The politics of transnational accountability policies and the (re)construction of corruption: The case of Tunisia, Transparency International and the World Bank

Abstract

This study explores the intersection between accountability policies and anti-corruption measures. Transnational actors define acceptable governance and implement accountability policies on the assumption that corruption is a problem endemic to developing countries. Such accountability policies influence and help constitute transnational geographic and social spaces. However, the impacts of such assumptions and the resultant policies on developing countries and their citizens have not been widely investigated. This study uses a critical discourse analysis of the case of Tunisia before and after its 2011 revolution, to explore the politics and vested interests specific to anti-corruption policies promoted by transnational actors. The study’s contribution is twofold: Firstly, we identify the highly fungible character of the emanant cycles of Western-driven corruption discourses, and indicate their consequences in Tunisia. Secondly, we propose a future research agenda towards non-exploitative anti-corruption and accountability policies.

Keywords:

• Transnational accountability
• Anti-corruption
• Tunisia
• Post-colonialism
• World Bank
• Transparency International

Notes

1 From the two largest parties in Tunisia; the Islam-oriented Ennahdha Party and the ‘secularist’ Nidaa Tounes Party, as well as the economically and socially liberal party Afek Tounes.

2 The question of whether religious identity impacts attitudes towards corruption (Iqbal & Lewis, 2002) and accountability (Lewis, 2001; Lewis, 2006) is important and under-researched, but beyond the scope of the current article.

3 FAQ − Frequently Asked Questions.

4 These are: a) the African Development Bank Governance (AFDB, 2011) ratings; b) the Bertelsmann Foundation Transformation Index (BTI, 2012); c) the Political Risk Services Country Risk Guide (PRSCRG); d) the World Economic Forum Executive Opinion Survey (WEF, 2011); e) the World Justice Project Rule of Law Index (RLI, 2012); f) the Economist Intelligence Unit Country Risk Guide (EIU, 2013); and g) the Global Insight Country Risk (GICR, 2013) ratings.

5 International Financial Institutions.

6 The WB’s arguments on democracy and accountability draw in part on contested interpretations of WB’s Articles of Agreement that prohibit the organization from interfering in the politics of member states (Article IV, Section 10), and mandate the organization to engage with countries only via their Treasuries and Central Banks (Article III, Section 2). See IBRD (1989) and Woods (2000).

7 Tunisian Economic Observatory.