The well-ordered universe: the philosophy of Margaret Cavendish

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Notes

1 Both 1655 and 1663 editions of Philosophical and Physical Opinions, ch. 34 talk about rational spirits as a society, but the description of creatures as ‘associations’ or ‘societies’ is virtually absent from 1664's Philosophical Letters and both the 1666 and 1668 editions of Observations upon Experimental Philosophy before appearing again, now very prominently, in Grounds of Natural Philosophy, in some respects a third edition of Philosophical and Physical Opinions. The term ‘society’ in the relevant sense also appears in a passage present in both editions of Natures Pictures (p. 310 of the 1656 edition; p. 595 of the 1671 edition).

2 Margaret Cavendish, Grounds of Natural Philosophy (London, 1668), Appendix 4.9, p. 289.

3 Margaret Cavendish, Grounds of Natural Philosophy (London, 1668), Appendix 1.10, p. 246.

4 Margaret Cavendish, Observations upon Experimental Philosophy, ed. by Eileen O'Neill (Cambridge, 2001), 35.13, p. 139.

5 Margaret Cavendish, Philosophical Letters, or, Modest Reflections upon Some Opinions in Natural Philosophy Maintained by Several Famous and Learned Authors of this Age, Expressed by Way of Letters (London, 1664), 2.4, pp. 144–5. Spelling in quotations is sometimes modernized, as here, without notice.

6 Cf. Margaret Cavendish, Grounds of Natural Philosophy (London, 1668), Appendix 2.1, p. 253.

7 Margaret Cavendish, Observations upon Experimental Philosophy, ed. by Eileen O'Neill (Cambridge, 2001), 1.12, p. 64.

8 Margaret Cavendish, Philosophical Letters, or, Modest Reflections upon Some Opinions in Natural Philosophy Maintained by Several Famous and Learned Authors of this Age, Expressed by Way of Letters (London, 1664), 3.41, p. 401.

9 In response to an earlier draft of this review, Boyle (p.c.) says that she understands the passages to make a similar point because she takes ‘proper’ and ‘natural’ to mean the same thing for Cavendish. I hope the main text makes clear how I take ‘natural’ and ‘proper’ to differ in meaning.

10 Margaret Cavendish, Observations upon Experimental Philosophy, ed. by Eileen O'Neill (Cambridge, 2001), 1.12, p. 64.

11 Margaret Cavendish, Observations upon Experimental Philosophy, ed. by Eileen O'Neill (Cambridge, 2001), 1.12, p. 64.

12 Margaret Cavendish, Philosophical and Physical Opinions (London, 1655), ‘An Epistle to Condemning Readers,’ p. 26. See also ibid., 1.27, p. 10; 1.30, p. 11.

13 Margaret Cavendish, Grounds of Natural Philosophy (London, 1668), 6.5, p. 75.

14 Thanks are due to Deborah Boyle, Boris Demarest, Marcy Lascano, Kristopher Phillips, and Maks Sipowicz for their helpful responses to an earlier draft of this review, and to Oliver Hill-Andrews for his guidance, patience and editorial assistance.

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Funding

This work was supported by Fonds Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek [12V1418N].