Abstract
This article proposes an economic alternative to the traditional approach to calculating non-market values of the environment and natural resources, which we refer to here as “patrimonial”. We will first examine the traditional economic approach and its tendency to apply market categories to the economic valuation of non-market goods and services associated with the environment and natural resources. We will then move on to examine the way in which the question is perceived within the context of patrimonial economics by focusing on another form of economic rationality, based on the notion of a shared legacy or patrimony. Lastly, we will illustrate the tension between market values and patrimonial values in the field of water management and untreated water distribution infrastructure by analysing the recent evolution of Associations syndicales autorisées (“Authorized Union Associations”, or ASAs) in France and their approaches to pricing.
1 Introduction
According to the European Union Water Framework Directive: “Water is not a commercial product like any other but, rather, a heritage which must be protected, defended and treated as such” (CitationEU 2000, p. 1). Interestingly, the phrase calls attention to the fact that water has, simultaneously, both a market and a non-market value. Although the text was published only recently, it illustrates the way in which Europeans have traditionally envisaged water resources. The aim of this article is to examine from an economic point of view, both theoretically and empirically, some of the terms of this debate. The objective is to highlight the need to reconceptualize non-market aspects of the economy, which, paradoxically, have, up until now, largely been thought of in terms of market categories. Water management provides a good illustration of the need for this change in analytical perspective in that, generally, the values accorded to the resource, its uses, and the way in which it is conserved, are far from the market ideal. One of the contributions of patrimonial economics, which will be used here as a theoretical framework, is precisely to show that market and non-market dimensions co-exist and can be viewed as two interdependent aspects in tension with each other, an understanding of which is useful in an analysis of concrete situations. In order to illustrate our hypothesis, we will refer to the French example of the Associations syndicales autorisées (ASA), which manage irrigation and other water distribution networks, notably for agricultural use in France. We will see, in particular, that the value attributed to water and its use within the framework of the ASAs, has a patrimonial aspect as well as a market aspect. The patrimonial aspectFootnote1 insists on the collective character of water and infrastructure management, placing it within the long-term perspective of the reproduction of human societies and of the resources on which they depend, a fact which distinguishes it from the logic of the market.
2 The traditional economic approach used to “attach a price” to nature: an exercise in redefining non-market aspects in terms of the market?
The question of the economic valuation of the environment and natural resources, both in terms of damage inflicted on them or profits potentially generated from them, has been of central importance for at least fifty years. Mainstream economists organize their reasoning according to two steps: (a) they theorize the way a rational individual – i.e., homo oeconomicus – operationalizes his/her choices. According to his/her preferences (i.e., tastes), this individual arbitrates amongst the choices by comparing the value of the goods and services. This value is derived from their marginal utility (i.e., the utility given by the consumption of the latest unit of the given good or service). (b) An optimal choice will be the one that brings the maximum of utility for a certain amount of money spent – the second step of neoclassical economic reasoning, which rests on the revealed preferences process and individual values. The aim is to translate the previously established exchange ratios (i.e., marginal utility ratios) into socially acceptable prices through a means of exchange (generally money). In order to achieve this, neoclassical economists generally find their inspiration in market procedures because they see the market as the institution which, through the expression of competitive prices – resulting from confrontation of supply and demand – coordinates individuals’ optimal choices.
We will first examine how economists envisage the various values associated with the environment and natural resources, then examine methods of monetary valuation used to attempt to “give a price” to nature.
2.1 The various degrees of economic value associated with nature
Historically speaking, the need to reveal the value of nature emerged relatively late. Indeed, for a very long time, natural resources were regarded as inexhaustible, free and available to all. The erosion of biological diversity, a recognition of the fact that human activity had damaged ecosystems, and, in general, the growing awareness of environmental problems at all levels, encouraged the development of various concepts that could be used to integrate into the market what had, up until then, been considered as being extraneous to it. Notions used to construct a reference framework were extremely evocative; for example, in profit and loss analyses of the exploitation of natural resources, the “wealth” of ecosystems and biological diversity has been foregrounded as the source of “services” to human populations. Attaching a price to nature involves in the first instance an analysis of the various groups of values, which in turn enables rational individuals to make their tradeoffs. To apply the typology elaborated by CitationVivien (2005), each of these values corresponds to a correlative question:
A value for what? The homo oeconomicus distinguishes between “use values” and “non-use values”. The former correspond to the benefits derived by the individual from nature, be they direct (hunting, fishing, etc.) or indirect (the use of climatic regulations, for example); the latter are linked to ethical or moral values attached to nature by the individual, independently of any use to which it can be put. Some economists refer to these as forms of “existence value”.
The second question which is asked to the homo oeconomicus touches on the issue of the dynamic character of his/her relationship with the environment: in other words, a value for when? Use values, while generally attached to a current use, can also refer to potential future uses. This situation brings to the fore the notion of “option value”, which, amongst other things, refers to the idea of protecting nature now with a view to exploiting it in the future. But, taking into account the limitations of our knowledge about the uses to which nature will be put in the future (for example, which plant, which has no specific use today, will serve as a vaccine tomorrow?), the term “quasi-option value” is applied.
Lastly, questions can be asked about the identity of end users: a value for whom? The rational individual generally considers values for himself/herself. But he/she may also consent to pay to enable his/her contemporaries to benefit from a certain quality or quantity of the environment. This refers to as “altruistic value”. Similarly, if the environment is likely to have a value for future generations, it will be called a “legacy value”.
The “total economic value” of nature thus consists of all these different values, which are not always mutually exclusive. Furthermore, it is often difficult, when carrying out this kind of macro-analysis, to deconstruct that which is delivered, with the help of currently applied economic methods, into individual price categories.
2.2 Economic valuation methods applied to natural resources and the environment, or how to reduce non-market aspects to the market
Since the 1950s, a good deal of research has been carried out with a view to developing a method capable of “revealing” the preferences of economic agents for natural resources. Theoretically, for a given good, the price resulting from a comparison between supply and demand reflects its value. The same type of reasoning can be applied to water. CitationWard and Michelsen (2002: 425) assert that: “Water has economic value only when its supply is scarce relative to its demand. Whenever water is available in unlimited supply, it is free in the economic sense. Scarce water takes on economic value because many users compete for its use. In a market system, economic values of water, defined by its price, serve as a guide to allocate water among alternative uses, potentially directing water and its complementary resources into uses in which they yield the greatest total economic return”.
Economists were, for many decades, incapable of developing a price for goods that was not subject to transactions. However, in applying the notion of “quasi markets”, hypothetical situations can be imagined in which agents express their willingness to pay, or receive, compensation as a means of protecting nature or accepting what it produces. As we will see, all of these methods, which attempt indirectly to attach a price to nature, are subject to numerous distortions. They are all implicitly based on the “commensurability” of nature with manufactured goods, which is, ultimately, tantamount to postulating the possibility of substituting/compensating natural and other goods or assets which are part of the utility function of economic agents or that constitute their forms of capital.
A certain number of methods for indirectly evaluating the environment have been developed since the end of the Second World War. The travel costs method is used, notably, to assess the economic value of remarkable natural sites (CitationClawson & Knetsch, 1966). Meanwhile, the hedonic price method (CitationRosen, 1974) is often used as a basis for assessing damage caused to the environment or, alternatively, evaluating amenities generated by it.
Because these two methods are only applied to specific cases, their scope is limited. Moreover, they are only used to evaluate use values. The scope of the contingent valuation method (direct method of evaluation), perhaps the one most frequently used today, is much greater. It is based on the idea of individuals agreeing to pay for an improvement in their situation, or, symmetrically, agreeing to receive compensation if their situation deteriorates. Faced with a hypothetical modification of their environment, subjects are requested to fill in individual questionnaires asking them to attribute a value to that change, and translate this value in monetary terms. The average figure for respondents’ monetary valuations is taken as the average of the price to pay (or compensation to be received). Furthermore, an econometric analysis of the data makes it possible to select explanatory variables which can be used to assess the validity of the study. The results are then aggregated by multiplying the average sum which respondents hypothetically agree to pay (or receive) by the total population of the sample. The success of the method is largely based on its apparent simplicity. Nevertheless, contingent valuation is affected by a number of biases which need to be addressed by the authors of the questionnaire. Naturally, results generated by an open question (“how much would you agree to pay to ensure that the quality of your tap water remains high?”) will be different from those generated by a question based on a value scale (i.e., “would you agree to pay $1, $10 or $20 to ensure that the quality of your tap water remains high?”). The choice of value scale also influences responses (alternatives of $1000, $10,000 and $20,000 could be presented). Furthermore, to the degree that individuals are faced with a hypothetical situation, it is by no means certain that they would display the same attitudes in real life as they did in the questionnaire. Lastly, amongst the drawbacks listed by CitationMitchell and Carson (1989), the fact should be emphasized that it is difficult to assess the degree to which respondents understand the question posed. In effect, there is no guarantee that they will all interpret the same words in the same way.
3 The need to think in market and non-market terms simultaneously: the contribution of patrimonial economics
Since the late 1960s, economists, reflecting a need to take into account the non-market aspects of human activity, have recognized the importance of environmental issues and have integrated them into the analytical framework of their standard models. Theorists working in this current of thought have used the concept of “externalities,” both positive and negative. If, as its name suggests, the category designates a value outside the market, it nevertheless “internalizes” that value into the price system. While such prices are not obligatorily market-based (although they can be used to calculate “pigovian” taxes), the fact that they can be expressed in monetary terms means that they have value-equivalence with the market sphere. This is a short step away from reducing non-market aspects to categories applied to the market. This is exactly what advocates of patrimonial economics, whose intention is to demonstrate the existence of different rationalities within the economic field, refuse to do. Even if the concept of patrimony can be regarded as a close cousin of common property, the large literature which has emerged since the end of the 1970s on common property and common pool resources has, most of the time, different roots. For instance, patrimony and common property cannot be regarded as synonymous or equivalent concepts, since a community can be considered as the holder of a common patrimony, without the necessity to become the co-owner of property rights. Moreover, all the works developed by the Bloomington school (CitationAligica & Boettke, 2009), and more specifically by Elinor CitationOstrom (1990), have a fundamentally individualistic approach. They regard collective action processes as the expression of individual behaviors. In contrast, the methodological framework mobilized by patrimonial economics is much more holistic.
3.1 The standard analytical perspective: a single rationality at work in the economic field
In spite of the shortcomings mentioned above, the monetary valuation of natural assets is a relatively effective way of revealing the value of nature. Prior to the 1970s, most assessments simply ignored the variable. As CitationBontems and Rotillon (2003) observed, cost–benefit analysis, which from an economic point of view remains the most popular approach to evaluation, can be thought of in two ways. First, when economic benefits outweigh social costs, the approach can be used “technocratically” to convince local people impacted by a particular project (a household water incineration plant, an airport, a railway line, etc.) of that project's legitimacy by bringing to bear arguments concerning environmental and social factors. But a perhaps subtler way of using monetary valuations would be to apply it “democratically”: by giving citizens and associations the opportunity not only to consult such evaluations but also to take part in the assessment process itself in order to ensure that their “preferences” are taken into account (CitationSagoff, 1998). In this framework, society is viewed as a collection of rational individuals all of whom express themselves, in their own names, according to a procedure defining what they are willing to pay (or receive). Their expression finds form in their right to vote. This explains the use of the Pareto criterion, a universally accepted criterion if ever there was one, to classify the various ways of distributing goods allocated within society and to determine which situations are preferable to others, with the best of them being described as “optimal.” Another approach, that can be described as “dualist” – to be found, for example, in the work of CitationSen (1982) – analytically separates the behavior of homo oeconomicus – the consumer intent on maximizing his/her wellbeing – from homo politicus, the citizen equipped with judgment and a capacity to take on board certain ethical ideas. In this case, two different orders, two types of rationality confront each other.
Beyond such differences, advocates of the two approaches share the opinion that, in the economic field, the rationality of the individual is fully, if not exclusively, expressed within the framework of market relations. This is demonstrated by the fact that, from the perspective of neo-classical analysis, the non-market sphere is a negatively defined category, a notion sketched out in function of what it is not. This can only be understood in relation to the market, the ideal of the dominant approach to economic analysis, when it is characterized as presenting a perfectly level playing field. The analytical category of the non-market sphere applied to (amongst other things) various environmental issues bears witness to the fact that in the field of economics, that which is external to the market is generally understood in terms of the market. In this epistemological perspective, which can be defined as “auto-referential logic” (CitationGodard, 1984), economists faced with the non-market sphere will fall back on the market by using concepts such as externality and natural capital and applying traditional methods of economic valuation.
3.2 The contribution of patrimonial economics: a different kind of economic rationality
Reflecting the institutionalist stream of thought, we take a radically different analytical approach which seeks to describe non-market relations in a positive fashion, relative to the economic concept of patrimony. The notion of patrimony was introduced in France in the field of the environment in the 1970s during a debate on the role of economic valuation in water management. The concept really emerged in a survey directed by CitationOllagnon (1979), the objective of which was to define the frameworks and modalities required to efficiently manage the Alsace Plain water table, during which researchers carried out an economic valuation of water as a resource. The researchers found that, far from easing conflicts between actors as standard economic theory suggests, attempts to express social relations with the environment using monetary valuations exacerbated conflict between stakeholders. It can thus be posited that the problem with water – as with the environment in general – is not that it is monetarily undervalued, as postulated in standard economics, but that there are no institutions capable of managing the resource on a patrimonial basis. CitationOllagnon (1979), then, sees patrimony as a set of material and immaterial elements attached to a community, and the maintaining and developing the autonomy and identity of this community through adapting in time and space to an evolving situation.
The idea suggested by CitationGodard (1990), who has worked on the notion of patrimony within the institutionalist framework of convention theory (CitationFavereau and Lazega, 2002), is that the environment suffers from a “deficit in legitimacy,” torn as it is between the different visions and social orders in which it is inscribed. In other words, the act of attaching a price to a non-market environmental object is not neutral; in fact, it has the effect of inscribing that object into a specific framework of legitimacy, into a “market order” opposed to other equally legitimate visions and social orders. In fact, as CitationPolanyi (1944) pointed out, a number of economic rationalities are at work in human societies, a fact reflected by the various ways in which scarce resources are allocated. The hypothesis that we would like to advance here is that patrimonial relations exist alongside market relations. Economic agents must not be conceptualized as mere examples of homo oeconomicus, selfish agents and “rational fools”, to take Sen's expression (CitationSen, 1982). It is important to consider them as members of different human communities: families, nations, social groups, and even humanity at large. The concept of patrimony – which can be used at different scales, from family patrimony to common heritage of mankind – translates this sense of belonging and attachment of individuals to various communities, embedded in time and territories.
These patrimonial relations are economic relations, including relations of production, exchange and distribution, the objective of which is to ensure the survival of human groups in space and time. They concern patrimonial objects and goods that are recognized for their importance in terms of the reproduction, both physical and in terms of identity, of these groups. The exchange and distribution of goods within patrimonial communities is based on establishing patrimonial values which, as in the case of (neoclassical) utility-value, correspond to the definition of classes of subjective equivalence used by individuals in order to guarantee relationships of solidarity characterizing the community.
A second step of the reasoning consists in translating these patrimonial values into monetary terms. Thus, for example, CitationBarthélemy (2005) has shown that, in Europe, contemporary agriculturalists form patrimonial communities that are defined according to certain legally recognized criteria of belonging focusing on relationships between different generations of farmers. In order to do this, the agriculturalists share patrimonial goods – notably production rights – according to rules of solidarity that are defined nationally, and by referring to values which vary according to the status of the individuals with whom exchanges are made (for example, in a family transaction, the price of land will be lower than it would be in other kinds of transaction).
Another of our hypotheses, also inspired by the work of Polanyi, is that, in modern societies, economic relations are structured by a dialectic between market relations and patrimonial relations. On the one hand, individuals act within a framework of market relations as producers or individual consumers in order to maximize their wellbeing. On the other, they act within a framework of patrimonial relations with a view to reproducing those relations. This dialectic finds a concrete expression in institutionalized compromises: negotiated rules which vary in time and space, guaranteeing the articulation of the market and patrimonial aspects of goods and people within the sectors under consideration. Thus, still referring to examples provided by Barthélemy, the status of milk quotas (considered as patrimonial goods), which, in Europe, takes the form of a compromise between individual and collective management, varies from country to country: very close to the market management model in the United Kingdom, but distributed free of charge in France to certain sections of the population.
4 The management and pricing of water at the interface of the market and non-market spheres: the case of Associations syndicales autorisées (“Authorized Union Associations”) in France
Attempts have been made in a number of studies to apply the analytical framework of patrimonial economics to water, notably, in those studies focused on the evolution of water policy in France since 1960's (CitationCalvo-Mendieta, Petit, & Vivien, 2010a, 2010b; Petit & Romagny, 2009). This section features an analysis of the case of the Associations syndicales autorisées, or “Authorized Union Associations” (ASAs). These associations are particularly interesting with regard to patrimonial economics in that, in both their underlying concept and their manner of functioning, they are characterized by the co-existence not only of individual and collective aspects, but also of market and patrimonial logics. Indeed, an analysis of the evolution of ASA pricing policies renders this dialectical tension increasingly apparent.
Box 1 The French structure of water management.
Water management in France is based on three principles: the river basin as the operational scale of management, a decentralized organization and the polluter/user pays principle.
French water policy is defined and coordinated at the national level, but implemented in a decentralized way. The 1964 Water Law defined the water basin as the pertinent scale of water management. In each of the 6 French river basins (in Metropolitan France), the decision-making authority is vested in a Water Board that brings together water users, representatives of public administrations, and representatives of regional and local authorities. Water management plans (defining priorities, objectives and actions) are multiannual in scope and are designed at two scales: the basin scale (by the Water Boards) and the sub-basin scale (by Local Water Boards).
Private property of water is the exception in France (as in most European countries), but even in this case water use is strongly constrained by regulatory authorities. Under the control of Water Boards, Water Agencies are the cornerstone of the water French system: they levy charges from water users and contribute to funding of public works to limit water pollution. Thus, financial specific resources are mutualized at the basin scale.
4.1 A patrimonial community of landowners managing a common good
The need to carry out costly work on water distribution infrastructure (construction, improvements and maintenance of irrigation networks) has prompted agriculturalists around the world to pool their resources. Communitarian irrigation organizations have existed in various European countries (Spain, France, the Netherlands, Portugal) for hundreds of years. Such organizations are responsible, amongst other things, for maintaining irrigation canals and the equipment associated with them. These traditional institutions take a variety of different forms – assemblies, communities, or, on the other side of the fence, consumer associations – with some organized along more formal lines than others. In France, Associations syndicales autorisées (ASA), defined by the law of 1865, are associations set up by land owners and authorized by the State. Their legal status was introduced with a view to meeting the need to finance the renovation of irrigation infrastructure (sometimes dating back to the Middle Ages) and share maintenance costs.Footnote2 The general assembly of landowners (which elects its own decision-making officials – union official and director) draws up statutes and votes on the geographical area for which the ASA is responsible, and which is subject to public enquiry. The ASA is then officially recognized by the Prefect (i.e., the representative of the State) as a public establishment. There are approximately 1860 ASAs in France (almost 1000 manage old canals conveying water by gravity; the others manage canals equipped with pumping stations), covering 20% of the country's irrigated land (CitationGarin & Loubier, 2002). The public authorities regard these organizations as instruments of regional development, a fact reflected in the principles described in the legal texts by which they are governed (CitationGarin & Loubier, 2002):
| - | eligibility for public funding for investments. | ||||
| - | defense of long-term collective investments (membership of an ASA is dependent on owning land). | ||||
| - | separation of roles between director (authorizing officer) and accountant (collector). | ||||
| - | balancing the budget, monitoring on the part of the public authorities. | ||||
| - | autonomy in terms of defining operating rules. | ||||
This last principle explains the characteristics of most interest to us here, characteristics which will enable us to argue that ASAs form a patrimonial community managing a common good (water, water distribution infrastructure) on a decentralized basis. At the same time, the dialectic between the individual and the collective identified in the preceding section is well established in that, while ASAs manage shared resources, their members form a community of private owners. Although they are recognized by the public authorities, ASAs have a high degree of autonomy in terms of the operational approaches they choose to apply: relations between members, rules governing how water should be distributed, pricing, rules concerning monitoring procedures and sanctions, etc. Individual ASAs draw up their own operational rules, taking into account the various social, economic, hydrographic and cultural contexts in which they function. Insofar as pricing is concerned, the vast majority of ASAs apply a flat rate (based on surface area), independently of water and land use, since most management costs are not dependent on the number of water towers in the territory for which they are responsible.Footnote3 However, this organizational approach is being called into question by evolutions in water use to which ASAs are trying to adapt.
4.2 New values, new uses: market and non-market aspects of the multi-functionality of irrigation systems
For around 30 years, irrigation systems have been affected by thoroughgoing transformations in the agricultural industry in France (CitationGhiotti & Rivière-Honegger, 2011; Ladki et al., 2011) and the ASAs are faced with socio-economic difficulties which threaten their very existence.
Canal networks, which have contributed so much to economic development, particularly in the south of France, have been affected by economic, social and political change: shrinkage in the agricultural sector (and the fall of employment in that sector, which accounted for 20.6% of French jobs in 1962 but only 4.3% in 1999)Footnote4; growing urbanization and peri-urbanization (urban households built on what was formerly agricultural land); a decrease in public subsidies for irrigation; uncertainty caused by the globalization of markets and European agricultural policy; and the new regulatory constraints described in the European Water Framework Directive. The irrigation of agricultural land is not the only use of water contributing to regional development; “environmental” uses (protecting ecosystems; supporting low flow levels, etc.), and recreational (leisure parks, fishing, rambling) and urban uses are also playing an increasingly important role, reflecting the evolution of society and its values.
For the ASAs, these new uses pose new problems and create new areas of responsibility (the security of goods and people; contributing to countryside amenities; safeguarding water supplies, etc.) which generate additional costs which the ASAs are not able to cover on their own. This situation calls into question the operational conditions and continued existence of ASAs. Indeed, these organizations are now attempting to adapt to the new environment by reappraising their management and organizational approaches (relations between members, shared values, distribution of responsibilities, etc.).
Faced with these evolutions, some ASAs, after re-examining approaches to coordinating the activities of various actors, are considering the possibility of modifying their pricing policies in order to take into account new water uses and maintain their networks when they are not being used. In the final analysis, this transition reflects the multi-functionality of irrigation systems which, according to CitationLadki (2010: 26), can be described as “the ensemble of purposes (or functions) that the actors in a given territory agree to allocate now (or which they may want to develop in the long-term) to the water network and to water infrastructure and approaches to irrigation in the plot constituting the irrigated system.” Within the framework of the ASAs, the multi-functionality of irrigation systems is characterized by two aspects: market and non-market. The market aspect corresponds to untreated water services offered by ASAs, which can cover different types of use, for which consumers pay. The non-market aspect corresponds to external effects (either positive or negative) generated by irrigation systems (contribution to minimal acceptable flow levels, rain drainage, forest fires, etc.). We will examine these two aspects by means of an analysis of the pricing structures implemented by most ASAs and the modifications applied to those structures with a view to including a patrimonial dimension within their overall approach.
4.3 A pricing system influenced by market and patrimonial aspects: two examples
First, it is useful to recall that although ASAs are not involved in any form of commercial activity (they do not sell anything) they are responsible for sharing costs amongst their members (according to criteria independently defined by each ASA)Footnote5 in order to balance their books.Footnote6 In this regard, the primary function of charges levied by the ASAs on their members is to recover costs, which, in fine, reflects a market-based approach. In effect, ASAs base their pricing systems on costs (production and maintenance costs). The influence of patrimonial aspects on pricing can be illustrated by means of two examples: the first concerns ASAs managing canals conveying water by means of gravity; the second concerns ASAs which run canals equipped with pumping stations.
In the first case, ASAs generally levy a charge per hectare. Individual ASAs calculate total annual charges and divide them by the area covered, thus arriving at price to be paid by landowners per hectare. It should be noted, in this context, that rather than fixing prices, ASAs apply pre-defined methods of calculation. Thus, if there is an explosion at a canal which causes damage requiring extensive repair work, a “charge for services rendered” can be levied. However, depending on the uses to which water is put, a distinction is sometimes applied between agriculturalists and individuals not associated with the agricultural sector, these last paying much more expensive charges.Footnote7
A certain number of ASAs which run gravity-based canals are reappraising their pricing policies in order to address the following issues:
| - | Modernizing infrastructure (notably, intakes). | ||||
| - | Replacing open-air canals with underground canals (to avoid water loss through evaporation). | ||||
| - | Conversion to the use of pumping stations (to meet “urban” demand). | ||||
All these modernization projects, which should (theoretically) generate water savings, are being carried out in order to meet the requirements of the European Water Framework Directive, in terms of the ensuring the good quantitative status of water bodies by 2015.Footnote8
Generally speaking, environmental services delivered by gravity-based irrigation networks can be used as a key to reappraising ASA pricing systems by levying charges on water consumers benefiting from those services without contributing financially to the maintenance of those networks. In effect, it is estimated that gravity-based networks are not very efficient: 20–25% of water taken from rivers is used for irrigation while the rest either evaporates, filters into the water table, goes back to the river, or sustains ecosystems.
In the second case, in ASAs running canals using pumping stations, which have focused a little more on pricing issues, the following approaches can be distinguished:
| - | Fixed prices calculated on the basis of fixed units (per hectare or unit of quantity). | ||||
| - | Variable charges based on variable units (cubic metre consumed, for example, or the number of hours in which water is available, or the number of hectares under irrigation). | ||||
Some ASAs managing canals which convey water by means of gravity, for example in the Lot département, are faced with the fact that there are no longer any requirements for water in certain areas (former agricultural plots which have been built on; land belonging to retired farmers). Current pricing practices involve paying the owners of plots which do not require water but which are nevertheless located within the territory for which the ASA is responsible, while not distributing water to the owners of plots located outside that territory. To resolve this problem, Robert Roussies, Director of the Lot ASA Union, suggests introducing a new charge, based on the plot located within the ASA's territory, regardless of water use. This would be in addition to (or subtracted from) the use-based charge (taxe syndicale). He also suggests that this new charge should be referred to as a “patrimonial charge,” a “territory charge” or a “non-use charge.” Serving as a financial contribution to the maintenance of the network, this “patrimonial charge” would be paid by those landowners not supplied with water but nevertheless located within the ASA's perimeter.Footnote9 Amongst other arguments used to defend this change in pricing policy, presented as a “win-win” arrangement, is the need for “a collective recognition of the fact that irrigation systems are of central importance in terms of regional development” and for “a process of valorisation” (CitationRoussies, 2011: 11). However, this aspect, defined as “patrimonial”, hides a market aspect to the degree that landowners paying this new charge would, in return for cheaper prices (temporarily) cede their rights to water which other consumers could then use. The objective, therefore, is not only to take into account the “non-use” of water, but also to find a way of sharing rights over water which is not being used by applying an approach which cleverly combines the market and patrimonial spheres.
5 Conclusion
Structural modifications to ASAs are currently being applied on two levels. Canals conveying untreated water, originally destined for irrigation purposes, are increasingly being used to supply “urban” and “environmental” needs rather than traditional agricultural ones. However, to the degree that agriculturalists retain important decision-making powers within ASAs, the associations’ governance structures have not reflected these changes.
Nevertheless, the two examples referred to in this article, which illustrate a number of ways in which patrimonial values associated with water and water infrastructure can be appropriated, call for the implementation of new means of solidarity over and above the internal functioning of ASAs, which require a more open dialogue between irrigation communities and other actors in society. As CitationLadki observes (2010: 311, note 229),
“[…] valorising multi-functionality also implies a new way of thinking about how canals can be used. In effect, it is a question of broadening the identity-based relationship between the circle of agriculturalists and other actors associated with canals and water distribution (individual members, environmentalists, collectivities, industrialists, etc.) and creating the basis of a new legitimacy for ASAs, the guardians of this patrimony. That would require that “actors respect a shared set of rules […] and, in certain situations, a common system of representations or values” (CitationGilly & Lung, 2005: 6). Behind this arrangement between actors, a compromise is being elaborated, a compromise based on reciprocal concessions.”
Beyond these organizational aspects, the question arises as to how to integrate patrimonial values associated with water and water infrastructure into current pricing systems. While this question is of central importance in terms of the current and future evolution of the cases studied in this article, it largely surpasses the field of patrimonial economics. Indeed, it provides, for the moment, a primarily analytical approach to certain phenomena (including the management of and pricing systems applied to untreated water) that accentuate the need to analyze non-market aspects positively, from the perspective of patrimonial economics.
More generally, it can be observed that the market approach cannot entirely explain pricing structures in the water sector because these structures are the result of institutionalized compromises between market-based economic efficiency (translated by cost recovery) and equity-based criteria, the definition of which depends on power relations within collectives. The patrimonial value of water resulting from these processes of arbitrage between the economic, social and political spheres fully justifies our argument that patrimonial economics should be associated with the old traditions of political economy, while creating the kind of new analytical perspectives we have attempted to outline here.
Acknowledgments
While retaining responsibility for their views and any errors that may appear in the text, the authors would like to take this opportunity to extend their thanks to Joël Gallais, Patrice Garin, Stéphane Ghiotti, Marwan Ladki and Marc Polge for making their work available and/or for their comments concerning a previous version of this article.
Notes
1 The English translation of the term “patrimoine” is difficult since the candidates for this translation (patrimony, heritage, legacy) can hardly cover the whole significance of this term, used here as a concept. We have chosen to use the terms of ‘patrimony’ and ‘patrimonialization’, following Henry Ollagnon's definition which conceptually defines “patrimoine” as “an ensemble of material and immaterial elements focused on a community which works on maintaining and developing its identity and autonomy by adapting in time and space to an evolving situation (CitationOllagnon, 2000, p. 339).
2 It should nevertheless be pointed out that, from the outset, infrastructure was not exclusively used to distribute untreated water for irrigation purposes and that the ASAs can also take responsibility for drainage, sanitation and, more widely, the distribution of untreated water for a variety of different uses (CitationGarin, Montginoul, & Ruf, 2003).
3 Note that financial contributions are made by owners or tenants of land situated within the territory for which the ASA is responsible (landowners whose land is situated within this territory are obliged to become members of the ASA).
5 Some ASA managers justify levying much higher charges for non-agricultural consumers by applying a “solidarity principle” which makes it possible to keep charges for agriculturalists at an “acceptable” level.
6 Conversation of March 15, 2011, with Marc Polge, of ASA Info, a consultancy firm providing information and training services for ASAs (http://www.asainfo.net/).
7 In the case of the Canal de L’abbé ASA located in the Hérault département, individuals not involved in the agricultural sector pay a watering tax which is twice as high as the irrigation tax paid by agriculturalists (CitationLadki, 2010).
8 As an example, it should be pointed out that the Canal de Gignac ASA was found guilty in 2005 by the water monitoring board for not respecting minimal levels of flow. This constraint will become more important in the future with the application of the Law on Water and Aquatic Milieus (adopted in France in 2006) which stipulates an increase in these flows beginning in 2014 (CitationGhiotti & Rivière-Honegger, 2011).
9 However, this “patrimonial charge” is still at the project stage and so a complete analysis is not yet possible. In fact, several operational questions remain, particularly concerning the way this charge will be determined (amount, distribution, etc.) and the possible effects in terms of equity between users or even water use conflicts.
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