The social welfare reform during the progressive regimes of South Korea: Theoretical implications

Abstract

This study assesses the social welfare reform during the progressive regimes of South Korea (hereafter Korea) led by President Kim Dae-Jung (1998–2003) and President Roh Moo-Hyun (2003–2008), and considers its theoretical implications. Analysis of the social welfare reform under the two progressive governments has indicated that the reform did not produce the anticipated results. Although the Korean economy has grown rapidly along with a considerable increase in the national income per capita in comparison with that in the past, the country's social welfare system still remains significantly underdeveloped in all respects, relative to that of all the other OECD countries with similar economic power, let alone the advanced welfare states in Western Europe. This study maintains that the key reason for the inertia or status quo despite the significant efforts of both the governments to expand social welfare is explained in the Korean growth-first doctrine, which inherently considers that distribution hinders growth and that social policy is secondary to economic policy, thus limiting the choices of the country's decision makers, as has been the case all along since the developmental period. Given that the growth-first doctrine inherently regarded the relationship between growth and welfare as mutually exclusive, it was perhaps natural that the influence of the doctrine upon the social welfare policy of both the progressive governments would not be so positive. This suggests that path dependence is active in the case of the Korean social welfare policy, thus substantiating the validity of path-dependence theory.

Notes

1 Thus far, no study has been conducted using the concept of path dependence to explain the reasons behind the rigidity of the Korean welfare system both inside and outside Korea, except for Lee (2005) and Kim and Kim (2006). Therefore, this study provides additional sources of information and insights to the existing studies on Korean social welfare.

2 Wilensky and Lebeaux (1958) first introduced the terms ‘residual’ and ‘institutional.’ In the residual model, the role of state is highly restricted, while the individual, the family, the voluntary sector, and the private market economy become the optimal means of meeting needs and redistributing resources. Public services, as such, are provided only as a last resort after clear evidence that all other avenues of support have been exhausted. The assistance offered is usually restricted to a limited amount of financial assistance and is regularly means-tested. Even in these limited cases, the primary goal of state intervention is to maximize individual autonomy, usually through paid work. In the institutional framework, however, the state assumes a larger role, while at the same time offering a broader range of services that are neither restricted to a small proportion of the population (i.e., the poor or disadvantaged) nor are they regularly means-tested.