Ideology, Society, and the Origins of Nuclear Power in Japan

Abstract

In light of events at the Daiichi nuclear plant, this article discusses the origins of nuclear power in Japan. These origins lie in a confluence of forces: strategic, economic, and cultural. Drawing inspiration from the work of Antonio Gramsci, the article considers the operation of these forces through a historical lens, with an emphasis on Japan's transition from feudalism to capitalism; the emergence of imperialism and ultranationalism; the postsurrender occupation of Japan by the United States; and the post-Occupation debate over nuclear power. Gramscian analysis highlights key roles of both the state and civil society in the promotion of science and technology as a tool of economic growth and as a symbol of national autonomy. The article suggests that, despite the Fukushima tragedy, Japan will continue to develop its nuclear industry for many years to come. This is the case not only because of ongoing strategic concerns and the power of the “nuclear village” but also because the ideology of techno-nationalism is deeply ingrained within and throughout Japanese society.

Keywords:

• Japan
• United States
• nuclear power
• Antonio Gramsci
• Marxism
• ideology
• political economy

Notes

 1 In regard to antinuclear movements in East Asia, see Sulfikar 2009, Chen 2011, and Hong 2011. For contrasting post-Fukushima approaches in Europe, see Office of the Prime Minister 2012 and Jahn and Korolczuk 2012.

 2 The classic account in English of the development of Japan's energy sector is Samuels 1987.

 3 Japan's “nuclear village” is defined by Kingston (2013: 201) as “pro-nuclear advocates, including utilities, bureaucrats, politicians, journalists, and experts.” Samuels (2013: 118) asserts that “nuclear village” has become “undoubtedly the most widely embraced metaphor in Japan's post-3.11 discourse.”

 4 Including, of course, the struggle for emancipation from Japanese imperial control (Jasanoff and Kim 2009).

 5 Samuels 1994: x defines techno-nationalism as “the belief that technology is a fundamental element in national security, that it must be indigenized, diffused, and nurtured in order to make a nation rich and strong.” Nakayama 2012 advocates moving away from this term so as to account for the more open, less state-driven process of technological diffusion from Japan throughout East Asia in the postwar era. I use techno-nationalism in this article simply because much of the empirical material is drawn from the earlier period, and because nuclear power can be viewed as both a civilian technology and a military technology.

 6 The literature is vast. A very good recent contribution is Thomas 2009.

 7 The word pacifism is emphasized because of the debate in the literature regarding the question of pacifism in postwar Japan. The debate hinges on the implications of the security umbrella provided by the United States and the peculiar form and understanding of “pacifism” that results. See Bamba and Howes 1978 and Izumikawa 2010.

 8 The literature on the transition from Tokugawa to Meiji is vast. A recent Marxist account of this process and its outcomes is Allinson and Anievas 2010. In what follows I draw upon a number of accounts, primarily Norman 1973, Westney 1987, Smith 1988, and Morris-Suzuki 1994.

 9 On Japan's prewar nuclear research, see Dower 1996.

10 From the outset, the privately funded Japan Atomic Industrial Forum spent hundreds of millions of yen every year on its campaign to garner public support for commercial nuclear power (Samuels 1987: 236).

11 Japan's urban population tripled in size between 1945 and 1970 (Francks 2009: 154).

12 In 1955, 166,000 televisions were either in use or licensed in Japan; by 1960 there were almost 7 million. The corresponding figures for West Germany were 2,000 and 4.5 million (Tipton 2002: 158).

13 It was not until the end of the 1960s that almost all Japanese households possessed the “three sacred treasures” (black-and-white television, washing machine, and refrigerator) (Francks 2009: 175, 230).

14 For a detailed autopsy of the incident, see Swenson-Wright 2005: chap. 5.

15 The bulk of the material in this paragraph is from Osgood 2006: 162–66.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Dominic Kelly

Dominic Kelly is associate professor in the Department of Politics and International Studies at the University of Warwick, UK. He is the author of Japan and the Reconstruction of East Asia (2002), coeditor (with Wyn Grant) of Trade Politics in the Twenty-First Century (2005), and coeditor (with Gavin Kelly and Andrew Gamble) of Stakeholder Capitalism (1997). He is currently researching in the areas of trade politics and the political economy of nuclear power.