Moral dialogs

Abstract

Moral dialogs are social processes through which people form new shared moral understandings. They differ from reasoned deliberations because they are focused on values and not on facts, logic or reason. They differ from irrational passions because value statements require moral justifications. Such dialogs take place not just in families and communities, but often on national levels and sometimes even on transnational ones. They played a core role in major societal changes brought about by social movements, such as those that advanced civil rights, women's rights, and the protection of the environment. Most importantly, when successfully concluded, moral dialogs affect not just attitudes and values, but also voluntary behavior as well as laws. Although dialogs may differ greatly in their normative content, they have the same basic sociological format and follow the same basic ‘natural history.’ The article introduces the author's conception of what constitutes moral dialogs by drawing on available evidence, and provides a framework for additional research on the subject at hand.

Keywords:

• Emotion
• Reason
• Shared moral understanding
• Social movements

Notes

1 On the concept of nonrationality, see Talcott Parsons's action theory in The Structure of Social Action (New York: Free Press, 1949) and Max Weber's distinction between Zweckrationalität and Wertrationalität in Economy and Society, eds. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978).

2 Data Source: Google Trends (http://www.google.com/trends).

3 See Sen, 1977; Thaler, 2015; Kahneman, 2013; Simon, 1997 (Herbert Alexander). 1997.

4 The well-taken arguments that follow, deal with related but different issues. Thus Porpora et al. critique the intuitionists for making a “distinction between rationality and emotionality” that is “too sharp.” Emotion and reason are not opposite, they argue. Instead, emotions are “judgments” and thus “are susceptible to argument” (2013, p. 53). Arlene Stein asserts that “[e]motions do have a logic…” (2001, p. 117). And according to Jasper, “to the extent that [emotions] are collectively shaped, depend on context, and are based on cognitions (themselves changeable through learning), they do not appear irrational. (1998, p. 403).

5 For some extra examples, see Michael LaBossiere, Moral Methods, 2012.

6 On the emotional role of Brown v. Board of Education (1954), see Jeff Goodwin, James M. Jasper, and Francesa Polletta (eds.), Passionate Politics: Emotions and Social Movements (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2001), 7–8.