The Promise of Prediction Contests

Abstract

This article examines the prediction contest as a vehicle for aggregating the opinions of a crowd of experts. After proposing a general definition distinguishing prediction contests from other mechanisms for harnessing the wisdom of crowds, we focus on point-forecasting contests—contests in which forecasters submit point forecasts with a prize going to the entry closest to the quantity of interest. We first illustrate the incentive for forecasters to submit reports that exaggerate in the direction of their private information. Whereas this exaggeration raises a forecaster's mean squared error, it increases his or her chances of winning the contest. And in contrast to conventional wisdom, this nontruthful reporting usually improves the accuracy of the resulting crowd forecast. The source of this improvement is that exaggeration shifts weight away from public information (information known to all forecasters) and by so doing helps alleviate public knowledge bias. In the context of a simple theoretical model of overlapping information and forecaster behaviors, we present closed-form expressions for the mean squared error of the crowd forecasts which will help identify the situations in which point forecasting contests will be most useful.

• Forecast aggregation
• Forecasting contests
• Public knowledge bias
• Wisdom of crowds