Legislatures: Help or hindrance in achieving successful crisis management?

Abstract

Legislatures have the potential to influence the politics and policies of crisis management. As such, they deserve analytical treatment from those interested in the effectiveness of state-led efforts to resolve crises. However, determining and evaluating the extent of a legislature's involvement in a crisis management process is a complicated research endeavour. The purpose of this article is to reduce this complexity by presenting a research framework that can be used for the analytical and evaluative exploration of legislatures in relation to crisis management. As the framework unfolds, insights are generated about how the interaction between politics and policy affects crisis management performance, and the ways in which interpretations of ‘success’ and ‘failure’ are constructed subjectively by crisis actors. Emerging from the framework is an argument that assessments of institutional performance must be cognizant of the ‘normative pluralism’ that characterises contemporary crises.

Keywords:

• Legislature
• Parliament
• Crisis management
• Governance
• Success and failure
• Research framework

1 Introduction

Regardless of their specific characteristics and qualities, all legislatures perform at least one crucial function within democratic states. As the embodiment of the electoral process and the centrepiece of constitutional principle, the legislature constitutes the source of legitimacy and authority for government actors, authorities and their policies. While the range and effectiveness of legislature functions varies greatly from country to country, the indispensable need for legitimacy ensures that, constitutionally at least, the national assembly tends to represent ‘the sun around which every planet revolves’ (Bogdanor, 1999, p. 1). In the context of this special edition the unique position that the legislature holds within a liberal-democratic system can be seen to be especially important because these institutions, more than any other, span the nexus between policy and politics. What this means is that a legislative assembly has the potential to influence government success or failure either as a policy relevant institution, with the capacity to affect authoritative decision making or, alternatively, as a political institution with the capacity to influence evaluations of policy enacted elsewhere. Consequentially, the study of legislatures can enhance our understanding of crisis management success or failure by shedding light on certain functions, which can influence pre-event planning, impact on the performance of state-led crisis responses, or shape the ways in which those responses are judged.

Despite the potential relevance of legislatures to understanding policy success and failure, we still know very little about them in relation to crisis management. Representative assemblies are usually referred to incidentally by crisis scholars, as a footnote within research concerned with other crisis management issues or as passive institutions – neutral parts of the empirical landscape rather than units of analysis worthy of any sustained attention. As such, legislatures appear frequently in crisis literature but have never been examined substantively by crisis scholars in their own right. Hence the national legislature presents something of a neglected puzzle, which if unlocked can provide novel insights about how crisis management performance can be studied and ultimately improved. However, solving the puzzle is not straightforward; determining whether representative institutions are a help or hindrance in this policy area is a difficult task given the partial nature of those crisis studies that do refer to them and the lack of existing research that focuses on them exclusively.

The primary purpose of this article, therefore, is to draw together and synthesise relevant crisis and parliamentary literatures in order to construct a generic research framework, which can facilitate insights about the performance of a legislature in relation to crisis management generally. More specifically, the article presents three forms of heuristic guidance. First, it provides a means through which researchers can initially prioritise certain legislature functions as units of analysis, based upon the degree of policymaking influence invested in elected representatives. Second, a series of representative functions are outlined, and their relevance to specific crisis contexts examined, so that researchers can select and review those legislature competences that are most applicable to their own agenda. While these two sections draw attention towards specific analytical foci, they are largely silent on the issue of evaluation. The question still remains; how can we tell if a legislature's involvement in a crisis episode has been a help or hindrance? The article addresses this issue in its penultimate section through an exploration of the ‘normative pluralism’ and ‘expectations’ of actors vis-à-vis crisis management, which it is argued, influence (and differentiate) the ways in which legislature performance will be evaluated. These three components are brought together and presented below in a single diagram. The model's initial purpose is to act as a ‘road map’ for the reader but, ultimately, its design is meant to encourage the researcher to gauge the policymaking influence of the legislature; match specific functions to the characteristics of a crisis, and; explore the expectations of three ideal-types of crisis actor (see Fig. 1 ).

2 Prioritising units of analysis: policymaking and policy supporting functions

Before engaging in any substantive investigation, researchers are first advised to broadly gauge the nature of the legislature's influence in relation to policymaking. As the model highlights, this is a necessary and practical departure point because it allows certain legislature functions to be initially prioritised over others as units of analysis.

Fig. 1. Framework for studying legislature involvement in crises.

If uncertainty exists about the policymaking influence of a specific institution, guidance can be found in comparative legislative research. Within this literature the provenance of most works can be traced back to three canons that can be applied to analyses of legislature power regardless of political system. First, Blondel's (1973) framework, which demands a focus on the policymaking constraints placed upon a legislature, including constitutional restraints (variations in ‘official’ institutional powers), internal constraints (time allocated to procedures, political and technical competence of members and staff, committee structure) and external constraints (executive characteristics, leadership qualities and nature of parties). Second, Polsby's (1975) continuum that stretches between two ideal types – ‘transformative’ assemblies (which have the ability to make policy independently) and ‘arenas’ (which exist primarily as forums for political debate and engagement). Categorising legislatures within this spectrum involves assessing the nature of the parties within the institution in terms of management and majority voting control. Finally, Mezey's (1979) seminal classification system which is, in part, developed via an assessment of a legislature's ability to constrain the policymaking influence of an executive through formal and informal legislative veto powers.

The lineage of these models can be seen clearly within contemporary assessments of the policymaking power of legislatures (Maurer, 1999; Norton, 1998; Park, 2002). However, their importance to the framework being developed here is that they allow the crisis analyst, interested in the role of legislatures during uncertainty, to prioritise the relevance of policymaking or policy supporting functions to analyses of crisis management, through three analytical questions. Thus the research framework begins with an assessment of the policymaking constraints of a legislature; the way in which a legislature can constrain an executive's policy power, and; the nature of parliamentary parties and voting behaviour, which all leads to an estimation of the policy relevance of the representative institution in question. If it is determined that the legislature is capable of producing or significantly influencing policy outputs on a regular basis, the researcher is advised to give priority to policymaking functions. However, if it is determined that the policymaking power of an assembly is relatively weak, crisis scholars must recalibrate the analytical focus towards legislature functions that are relevant to political and policy support dynamics. These support functions may not influence the formulation of crisis policy but they are nevertheless extremely important because of their ability to affect the politics of a crisis episode, the legitimacy of specific actors and agencies, and the ‘front-line’ implementation of strategic decisions.

Before moving on two important points must be made. First, a reiteration: in no way should it be construed that legislatures with more policymaking power will play a more substantial role in the management of crises. There is no normative argument being presented here about the relative value of either type of function. Consequentially, assessments of policymaking influence should not lead to the exclusion of any functions from analytical treatment. The process is about prioritising rather than discarding units of analysis. These points must be borne in mind as we explore each function in more detail below.

3 Policymaking functions

It would appear to be intuitively correct to claim that the policymaking functions of a legislature do not sit comfortably with the requirements of effective crisis management. Crisis literature teaches us that the modern crisis episode demands collective decision making under time pressures within conditions of high uncertainty (Rosenthal & Kouzmin, 1997). Within such contexts, the protracted, deliberative and partisan character of legislative lawmaking does not appear to be particularly conducive to crisis resolution. However, a more nuanced analysis of the characteristics of crises, the mechanics of crisis management and the nature of legislatures reveal that in actual fact there can be a role for elected representatives in this regard. Three potential functions are discussed below.

3.1 The legislative function

Elected representatives have the opportunity to affect the production and content of legislation designed to resolve crises. At one extreme can be found Polsby's transformative assemblies, which will be able to control the creation and production of legislation independently. At the other extreme, the most emasculated assemblies are unlikely to affect the content of legislation but will still perform an important role in terms of legitimation. In the majority of cases, however, the legislature's ability to affect crisis policy will materialise through the scrutiny and amendment of executive proposals.

In the pre-crisis stages of crisis management a role exists for the legislative function in terms of the formal delineation of crisis response frameworks, such as the United Kingdom's Civil Contingencies Act (2004) or the Stafford Act in the United States. Such frameworks may, inter alia, empower specific agencies, crystallise jurisdictions and reflect the principles that should guide contingent crisis responses. The influence of elected representatives in relation to statutory preparedness measures is likely to be modest, centring on their ability to scrutinise bills within the legislative process. Moreover, the creation of preparedness legislation is also likely to result in the legislature limiting its own role in future crisis responses through the abdication of authority to new forms of technology, different institutions or alternative tiers of governance. Nevertheless, such frameworks can become a crucial element in the success or failure of crisis management efforts. One would expect, for example, that the existence of a statutory framework would expedite the operational aspects of crisis resolution. However, this is not always the case. As Farber and Chen's (2006) analysis of disaster legislation in relation to hurricane Katrina highlights, contradictions between federal and state disaster law exacerbated inertia in the crucial days and hours before the hurricane and hampered the federal government's ability to ‘push’ its way fully into many operational aspects of the crisis response.

Legislation also has a role to play in the emergency phases of crisis management. In the most extreme cases, the legislative function can often be used to delegate extraordinary powers to an executive. Hence the legislative function can be used to concentrate and expand the legislative powers of an executive so that it can issue emergency decrees, suspend laws or institutions, censor information or even derogate from constitutional principles in the name of crisis resolution. Despite the constitutional importance of parliamentary approval, assessments of emergency powers during states of emergency indicate that the legislature's input into emergency legislation tends to be minimal, particularly when the threat posed by a crisis is grave. The need to ‘rally round the flag’ in the most extreme adversity, the concomitant absence of party politics and the fact that the executive arm is structurally more suited to crisis management can ensure the legislative function is often reduced to a symbolic, supporting role in the most dire circumstances (Gross & Ní Aoláin, 2006, p. 64). However, other analyses show that government responses to crises in advanced democracies often rely upon ordinary legislation. Studies of national security crises (Ferejohn & Pasquino, 2004) and economic crises (‘t Hart & Tindall, 2009), for example, highlight how recent anti-terror legislation and attempts at market stimulus have both been initiated through normal legislative instruments. Indeed, for Ferejohn and Pasquino (2004), the need to facilitate policy support when a threat is uncertain ensures the continuing centrality of the legislative process, precisely because of its legitimating quality. In turn, this centrality has meant a greater role for many legislatures in terms of recognising emergencies in the first instance; scrutinising the implementation of crisis law, and; providing the funds for ongoing crisis responses (Ferejohn & Pasquino, 2004, p. 210).

3.2 Parliamentary accountability and crisis policy

What we can immediately claim about the post-crisis period is that strong policymaking legislatures are likely to play a role in post-crisis inquiries and, as a consequence, drive policy reforms and successions. In such situations the legislative and accountability functions of a legislature combine. For example, the Scottish Parliament scores well on Blondel's and Mezey's frameworks as set out in section one. In the wake of the Scottish exam crisis, the Parliament's committees were recognised officially by the Scottish Executive for providing the impetus for reform, for crystallising and communicating public views to the Executive, and for delivering a number of recommendations that underpin components of the SQA Act (2002), which reformed the Scottish exam system (Scottish Executive, 2002). However, to a large extent, the degree of uncertainty and complexity that characterises the crisis episode will have a bearing on the ability of elected representatives to shape any reform process. If a crisis emerges from recognisable problems, particularly those that have a clear political or policy orientated character, there is a greater likelihood of legislature involvement in the reform process. In these situations representatives will be on terra firma and capable of making informed judgements. Conversely, in the wake of more ‘post modern’ crises caused, for example, by scientific innovation or epidemiological risks, parliamentary forms of accountability tend to give way (or are forced to cede) to expert inquiries.

The analysis of accountability mechanisms should not be restricted to the post-crisis period. Strategies for ‘horizon scanning’ require mechanisms that span organisational, sectoral and social boundaries. This provides an a priori indication that elected representatives, acting as conduits between social and political systems, can be sensitive to emerging forms of disruption. The existence of specific scrutiny processes that regularly examine the political and policy landscape can enhance this role. Hence an argument can be made that parliamentary scrutiny mechanisms can identify vulnerabilities and, depending on the strength of the legislature, facilitate more effective preparedness measures. Evidence of this function in operation does exist. For example, the 2000 fuel crisis in the United Kingdom was caused by the direct action taken by hauliers and farmers who blockaded fuel refineries across the UK, protesting at high fuel costs. In July 2000, two months before the blockades began, a House of Commons select committee published a report which made reference to the feeling of unrest within the haulage industry, which was at that point beginning to manifest in a ‘vigorous campaign… which included attempts to disrupt the flow of traffic in cities and towns, and on motorways’ (HC 296, 2000, para. 1). However, the utility of this function does depend on the capacity of the legislature to then influence preparedness measures. It is interesting to note that only weeks after the Commons committee was ignored, ministerial announcements were emphasizing how ‘lives were at risk’ due to the disruptions in public services caused by that crisis (BBC, 13 September 2000).

3.3 ‘Issue escape’ and crisis decision making

Several crisis scholars are united by the claim that crises, as agents of high uncertainty, temporarily loosen the control of dominant political institutions and actors (Alink & Boin, 2001, p. 289; Boin, ‘t Hart, Stern, & Sundelius, 2005, p. 69; ‘t Hart, 1993, p. 41). These works can be compared to parliamentary and policy studies that also examine how political issues sometimes ‘escape’ from the normal parameters of a policy process, leading to temporary increases in the influence of a legislature (Judge, 1993; Packenham, 1990; Smith, 1991). For example, one analysis of the relationship between policy communities and the Westminster Parliament stresses how the legislature's relevance to policy development can increase when the political context is characterised by fluid and uncertain relationships, contestation and issues that are value laden or ideological (Judge, 1993, p. 126). Judge's cases show that when the policymaking climate becomes unstable, issues can ‘escape’ from the normal bureaucratic confines of a policy community into the public sphere and, consequentially, legislatures can become important as a forum for affected interest groups wishing to influence legislation. During these periods of uncertainty, the Commons was used in attempts to ensure that specific policy details, lost at the formulation stage, were ‘rediscovered’ via bill scrutiny and then reinserted into legislation or recognised in the final stages of policy initiation. Other parliamentary studies, such as Robert Packenham's seminal analysis of the Brazilian Congress, have also highlighted how legislature's can be turned to during periods of political uncertainty. Packenham's research showed that when Brazil found itself in the grips of a coup or on the precipice of revolution, the legislature was relied upon to find ways out of apparently intractable constitutional situations. What Packenham records, therefore, are crisis characteristics forcing issues out of the hands of military and political elites who, under normal circumstances, restrained the legislature's authority. More contemporary examples of ‘issue escape’ and subsequent legislature influence over crisis decision making can often be found in testimonies within post-crisis inquiries. For example, the narratives of those involved in the 2001 Foot and Mouth epidemic in the United Kingdom indicate how one of the most contentious decisions taken during that crisis – the decision to impose a ‘blanket’ closure of rural footpaths – was a reaction to the ‘mood’ of the national parliament, that was in turn being lobbied intensely by farming groups (HC 888, 2002, p. 69; Annex, 26 April, para. 39).

Ultimately, what all the above shows is that the factors that lead to issues escaping from normal policymaking processes are the same as those that characterise modern crisis episodes. Thus if high uncertainty encourages a loosening of executive control, extreme value conflicts, and instability within a policy community, a legislature may be invigorated, either as a site for increased interest group activity or as a venue for the formulation of extraordinary crisis management solutions.

4 Policy support functions

Legislatures can also perform policy support functions that can be relevant to the management of crises. Easton's classic distinction between ‘authoritative’ and ‘associated’ political outputs is instructive here as a means of understanding what is meant by policy support functions (Easton, 1965, p. 354). Authoritative outputs are essentially public policies – they are a means through which a political system allocates values and distributes resources. Associated outputs, however, are transactions or exchanges between a political system and its environment that influence the acceptance or rejection of policy. Thus the importance of associated outputs relates to a capacity to mobilise or erode support for authoritative action.

4.1 Parliamentary accountability and crisis framing

In many crises the significance of a legislature's accountability mechanisms will be overlooked if researchers only seek to connect them to specific examples of policymaking. Scrutiny processes can also act as conduits for political forms of crisis communication. In this regard, accountability mechanisms can be seen as potent mediums for crisis ‘framing’, which typically involves ‘the purposeful utilization of crisis-type rhetoric to significantly alter levels of political support for public office-holders and public policies’ (Boin, McConnell, & ‘t Hart, 2009, p. 83).

Assessments of the political construction of certain crises often refer to parliamentary accountability mechanisms (Alink & Boin, 2001; Brändström & Kuipers, 2003; Boin & ‘t Hart, 2003). Consider, for example, Brändström and Kuipers (2003) analysis of how ‘normal incidents’ become politicised into crises. Here parliaments are not only mentioned as potential venues for ‘blame games’ generally (Brändström & Kuipers, 2003, p. 282) but are also recognised empirically as institutions that can play an initial role in the ‘construction of severity’ (Brändström & Kuipers, 2003, p. 293) and the allocation of responsibility once a crisis has been defined into existence (Brändström & Kuipers, 2003, p. 301). Other works have also noted how ‘symbolic outputs’ are often communicated as acute operational crisis responses are engaged. Parliamentary accountability mechanisms are referred to by these scholars as mechanisms capable of providing reassurance during the uncertainty of crises (Boin & ‘t Hart, 2003, pp. 546–548; Byztek, 2008, p. 91) or as rituals ‘endowed with special symbolic meaning…[which] shape and conform to public perceptions of grave disturbances’ (Boin et al., 2005, pp. 84–85). Finally, like the lesson learning function explored above, the most obvious place to examine accountability mechanisms as framing conduits is the post-crisis period. References to parliaments are plentiful within post-crisis studies, suggesting they can play a role in a collective framing process that will affect the fate of actors and authorities (Olmeda, 2008, p. 65; Preston, 2008, p. 52; Staelraeve & ‘tHart, 2008, p. 150). For example, Preston's (2008, p. 51) study of the blaming process in the aftermath of hurricane Katrina's mismanagement, explicitly argues that the republican controlled Congress managed to insulate senior members of the republican controlled White House from the ‘lion's share of the blame’. However, it is worth underlining the fact that parliamentary accountability mechanisms are not perfect in terms of crisis communication: they are limited and their effectiveness depends on a number of variables (see Staelraeve & ‘tHart, 2008, p. 150), particularly amplification by media outlets. Only when a crisis provokes significant and sustained media interest will parliamentary mechanisms be potent framing tools.

4.2 Conflict management functions

The popular characterisation of crises as periods of conflict (Boin et al., 2005, p. 58; Rosenthal, ‘t Hart, & Kouzmin, 1991, p. 213) allows for the suggestion that legislature functions could play a conflict management role during a crisis episode. For example, parliaments can act as cathartic ‘safety valves’, which can allow those affected by crises to purge anxieties and ‘let off steam’. Political authorities cannot accede to the demands of all interests, sometimes not even partially, but the ability of a representative assembly to publicly air such demands can have a number of positive effects. Classic forms of parliamentary research, for example, indicate that the ability of a legislature to give excluded groups a voice within a political system can influence their attitudes to direct action or political violence (Jewell & Patterson, 1973, p. 10). Moreover, the tension levels of those affected by unpalatable or authoritarian crisis management measures can develop into policy resistance, which could be alleviated if citizens are allowed the opportunity to express their emotions in an appropriate setting. The representation of crisis victims during periods of post-crisis inquiry also provides another cathartic outlet. The ability of representative channels to allow victims to express opinion, and gain recognition, can have implications for the type of politics characterising the aftermath of any emergency.

Deliberative processes may also enable representative assemblies to play a conflict management role. Quite simply, represented and representative attitudes could be changed by deliberation in ways which moderate the political conflicts gravitating around a crisis response. This supposition is bolstered by theoretical and empirical literature on deliberation, which state that the assessment of differing positions and the formulation and articulation of alternatives can shape preferences and reconcile divergent views (Rosenberg, 2007; Steiner, Bächtiger, Spörndli, & Steenbergen, 2004). Where many stakeholders are involved in a crisis response conflict is likely and it is in such contexts that deliberative mechanisms can play a role. Allowing stakeholders the opportunity to participate directly or to gain representation in decision making deliberations could reduce levels of acrimony. However, the partisan nature of representative assemblies must once again be taken into account when conducting analyses of this function. If preferences are being modified through deliberative processes, they are perhaps more likely to be changed in a way that mirrors the partisan nature of party political life within a legislature. In these situations, political conflicts could be entrenched and polarized rather than reduced.

4.3 Localised constituency roles

Crises can often impact across large geographical areas, which means that the constituency roles that individual elected representatives perform can be pertinent to crisis resolution because parliamentarians can act as ‘transmission belts’ (Norton, 2005, p. 183) or ‘two-way channels of communication’ (Rush, 2005, p. 251), who connect their constituents to political and bureaucratic leaders.

For example, ‘errand running’ is a rather pejorative description of the constituency casework role performed by representatives (Dogan, 2007, p. 430; Mezey, 2008, p. 85). The literatures relating to casework, spanning several countries, indicate how elected representatives are a recognisable and regularly used channel for the resolution of individual grievances during normal periods and that elected representatives increasingly view this role as important (Heitshusen, Young, & Wood, 2005, p. 39; Norton & Wood, 1993, pp. 147–153; Russell & Bradbury, 2007, p. 98). During the uncertainty of a crisis, therefore, particularly one spanning a large timeframe and geographical area, the errand running function may be crucial to those affected as it offers a clear, accessible and perhaps exclusive route between constituent and crisis manager. Errand running parliamentarians might also be used to evaluate the effects of contingently made decisions and ongoing crisis policy by providing crisis leaders with feedback about their efforts. Crisis responses must be extremely sensitive to feedback from those affected because the suddenness and unpredictability of many situations reduces the opportunity for consultation, meaning that crisis responses must be constantly informed by positive or negative feedback ‘signaling both the functionality and legitimacy of the standing arrangement’ (Boin et al., 2005, p. 54). Errand running parliamentarians could assist crisis managers by providing feedback from the ‘front line’ because, as one US study notes, they are ‘theoretically the most sensitive to the feedback of information regarding changes in the environment produced by outputs of the political system… Most of the “hollering” will be directed at them’ (Grumm, 1972, p. 268).

Representatives are also capable of mobilising local support for government authorities and their actions. Legislative scholars in the US, for example, document how representatives can mobilise support for federal policy by explaining, justifying, interpreting and even adjudicating on policies within their communities (Beer, 1990, pp. 78–80; Fenno, 1978, p. 162; Mezey, 2008, p. 39). Other studies of the constituency work of parliamentarians have also recorded how individual representatives can facilitate acceptance by providing citizens with authoritative explanations of policy (Norton, 2005, p. 191) or by acting as ‘policy advocates’ (Searing, 1985, p. 353). Hence the local representative may have the potential to mobilise local consent for the effective implementation of centrally created crisis policy. This capacity should not be underestimated. Many crisis responses require acceptance or active support from those affected. If attempts to resolve crises become controversial or unpalatable, their success or failure may depend entirely on the degree of support that can be generated for them.

Reflecting upon the exclusive character of representation, commentators have highlighted how legislatures are capable of ‘insulating’ government authorities from the vagaries of public opinion (Manin, 1997; Wood, 1991). These works intimate that representatives can insulate or protect crisis managers from unhelpful forms of constituency communication during a crisis episode. The value of the local representative in this regard relates to a potential ability to alleviate pressure from crisis managers so that they can focus on resolving the immediate problem. Pressure could be alleviated in two ways. First, representatives could act as ‘lightning rods’ (Ellis, 1994), meaning that they become the focus of emotional outbursts from affected constituents. The idea behind the ‘lightning rod’ function is that parliamentarians attract and absorb expressions of emotion from constituents on behalf of crisis managers but do not communicate them onward. A second way in which representatives could alleviate pressure off a crisis response is by acting as a ‘gatekeeper’ or ‘filter’ through which constituent demands have to travel before arriving at a crisis manager. A representative may, for example, communicate one single message onwards after they have been contacted by several constituents with the same complaint. Ultimately, the value of these functions should be felt within the state's crisis management machinery through the alleviation of demands.

5 The evaluation of legislature functions

There should be no doubt that evaluating success or failure within any system of governance is a complex task. The literatures on policy evaluation expose a researcher to a multitude of philosophical, methodological and analytical conundrums that reflect some of the most fundamental questions within political science. Should policy be seen in rational terms and measured through positivist modes of analysis? Must we concede instead that success or failure will always lie in the eye of the beholder and that all evaluative processes are ‘constructed’? How can we capture methodologically the multiple outputs, outcomes and unintended consequences of government action? It would be unwise, within the scope and aims of this article, to attempt to tackle all of the issues raised by such questions. The focus must be restricted here to the performance of legislatures’ vis-à-vis crisis management. Unfortunately, the complexity of the evaluative task does not reduce when examining specific crisis management initiatives or the related role of representative institutions. Hence we must be careful about proposing a definitive answer to the question of how legislatures should be evaluated, not least because such an attempt would also have to accurately pre-empt the specific nature of future research agendas. It is perhaps wiser to agree with the counsel of Bovens and ‘t Hart (2004, p. 149) when they argue that the role of policy science in the evaluative process should be less about creating objective measures of success and more about facilitating a wide ranging, reflective dialogue between different perspectives and criteria. In acknowledgement of this, a more exploratory discussion is presented here, which is centred around the challenge of assessing parliamentary functions with the capacity to produce multiple outcomes. Emerging from this discussion is an argument that an understanding of the variegated expectations of crisis actors is essential in any assessment of legislature success or failure.

It has been recognised for some time that systems of governance can produce outputs that can be evaluated in different ways. Bovens et al.’s distinction between ‘programmatic’ and ‘political’ evaluation, for example, has been operationalised in analyses of crises to show how (Bovens, ‘t Hart, & Peters, 2001, p. 20):

Programmatic success or failure is one thing, the political legitimacy of programmatic decisions quite another. The programmatic and political levels need not correlate… successful indicators at the programmatic level may easily be followed by indicators proving high controversy, even ‘scandals’, and obvious political failure. Or vice versa: something which is definitely a programmatic failure may never attract the attention of the media, the population or important political actors. (Albæk, 2001, p. 466, original emphasis)

Programmatic and political assessments can also be applied to legislatures. Doing so unmasks the fact that one single legislature function can simultaneously produce two outcomes of varying relevance to a crisis response. When we factor in Marsh and McConnell's (2010) third evaluative dimension – the success or failure of policy processes – the problem only exacerbates further. The cathartic function, for example, is ostensibly a representative process through which a political outcome is achieved, yet it is also a function that can lead to better programmatic performance by reducing resistance to policy implementation. Moreover, different degrees of success or failure can exist between process, programme and political dimensions at any one time (McConnell, 2010, p. 55). Hence one legislature function can be the subject of a complicated and overlapping series of evaluations, which means that we cannot place a function unequivocally into a programme, process or political ‘box’ and then evaluate it accordingly.

An alternative process that offers more analytical purchase is to first identify the expectations of the most important actors in a crisis episode and then to determine how the activities of a legislature facilitate or frustrate them. Here we might return to Bovens and ‘t Hart's (2004, p. 150) discussion of ‘normative pluralism’ in the evaluation process and their argument that:

In making sense of controversial policies, multiple and different types of norms and standards of evaluation will be deemed relevant by different groups of stakeholders. Within but certainly between different national or subnational political and administrative systems, important variations in value configurations may be found, without the policy analyst being able to make an authoritative choice in favor of one or the other configuration.

This brings us to the core of the evaluative dilemma. Within all crisis responses we can observe many actors who each have different value configurations and evaluative criteria for judging success or failure. As Bovens and ‘t Hart argue, the challenge is not to preference one set of values over another but to understand the whole gamut of contrasting positions. If we can make sense of the normative pluralism in a crisis and relate the expectations of actors to legislature involvement, the need to classify specific functions in terms of process, programme or political outcomes can be circumvented. However, matching expectations to representative functions still allows institutional effectiveness to be evaluated in a way that recognises subjectivity, multiple crisis audiences and criteria, and the multi-faceted nature of parliamentary outputs. As a guide to this process, three ideal types of crisis actor are set out below alongside a discussion of each type's potential expectations from a state-led crisis response. The question of how a legislature can frustrate or facilitate these expectations is used to draw out insights about how these institutions will be evaluated by each group.

5.1 Crisis manager expectations

Obviously we have to acknowledge that the label ‘crisis manager’ is being used here to capture a diverse range of actors who may not always act in a collegiate fashion. Nevertheless, it is still possible to define a group of important individuals ‘inside’ the machinery of a government-led response who share some common features. Hence front-line responders, local and central bureaucrats, appointed members of an executive, and elected political leaders can all be classified under the term crisis manager.

Two features unite this group of actors and help us to understand how they may evaluate the efforts of a legislature. First, they are all incumbents within political and administrative systems, meaning that they are likely to share (or at least acknowledge) certain values that underpin their system of governance. Although these values can be reinterpreted by actors and agencies, they at least provide a common touchstone (or value configuration) with the capacity to condition the thought and behaviour of political and bureaucratic agents (Bevir & Rhodes, 2003, p. 33). The second feature that unites these actors is their orientation towards the objectives of a crisis response. Resolution will be the primary objective but a subsidiary goal will be to come out of the crisis cleanly, free from association with blame and the threat of lesson learning reforms.

What do these actors want from a legislature during a crisis? Crisis managers are likely to have a positive view of any legislature functions that: (a) entrench their legitimacy and authoritative status during acute periods of high uncertainty or; (b) facilitate social and political support for them, their organisation or their policies in the post-event period. Policy support functions, such as the conflict management processes delineated earlier, do have this capacity. However, these agents are also likely to want as much autonomy from political interference and partisanship as possible, particularly in relation to the front-line, operational dimensions of crisis management. Certain functions, such as the local ‘lightning rod’ role, are likely to be appreciated in this sense but the desire for autonomy also militates against a claim that all policy-relevant functions will be welcomed by crisis managers. Issue escape functions provide a reasonable example here as they emerge from a loss of executive control and a concomitant rise in legislature involvement – two outcomes which are likely to be viewed negatively by administrative and political crisis managers.

5.2 Citizen expectations

Citizens will have different expectations of a crisis response depending on their proximity to the effects of disruption. Hence the concerns of directly affected individuals at the sharp end of a crisis can be distinguished from more generally affected publics (usually represented by interest groups) and, in turn, these groups can be differentiated from the large mass of the public who will feel little or no effects from many crises.

However, there are some crucial differences between citizens and crisis managers in terms of expectations. The first of these relates to the style or nature of crisis management efforts. While crisis managers and citizens will be united by their desire to resolve the crisis, the directly affected are far more likely to want a crisis response that is cognizant of their views. They may expect to be recognised, to have a voice in policy deliberations and ultimately to influence the decisions that will affect them. Such expectations can easily conflict with the wishes of crisis managers who may want to be insulated from citizen demands or engage in more authoritarian forms of crisis management which trade off inclusion for (perceived) effectiveness. Another difference between crisis managers and citizens relates to the degree and nature of accountability facilitated from those involved in prevention and management efforts. Unlike crisis managers, an increasingly risk aware citizenship will expect accountability processes to be exhaustive, for blame to be squarely allocated and more substantial reform efforts will be expected as a consequence.

What do these actors want from a legislature during a crisis? For those interested in influencing crisis management decision making during acute stages, legislatures are likely to be evaluated positively if they can act as a conduit linking the citizen to the crisis manager. Conversely, crisis managers that are exposed to an excessive number of demands may not view the legislature's involvement in quite the same manner. It is entirely possible that the successful performance of the conduit role will be viewed by that group as an unwelcome distraction from core crisis management duties rather than a democratic virtue. These opposing views are encapsulated perfectly in the contrasts between the ‘errand running’ and ‘lightning rod’ constituency roles. If local representatives perform errand running functions effectively they will receive positive citizen evaluations. If, however, the lightning rod and gatekeeper roles are preferred, insulated crisis managers may be more satisfied at the expense of citizens.

The tension between crisis manager and citizen expectations will also be present in evaluations of parliamentary accountability. Positive citizen evaluations are likely to materialise when a legislature that is representative of citizen views has enough strength to lead a reform agenda; frame and allocate blame appropriately, and; influence the specifics components of policy change. However, the conduit and cathartic functions are also crucial to citizen appraisals, particularly if the lesson learning capacity of a legislature is weak in comparison to an executive. In this regard, the ability of a parliament to go through ‘due process’ and at least consult and communicate the views of affected citizens will be crucial in terms of how it is judged by citizens. Substantial legislature involvement post-crisis in these ways is, however, unlikely to be embraced positively from a crisis manager perspective. A weak policymaking legislature that manages to create citizen acquiescence and support without imposing its own reform agenda will be more welcomed by that group.

5.3 Opportunistic expectations

Numerous actors gravitate towards the politics of a crisis, even if not directly affected or required for the purposes of resolution, because of the capacity of crises to act as agents of change. These actors are labelled opportunistic here as they are united by their exploitative motivations. Opportunistic actors can include individual or groups of elected representatives, journalists, shunned crisis management agencies or even actors and organisations from other governance tiers (at the local or supranational level for example) that have been excluded from a crisis response.

The opportunistic pursuit of interests will be a feature of this group and if objectives overlap temporary coalitions may form between actors with similar goals. Determining the motivations of opportunistic actors can, however, be difficult because in a crisis all actors seek to advertise their advocacy for the public interest and make public their desire for a quick return to normality. To reap the rewards of a crisis, actors must be seen putting differences to one side and pursuing resolution first and foremost. Unlike crisis managers and affected citizens, public concessions from opportunistic actors about the need to end the crisis quickly may mask the fact that the escalation, exacerbation or politicisation of events may better serve their interests. Hence underneath the ostensible banner of resolution, opportunistic actors may pursue ‘hidden agendas’ (McConnell, 2010, p. 90) which make it difficult to ascertain how they will evaluate crisis management actions.

The opportunistic actor is likely to evaluate a legislature positively if it allows them the chance to engage in communicatory crisis politics or if it is capable of broadening out the decision making process to include new groups. The most obvious functions in this regard are those that facilitate involvement in ‘meaning making’ contests, particularly accountability mechanisms that can frame crisis issues and allocate blame. However, as opportunistic actors tend to exist outside of government crisis management machinery, any legislature function that can open up policy deliberations to external interests and loosen executive control are also likely to be appraised positively. Conversely, legislature functions that improve the chances of an effective, quick resolution to a crisis may disappoint this group as might support functions that appease stakeholders or generate legitimacy for government actors. However, there is one important difference between opportunistic actors and crisis managers and citizens. The latter should have no difficulty in publicly airing grievances about what they perceive to be poor legislature performance because crisis resolution is a virtuous goal. Opportunistic actors, however, may not have this luxury. If their objective is to exacerbate a crisis for their own self-interest they are hardly likely to broadcast the ways in which a legislature has failed to accommodate them. What this means is that despite their political expectations, the most opportunistic actors may actually be the most benign in terms of evaluative politics.

6 Conclusion

This article has presented three strands of heuristic guidance through which the ‘puzzle’ of legislature involvement in crises can begin to be unlocked. These strands were woven together in a single diagram and are summarised together here. Like all frameworks used for the analysis of political life, the model that has been unfolded in this article simplifies complex questions and realities. By now it should be apparent that legislatures and crises are intricate, multi-dimensional units of analysis. Hence the complex relationship between the two can never be explained comprehensively within a single diagram. However, the purpose of the model is to present a flexible, exploratory pathway rather than an explanatory ‘magic bullet’. It is also important to note that the diagram presented above is not an algorithm or a step-by-step procedure leading to automatic research success. Researchers do not need to follow the model slavishly: deviations should be made to suit research agendas, particular theoretical concerns or the empirical realities of case studies. Nevertheless, three forms of guidance can be suggested for those interested in determining legislature performance during crises.

6.1 Determine the policymaking influence of the legislature

If there is no pre-existing parliamentary scholarship, an assessment of institutional constraints and party political dynamics can provide an indication of policymaking potential. This process is about prioritising (not excluding) policymaking and policy supporting functions and should be done without prejudice. The identification of a legislature with minimal policymaking influence in no way suggests that it will be redundant in terms of crisis management.

6.2 Associate the characteristics of the crisis with possible legislature outputs

Parliamentary activities and outputs can be matched to the specific characteristics of a crisis episode. The association between context and function, however, should not be interpreted too strictly as a single legislature function can have multiple outcomes, meaning that it can be potentially relevant to several contexts. Despite this issue, a keen understanding of the nature of this crisis episode will allow a researcher to mould the analytical treatment of a legislature to specific research objectives.

6.3 Assess the expectations of the key crisis actors against legislature involvement

When the analysis shifts from assessing what the legislature has performed to how effective it has been, the institution's functions should be examined in relation to the expectations of crisis actors. This is not to say that objective criteria and measurable benchmarks of success and failure cannot play a role in the evaluation of legislature performance; they can, particularly in relation to those functions which are orientated more towards the operational aspects of a crisis response (constituency roles for example). The point remains, however, that all evaluative efforts should begin by recognising the multiplicity of value configurations that lead to differing opinions about success or failure.

Continuing trends indicate that crisis responses are becoming more crowded. So-called ‘risk societies’ are creating more and more active, critical citizens who are prepared to assess crisis management performance. The number of crisis managers involved in a typical state-led response is increasing as a consequence of larger changes to systems of governance. The growing scope, influence and accessibility of 24 h, multi-media reporting will only encourage greater numbers of opportunistic actors seeking to exploit crises. As a consequence the variety of interpretations of crisis management ‘success’ and ‘failure’ is likely to increase and fragment. In such contexts understanding the normative pluralism that characterises contemporary crises will be a complex but essential part of assessing institutional crisis management performance.