Analysis of monitoring and limiting of commercial cheating: a newsvendor model

Abstract

Commercial cheating, that is, counterfeit products and lower quality products sold as genuine products, exists extensively in many countries of the world, especially in the developing countries. In this paper, we investigate the phenomena of commercial cheating, study the optimal cheating actions of inventory managers under a monitoring and limiting regime from the industrial administration office (IAO for short) and demonstrate the efficiency of monitoring and limiting such cheating activities. A newsvendor model has been considered for the inventory manager to order different quality products with different set-up costs. The model, a kind of extension of the general newsvendor problem, is viewed as a shocked inventory model. We analyse some properties of the optimal cheating policies from the point of view of an inventory manager, and investigate the effectiveness of both the punishment level and the checking rate.

Keywords:

• inventory
• counterfeit
• optimal policy
• checking rate

Acknowledgements

We thank the anonymous referees for their valuable comments that helped improve this paper. This paper was supported partially by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grants 60274050, 70221001 and 70328001.