Beyond zero-sum: game theory and national forest management

This is a revised version of a paper presented at the 2003 Annual Meeting of the Western Social Science Association, Las Vegas, NV.

Abstract

Following two decades of bitter struggle, the current debate over management of the U.S. national forests is characterized by animosity, controversy, and seemingly intractable gridlock. This view has led some to characterize the current management process a situation of pure conflict or a zero-sum game. In this article, we develop a game-theoretic model based on an argument that national forest policymaking is a game between the U.S. National Forest Service and Environmentalists and that this game is not zero-sum. The model is used to account for outcomes associated with contemporary management policy and to examine some recent changes to the game's rules and how this may affect outcomes. The analysis shows that some changes will have little to no effect on outcomes, while others have a significant potential to do so.

Acknowledgement

We thank the editor and anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions, though they should not be held responsible for article content.

Notes

This is a revised version of a paper presented at the 2003 Annual Meeting of the Western Social Science Association, Las Vegas, NV.

1 As noted earlier, one can also assume that external actors move first in the game by offering a proposal that can be either accepted or rejected by the USFS. Our analysis reveals that the outcomes in the game do not change depending on which actor moves first. Thus, no generality is lost by assuming the USFS moves first in the game.

2 There is no guaranteed payoff to either side when a Fight occurs. The court may rule completely in favor of the USFS or the environmentalists or a compromise outcome may be handed down.

3 Not all environmental groups can be characterized as resolved. Some E groups may prefer the USFS winning to a Fight (an irresolute E), while others may view the Status Quo as the worst possible outcome. An anonymous reviewer called the latter environmentalists, “ideologues,” and we are thankful they brought to our attention an E type we had not previously considered.

4 Complete information means that the payoffs are known (there is no uncertainty in the game). To find an equilibrium using backward induction, begin at the end of the tree to determine which act will be selected. Once that is determined, move backward in the tree to figure out what the second to last player will choose and so on until you arrive at beginning of the tree. The following illustrates the method of finding the equilibrium via backward induction. At its last decision node, an irresolute USFS will defend itself in court since a Fight is preferred to the outcome it obtains when it does not defend itself, USFSLoses2. E knows that if it files suit, the USFS will defend and the result will be a Fight. If E does not file, the result is USFSWins2. Since the former is preferred to the latter, E files suit. The USFS knows if it rejects E's appeal, it will get a Fight. If it accepts the appeal, it will obtain the lesser preferred outcome, USFSLoses1. The USFS rejects the appeal. For E, appealing a decision leads to a Fight which is preferred to the outcome it gets for failing to appeal, USFSWins1. The USFS knows that if it makes a proposal, the outcome is a Fight, and if it makes no proposal, the outcome is the Status Quo. Since an irresolute USFS prefers the Status Quo to a Fight, the USFS chooses not to make a proposal. The same logic is used to determine the outcome, Fight, when the USFS is resolved. A resolved USFS knows that if it makes a proposal, the outcome is a Fight, and if it makes no proposal, the outcome is the Status Quo. Since a resolute USFS prefers a Fight to the Status Quo, the USFS chooses to make a proposal.

5 Appeals Reform Act of 1993, 16 U.S.C. 1612 note.

6 The rule change also eliminates the requirement that environmental studies be completed before trees are harvested.

7 Fed Reg., Vol. 68, #107, 4 June 2003.

8 Healthy Forest Restoration Act of 2003, P.L. 108–148.

9 P.L. 108–148, Sec. 106.

10 For example, under the new guidelines judges are expected to consider whether an act that may pose a potential risk to endangered species is potentially more or less harmful than the possibility of a fire (and the possible effect on the species) that may result if no action is taken to reduce hazardous fuels.

11 The USFS is dependent on private timber companies to remove trees and underbrush as part of hazardous fuel reduction actions. Those trees, however, are often dead, dying, or of a small diameter, and therefore have limited economic value. Thus, to pay for fuel reduction activities the USFS must depend on Congressional appropriation or it must provide access to timber with a greater commercial value, such as large, old-growth trees.

12 The USFS also wins if we assume the appeals process is eliminated for E. The outcome is USFSWins2.

13 See Healthy Forest Restoration Act of 2003, P.L. 108–148, and Fed Reg., Vol. 68, #107, 4 June 2003.