Indonesia	2005	60.1%	27.8%	11.8%	0.3%
	2010	40.9%	39.4%	19.7%
	2011	47.4%	31.5%	20.6%	0.5%
	2013	35.8%	38.3%	25.0%	0.9%
	2017	32.7%	47.7%	19.6%

Source: Pew Research Center, Global Attitudes Survey.

Table 3. Asian Student Survey: Second to Third Wave

Country	University	Date of Research		Sample Size
		Second Wave	Third Wave	Second Wave	Third Wave
Japan	Univ. of Tokyo	2013.10.1–11.15	2019.4.26–7.12	230	211
	Waseda Univ.			234	235
South Korea	Seoul National Univ.	2013.9.30–10.4	2018.10.2–2019.1.31	345	203
	Korea Univ.			395	262
China	Peking Univ.	2013.10.1–10.8	2018.9.15–12.12	200	207
	Tsinghua Univ.			200	203
	Fudan Univ.	2013.9.15–10.25	2018.9.18–10.1	200	216
	Shanghai Jiaotong Univ.			200	245
Vietnam	Vitnam National Univ. Hanoi	2013.9.17–9.25	2018.10.3–11.22	270	230
	Vitnam National Univ. HCMC			261	230
Singapore	National Univ. of Singapore	2013.10.1–11.30	2018.10.1–11.30	321	200
	Nanyang Technological Univ.	– –		– –	200
Indonesia	Univ. of Indonesia	2014.11.30–2015.3.17	2018.9.14–9.24	200	206
	Gadjah Mada Univ.			200	201

Source: Sonoda, Ajia no kokumin kanjo [National Sentiments in Asia], 254–255.

Table 4. Asian Views of China’s Influence: 2013–2019

		Good	Rather Good	Hard to Say	Rather Bad	Bad	Don’t Know
Japan	2013	2.8%	17.4%	18.3%	38.3%	17.4%	5.9%
	2019	7.1%	40.1%	26.8%	20.7%	2.7%	2.7%
South Korea	2013	3.3%	36.6%	18.0%	32.3%	5.6%	4.2%
	2018	1.1%	28.8%	13.4%	39.0%	14.5%	3.2%
Vietnam	2013	1.9%	11.0%	16.7%	32.6%	31.1%	6.6%
	2018	2.9%	17.4%	28.4%	32.3%	15.6%	3.5%
Singapore	2013	5.9%	40.9%	23.1%	23.1%	3.8%	3.1%
	2018	12.8%	49.6%	19.9%	12.3%	1.5%	3.8%
Indonesia	2014	23.5%	41.5%	18.8%	11.8%	3.0%	1.5%
	2018	27.8%	44.4%	5.3%	16.4%	4.0%	2.0%

Source: Asian Student Survey.

Table 5. Chinese View of Asia’s Influence: 2013–2018

		Good	Rather Good	Hard to Say	Rather Bad	Bad	Don’t Know
Japan	2013	2.1%	13.2%	21.5%	38.0%	19.1%	6.1%
	2018	7.2%	39.6%	25.4%	22.0%	2.5%	3.4%
South Korea	2013	3.3%	27.6%	44.0%	16.4%	2.0%	6.8%
	2018	2.6%	24.1%	40.9%	22.0%	2.3%	8.1%
Vietnam	2013	0.6%	6.6%	41.9%	27.4%	6.1%	17.3%
	2018	1.5%	8.9%	48.4%	18.9%	2.3%	19.9%
Singapore	2013	9.3%	51.5%	27.3%	2.8%	0.6%	8.5%
	2018	8.7%	48.3%	30.7%	3.4%	0.8%	8.1%
Indonesia	2013	1.1%	12.2%	41.3%	23.5%	4.0%	17.9%
	2018	1.6%	13.8%	49.0%	11.4%	1.5%	22.7%

Source: Asian Student Survey.

Table 6. Political Instability Frame: 2013–2019. “In spite of rapid economic growth, China is politically unstable.”

		Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Don’t know
Japan	2013	35.3%	50.0%	5.0%	1.1%	8.7%
	2019	18.1%	56.4%	17.4%	0.9%	7.2%
South Korea	2013	24.6%	50.5%	13.0%	0.5%	11.3%
	2018	31.2%	47.1%	12.7%	1.1%	8.0%
Vietnam	2013	12.8%	41.3%	23.2%	2.8%	19.8%
	2018	22.0%	45.5%	12.3%	2.6%	17.6%
Singapore	2013	9.7%	48.4%	25.6%	1.3%	15.0%
	2018	7.3%	36.9%	34.3%	3.0%	18.4%
Indonesia	2014	11.5%	49.3%	20.0%	0.5%	18.8%
	2018	8.5%	38.7%	22.7%	1.7%	28.4%

Source: Asian Student Survey.

Table 7. Increasing Opportunity Frame: 2013–2019. “The rise of China offers us a lot of opportunities.”

		Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Don’t know
Japan	2013	5.0%	35.1%	37.3%	8.2%	14.3%
	2019	8.4%	40.2%	33.3%	3.9%	14.2%
South Korea	2013	10.7%	54.0%	20.8%	2.1%	12.5%
	2018	9.5%	52.1%	22.5%	5.0%	11.0%
Vietnam	2013	3.8%	31.8%	37.7%	12.3%	14.4%
	2018	5.5%	35.8%	33.4%	8.4%	16.8%
Singapore	2013	16.3%	66.1%	8.5%	0.9%	8.2%
	2018	27.5%	60.1%	8.1%		4.3%
Indonesia	2014	14.3%	61.5%	19.8%	1.5%	3.0%
	2018	17.1%	55.3%	19.8%	1.5%	6.3%

Source: Asian Student Survey.

Table 8. Global Threat Frame: 2013–2019. “The rise of China has been threatening the global order.”

		Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Don’t know
Japan	2013	9.3%	44.4%	34.4%	2.2%	9.7%
	2019	8.6%	39.5%	44.0%	2.3%	5.6%
South Korea	2013	9.4%	40.9%	37.0%	3.5%	9.1%
	2018	7.5%	49.1%	26.7%	5.4%	11.2%
Vietnam	2013	14.2%	41.3%	30.6%	3.2%	10.8%
	2018	16.5%	48.8%	19.1%	3.3%	12.3%
Singapore	2013	6.5%	39.9%	43.9%	1.9%	7.8%
	2018	9.3%	36.0%	42.3%	3.5%	8.8%
Indonesia	2014	9.3%	32.3%	50.3%	3.8%	4.5%
	2018	7.3%	35.8%	44.1%	2.5%	10.3%

Source: Asian Student Survey.

Table 9. Peaceful Rise Frame: 2013–2019. “China will maintain her peaceful relations with Asian countries in spite of her rise.”

		Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Don’t know
Japan	2013	2.4%	11.5%	50.2%	16.7%	19.3%
	2019	1.8%	19.5%	54.1%	8.6%	16.1%
South Korea	2013	1.5%	17.1%	43.6%	8.7%	29.1%
	2018	1.5%	16.8%	41.7%	13.1%	26.9%
Vietnam	2013	2.8%	9.4%	41.7%	35.3%	10.8%
	2018	5.3%	20.7%	45.6%	14.1%	14.3%
Singapore	2013	5.3%	44.5%	19.6%	2.8%	27.7%
	2018	7.3%	39.8%	26.3%	3.3%	23.3%
Indonesia	2014	13.8%	58.5%	11.5%	1.0%	15.3%
	2018	8.0%	53.2%	16.9%	3.2%	18.7%

Source: Asian Student Survey.

Table 10. Determinants of Evaluation of China’s Influence: Second Wave

	Japan	South Korea	Vietnam	Singapore	Indonesia
(Constant)	2.68	2.79	3.91	5.87	3.53
X1 Political instability frame	−1.46	−1.60	−0.13	−3.25	−0.15
X2 Increasing opportunity frame	1.99	6.52	2.38	2.59	2.72
X31 Global threat frame	−1.77	−1.61	−2.28	−2.18	0.41
X32 Peaceful rise frame	3.83	2.46	−0.19	3.48	4.06
X41 Personal connection with Chinese	2.30	0.64	0.48	−0.26	2.01
X42 Chinese proficiency	2.26	1.65	−0.89	−2.06	−0.15

Note: Bold shows values of statistical significance.

Source: Asian Student Survey.

Table 11. Determinants of Evaluation of China’s Influence: Third Wave

	Japan	South Korea	Vietnam	Singapore	Indonesia
(Constant)	4.06	3.59	2.02	4.65	2.22
X1 Political instability frame	−2.87	−2.50	−1.84	−2.57	−1.48
X2 Increasing opportunity frame	3.54	4.38	1.35	3.36	1.06
X31 Global threat frame	−0.48	−3.13	0.08	−0.21	−0.60
X32 Peaceful rise frame	3.68	4.30	2.52	3.45	3.23
X41 Personal connection with Chinese	0.90	2.64	1.10	0.55	2.09
X42 Chinese proficiency	−0.11	1.34	0.10	−0.25	−1.77

Note: Bold shows values of statistical significance.

Source: Asian Student Survey.